

Civil Society, Democratic Governance and Development: The Case of Pakistan

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Abstract

The civil society in Pakistan largely comprises NGOs, professional organizations and trade unions. The number of NGOs has been steadily rising in Pakistan, but the boom came in the 1980s. The performance of the NGOs has been commended as well as condemned. NGOs have been trying to ensure good governance, despite many problems inherent in the sector itself, emerging from their dependence on donors, internal management, lack of trust of the people, and political pressures. The government-NGOs relations have been strained at times. Other components of the civil society have been active only occasionally. On the whole the civil society in Pakistan has remained a weak entity if compared with other countries of South Asia. Therefore, it's most significant area of operation – ensuring democracy – has also been deficient. The weakness of both the civil society and democracy has been deep-rooted. The paper is aimed at analyzing the interface among the major issues of social development, and limitations of the civil society organizations. This paper is based on primary data collected about role of the NGOs, from the NGO functionaries and social experts, along with using secondary sources about the role of civil society as a whole.

Introduction

The Pakistani society is undergoing an enormous change in almost all areas of its existence. However, the pace of change is varied and one may notice stark contrasts existing with each other. There are tribal institutions operating side by side with the transnational corporations. The globalized economic structures are functioning in the presence of feudal mode of production. The old is certainly dwindling to give way to the new; the process seems to be a complex one and thus the comprehension of this phenomenon is also not so simple. The role of both governmental and non-governmental actors has been important in this regard. The quality of governance has also been varying, yet, if judged from the perspective of realizing the ideals of equitable and

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sustainable development and prosperity, has largely remained on the weaker side. Democracy has not been fully realized yet, and achievements of Pakistan in democratic governance are also not satisfactory.¹ The state itself has been quite lacking in providing basic needs and security to all the citizens. If one looks at the civil society as a counter-veiling force to the excesses the state, on the other hand, as a critic of its failures, Pakistan yet has to go miles to be able to claim that it has a vibrant civil society. Being a poor nation, according to the UNDP ranking, Pakistan has to rely heavily on whatever resources – human, organizational, physical, or cultural – it has for becoming a really independent and prosperous nation.

This paper delineates the argument that a vibrant civil society is crucial for maintaining a pace of development which is normally expected of a democratic polity. This assertion, of course, cannot be free of contextual factors, such as the level of development of the society, infrastructure for delivering development goals, nature of the state apparatus, dominant approaches towards development, and socio-demographic characteristics of the population. In this context, Pakistan being an underdeveloped country, with a high incidence of poverty, and having different sets of socio-cultural norms in various regions, presents an interesting case for study. The circular argument of ‘a weak democracy leading to a weak civil society and *vice versa*’ can lead us nowhere. However, in a fast changing socio-political milieu and under the influence of information revolution, one cannot expect that the demand for democracy would be less significant or made in a casual manner, even in a poor country. Rather Pakistan is a country where democracy has been idealized, despite the fact that it has been mostly governed by un-democratic and dictatorial regimes. Even, such regimes have tried to adopt a democratic façade for a certain length of time in order to satisfy the popular demand for democracy. There have been large movements of the civil society for restoration of democracy, so it is hard to say that democracy is not embedded in the societal norms or ethos. One can, though, point out certain features of the polity which have been persistently hampering democratic governance, yet these cannot belittle the useful linkages between the working of the civil society and the process of development, negotiated through the institutions both in the governmental and non-governmental sectors.

¹ This has been documented and analyzed by SDSA Team, *State of Democracy in South Asia, A Report* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008). The report confirms a widespread aspiration for democracy, giving rise to new demands but it fails to meet them.

This paper particularly focuses the role of NGOs in enhancing development and creating awareness about socio-political rights of the masses. Both of these goals are interlinked, and have an interface with the issues of democratic governance in Pakistan. The first part of the paper explains the concepts of civil society, NGOs and democratic governance. It also explains the nature of state and issues of democratic governance in Pakistan. The second part is based on quantitative and qualitative analysis of data collected to judge the contribution of the NGOs towards realizing the cherished ideals of development and democracy. The data presented in tables and graphs, is based on an unpublished study made by the author. One conclusion drawn from this study is that the issues of democratic governance and development of NGO sector have a good deal of similarity, yet the NGO sector and other civil society organizations are trying to expand their own space, and the space for democracy, too.

Methodology

This paper presents findings of a survey. It has two sections; the first one is based on secondary sources, and the second one draws upon primary data collected through the survey. The first group of respondents comprised 120 NGO functionaries representing 93 NGOs, which have been working in all the four provinces, Federal Capital Area and Azad Kashmir. There were 3 international, 34 national, and 56 provincial/local level NGOs. They were asked to respond to questions with reference to their own NGOs. The second group of respondents included 60 social experts, selected to elicit their views on the performance of the NGO sector as a whole. They included 27 social scientists, 15 human rights activists, 11 journalists and 7 government employees of the social welfare department. They responded to the same matrix of questions as the NGO functionaries did, except for a few additional questions. Both the groups of respondents were asked to judge the contribution of the NGOs towards social change, development, democratic values and prospects for NGOs in Pakistan. The indicators were drawn in the context of modernization theory, dependency theory and the world-systems theory. Selected data from this study is presented in this paper in tables and figures.

I

Theoretical framework

a. Defining civil society

The modern social science literature assumes three major divisions of the society: state, business, and the voluntary/non-profit sector, also called the 'third sector'. The three are linked together. The elements usually

counted in the third sector are called ‘civil society’, as well as non-state actors. The liberal school of thought presents civil society as an arena of social relations whereas the Marxist theory explains the way economic contexts and relationships determine a civil society.² According to Haynes, civil society encompasses ‘the collectivities of non-state organizations, interest groups and associations – such as trade unions, professional associations, further and higher education students and religious bodies, and the media – which collectively help maintain a check on the power and totalizing tendency of the state.’³ A range of development organizations, and welfare and rehabilitation organizations, included in it are grouped together to be named as ‘NGOs’ (non-governmental organizations), while the rest of the list is also non-governmental in nature, but customarily not called ‘NGOs’. According to James, the non-state actors may include a large number of diverse elements, some of them are known as ‘voluntary agencies, action groups, grass roots organizations, non-governmental organizations, non-governmental development organizations, international development cooperation institutions, private philanthropic foundations, non-party political formations’.⁴ These are largely voluntary and service-oriented organizations and they lay emphasis on an approach ensuring them the identity of being people-centered and participatory organizations.

Generally the NGOs are supposed to be non-political as per rules in Pakistan, but the action groups engaged in right-based activities are definitely and compulsorily political even if they do not claim to be. The implications of development and welfare also reveal ‘empowerment’ of a certain level resulting out of such activities, which means that all such activities, are political to a certain extent. This is basically an anomaly with the registration law, which demands the non-governmental organizations to be apolitical, and that assurance has rarely affected NGOs’ work to empower people, as their history shows. However, the onslaught of the state on the NGOs in Pakistan has been largely due to the same ‘empowering functions’ which enables people to challenge the established power structures. It is also due to the NGOs’ open criticism of government policies and actions, and demands for a favorable change

² Oscar Rojas, ‘The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Sustainable Development’, in, CIVICUS, *Civil Society at the Millennium* (West Hartford (Connecticut): 2005), First South Asian Edition, p.88.

³ Jeff Haynes, *Democracy and Civil Society in the Third World Politics and New Political Movements* (Malden (USA): Polity Press, 1997), p.16.

⁴ P.J. James, *Non-Governmental Voluntary Organisations, The True Mission* (Kollam Ketel: Mass Line Publications, 1995), p.1.

from the powerful ranks of the society. The non-state actors also include action groups and pressure groups, which sometimes operate like NGOs.⁵

b. Evolution of civil society

Historically, the fall of communist regime in the Soviet Union triggered and facilitated many changes in the world social and political systems. This engendered a change which transformed the state-civil society relations. The new set of relations, also called ‘co-governance’, meant ‘that power is no longer concentrated in the State. The State and its instruments of government remain of central importance; but it is no longer the sole actor in determining the direction of society.’⁶ One of the significant developments has been the introduction of neo-liberal thinking. In the post-1989 world, according to Zaidi:

Market-friendliness, privatization, deregulation, devolution, and democracy are now the key cliches forming the mix (and fix) for societies that have hitherto been deviant from the norm adhered to in the West. With the demise of the bipolar world, the unipolar world now sees itself as an elongated extension of the West to the non-West. The measuring rod for success and achievement is now the ability to ape developed western countries, in order to make development ‘sustainable’. Governance, democracy, and devolution form a critical union to make development sustainable, and are said to manifest the key prerequisites for progress.⁷

Zaidi also explains that in the post-1989 world, devolution became a buzz word, declaring participation as a means to progress. Khan describes four stated objectives of devolution as: 1) building real democracy, 2) empowering institutional structure, 3) cost-effective

⁵ NGOs usually have defined objectives, vision and mission, some governing body or key individuals deciding the matters, and some program for work. To fulfill the registration prerequisites, they have to organize themselves, whereas pressure groups are loosely formed and sometimes do not operate regularly but only when the need arises. One famous example in Pakistan is that of WAF (Women Action Forum), which is often mistaken as an NGO.

⁶ Ezra Mbogori and Hope Chigudu, ‘Civil Society and Government: A Continuum of Possibilities’, in CIVICUS, *op.cit.*, p.109.

⁷ S. Akbar Zaidi, *The New Development Paradigm Papers on Institutions, NGOs, Gender and Local Government* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.4.

service delivery, and, 4) justice at the doorstep.⁸ Under the devolution policies adopted by the Musharraf regime in Pakistan, a bigger role was delegated to the local tiers of government, private sector and the NGOs for development, therefore, the state structures based on centralization started dismantling and weakening. Zaidi explains that ‘... the need for less bureaucracy, more efficient and timely delivery of services, and a closer and more direct access to the beneficiaries of development-related projects, have become an important consideration in this shift in thinking and strategy’.⁹

Spread of democracy was another important development of the post-1989 years, since many military regimes in the Third World countries and the command economies in the East European countries were replaced with democratic regimes. With rising devolution, more powers were delegated to the districts and municipal level governments. On the economic front, the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s reduced the role of the government. During the implementation of financial policies and amidst crises of the 1980s and the 1990s, more budget cuts and cuts in grants to lower level governments, caused another source of pressure for the state to open up the social sector development to the private sector and the NGOs. Thus the decades of 1980s and the 1990s, saw an unprecedented growth and an increasing role of the non-governmental sector in development and planning. Ultimately it was a shift towards more democratization of the society hence real participation of the civil society groups was enhanced. They ‘demanded and obtained, new constitutions, and decentralized and local governments. The role of non-governmental organizations as important players in ‘civil society’ in these more mature states also helped to increase participation, with more control and involvement by organized groups’.¹⁰ By time, the government’s role became more active as a facilitator instead of a provider. The years after 1975 saw a series of awareness programs which resulted in a demand for realization of democratic and civil rights. To achieve that, civil society organizations grew in number, and they particularly took up the task of advocacy for human rights. It goes without saying that the governments of an authoritarian state could have never done that. Various other projects taken up by the NGOs focused upon service delivery as well, thus they

⁸ Shahrukh Rafi Khan, ‘Promoting Democratic Governance: The Case of Pakistan’, *The European Journal of Development Research*, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 92.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.4-5.

¹⁰ S.Akbar Zaidi, *op.cit.*, p.7.

helped in development – a need much more easily realized by the people than the need for awareness-raising or advocacy for rights.

The state has been receding and among its reasons were included its inefficiency and corruption. The output of development aid given to the governments for many decades was not found satisfactory, thus the approach of donors was changed. Since the day donors started insisting on giving fund directly to the NGOs, and not through the government, the NGOs have become, for some people, a lucrative business. Moreover, the access to the state, whoever enjoys it, is manipulated successfully to divert fund to their own NGOs, hence a large number of NGOs are run by retired bureaucrats, politicians or politically well-connected persons. This issue has direct linkage with the question of democratic governance and NGOs.

Situating the emergence of civil society in the 1990s in Pakistan, Pasha refers to its potential as: ‘the expansion of civil society means democratic advance’, but he also warns of a blind faith in it, because ‘While promising new channels of ‘interest articulation’ and personal freedom, civil society also congeals a new form of social power which requires a stronger, not weaker, state to counteract. The prospects of democracy are, for better or worse, depending upon the manner in which civil society is stabilized by the state, ...’¹¹ thus democracy is having a synergic effect for civil society.

Analyzing the structure and function of the civil society in Pakistan, Sattar and Baig explain the conception of civil society that is generally accepted in Pakistan, and which, to them is:

‘... an umbrella term for a range of non-state and non-market citizen organisations and initiatives, networks and alliances operating in a broad spectrum of social, economic and cultural fields. These include formal institutions such as ... nongovernmental organisations, trade unions, professional associations, philanthropies, academia, independent and quasi-independent pressure groups, think tanks, and traditional, informal formations such as faith-based organisations, shrines, seminaries, neighbourhood associations, burial societies, ... and savings groups’.¹²

¹¹ Mustapha Kamal Pasha, ‘The ‘Hyper-Extended’ State: Civil Society and Democracy’ in, Rasul Bakhsh Rais (ed.), *State, Society, and Democratic Change in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.185-6.

¹² Adnan Sattar and Rabia Baig, *Civil Society in Pakistan* (Karachi, NGORC, 2001), p.11.

Moreover, the authors opine that Pakistan's civil society is made up of hybrid forms, different kinds of inheritances and 'unresolved struggle between the practices and values of pre-capitalist society and new modes of social life, between authoritarian legacies and democratic aspirations'. They add that cultural manifestations of this civil society appear as 'a collection of incoherent voices, conflicting worldviews and opposing interests'. Moreover, old social forms of *jirga*, neighbourhood associations and shrines have been operative since centuries, while many new groups have also emerged. 'Such are the dynamics of an evolving civil society, caught between the throes of a dying social order and the birth pangs of a new one'.¹³

c. Democratic governance

The World Bank defines governance as 'the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources. It involves 'the exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society's problems and affairs'.¹⁴ According to the UNDP, 'democratic governance refers to the management of societal affairs in accordance with the universal principles of democracy as a system of rules that maximizes popular consent and participation, the legitimacy and accountability of rulers, and the responsiveness of the latter to the expressed interests and needs of the public'.¹⁵ The UNDP has identified three major characteristics of democratic governance as follows. (a) Democratic governance itself is 'a moral imperative consistent with the permanent aspiration of human beings for freedom and for a better social and political order, one that is more humane and more or less egalitarian'. (b) It is 'a continuous process of expanding the political space to ensure for everyone equal access to basic rights and liberties'. (c) It is a 'form of political practice based on universal principles of rule of law, popular legitimacy, participation and the accountability and alternance of rulers'.¹⁶ Good governance is an expansive concept of governance and democratic governance. According to the UNIFEM, the concept prescribes an

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ http://www-ds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSCContentServer/WDSP/I/B/2006/03/07/000090341_20060307104630/Rendered/PDF/34899.pdf accessed 5-9-2010.

¹⁵ <http://undp.org.pk/>, accessed 14-10-2010.

¹⁶ http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs04/DEMOCRATIC_GOVERNANCE_AND_HUMAN%20RIGHTS_IN_THE_INTERNATIONAL_FRAMEWORK.pdf accessed 5-9-2010.

agenda for participation, human rights and social justice. It highlights the nature of social relations which undermine women's capacity to take part in public decisions and call for reforms in governance which are gender-neutral, in order to avoid reproducing existing patterns of exclusion and gender biases and policies of exclusion in the affairs of public management.¹⁷

Following the same lines, a group of Canadian agencies (2006)¹⁸ has explained democratic governance in terms of 'two of the main pillars of the liberal democratic tradition: citizen participation in the determination of government itself and in the broader decision-making processes by which communities are governed; and a rights 'platform' that supports and protects the role of individuals and minorities in the governance process'.¹⁹ In this sense it is a democratic polity which could guarantee participation of people in decision making at the governmental level. Moreover, governance is ensured by local associations, voluntary or non-governmental organizations, and other networks of the civil society. All these agencies help the masses in voicing their concern and taking active part in deciding the issues, at least the ones which are bound to affect an individual's life. The issues of 'supporting' and 'protecting' rights to participate, especially those of the disadvantaged groups (religious and indigenous ethnic minorities, labour, peasants, women, children, prisoners, disabled, sick, elderly, etc.), certainly need platforms to address them. In today's world, these platforms are provided by the civil society organizations and media organizations, which of course are gaining strength in this age of cultural globalization and information revolution. The very easily identifiable agents for such activities are NGOs, who have been engaged in the field of rights of the disadvantaged groups in a large number. This paper has particularly focused the role of NGOs in ensuring democratic governance in Pakistan. Undoubtedly, the NGO sector here is linked with global agents

¹⁷ 'Good Governance—a Gender-Responsive Definition', http://www.unifem.org/progress/2008/whoFS_box1a.html, accessed 5-9-2010.

¹⁸ 'Elements of Democratic Governance' Discussion Paper, June 2006, <http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/assets/pdfs/cip-pic/library/Discussion%20Paper%20-%20Elements%20of%20Democratic%20Governance.pdf>, p.2, accessed 4-9-2010. This paper reflects discussions amongst the Democracy Council including: Elections Canada, International Development Research Council, Parliamentary Centre, Forum of Federations, National Judicial Institute, Rights and Democracy, Canadian International Development Agency, and Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

of change, global civil society organizations, and global governance agencies. Thus, in an environment, in which ‘some core liberal democratic values are taken to have intrinsic merit and [are taken as] to be universal in scope,’²⁰ one should expect these values to bring about ‘peace, security, prosperity, and development dividends ... while the participation and protection of individuals, aforementioned as basic elements of governance, are taken to be valuable in their own right, and are increasingly perceived as key components of state legitimacy’.²¹ A discussion paper focusing ‘Elements of Democratic Governance’, provides an insight into the challenges faced by democracy, and points out that if democracy is young it cannot deliver. The assertion is worth consideration in the case of Pakistan, as is discussed below.

State, governance and civil society in Pakistan

The two interrelated concepts – state being the actor and governance being its action – need to be understood together because the qualities of state are bound to reflect in its action. State in Pakistan, needs to be understood in its two aspects: the nature/structure of the state, and the functioning of the state. Regarding nature of the state in Pakistan, Malik asserts that it is inherently centralized, denying participatory politics owing to its colonial heritage. Here the rural based chiefs, known as *waderas*, *jagirdars*, or *pirs*, have been acting as intermediaries between the people and the state. They have been taking political parties as ‘convenient vehicles for the promotion of narrow dynastic interests’.²² One can imagine, such vested interest groups cannot allow any emancipating process among the masses, be it mass education, migration, integration within the globalized economy and culture, awareness about gender injustices, promotion of modern media, infusion of urban-political tendencies, or growing political activism in their rural bases.²³ According to Malik, the ‘thin basis of Pakistan’s state structure’ has been exposed. This state has characteristics of a typical Third World state, because it generously allocates to non-development sectors, leaves the vital social sectors in doldrums, hence damages the basis of the civil society. The state, often, had also not been willing to accept the verdict of the electorates, while on the other hand those who enjoyed this electoral legitimacy, when formed governments, they were never really

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Iftikhar H. Malik, ‘Ethnic Politics in Sindh’, in Rasul Bukhsh Rais (ed.), *op.cit.*, p.161.

²³ *Ibid.*

allowed to be 'in power' thus they were dismissed very soon, on various pretexts.

Anyhow, it has happened in Pakistan that as a result of the actions of the state, as well as non-state agencies and certain international factors, urban middle class and the bourgeoisie started establishing itself, and the rural communities established closer contacts with the urban communities and this process started changing the traditional state structures. In the mean time, the middle class professionals, industrialists and technocrats started to make their way into the political leadership at local and national levels.

Pakistan is a highly diversified country. Regarding its function, the state here faces the challenge of creating harmony and maintaining a social order which could fulfill the aspirations of peoples, who belong to different ethnicities, are in different social structures, at different levels of development, and follow different sociopolitical norms. The elitist state preserves ethnic distinctions, and contrary to a pluralist system fails to promote accountability. Rais explains that the Pakistani politicians have been socialized in an environment having two parallel political ideologies of dictatorship and democracy. He comments that:

Politicians of all shades and opinion, though with varying degrees of commitment, subscribe to the democratic principles of government—constitutionalism, individual freedom, competitive politics and peaceful change. This is not to suggest that when in power, or even out of it, they have strictly upheld these principles; quite often they have not. But philosophically, they are a distinct political category as they seek power through a democratic process and on the basis of popular legitimacy.²⁴

Some significant questions about feasibility of democratic governance in Pakistan, relate to the fact that democracy itself has been questioned in Pakistan as a viable style of polity.²⁵ Thus 'state formation, fissiparous tendencies, and fall-out from inter-ethnic dissensions have undermined efforts for democratization and centralization. To a greater degree, the recurring dilemma of Pakistan's governability is rooted in the dichotomous relationship between an all-powerful, ever-transcendent, and vetoing state structure and a feeble, ill-organized, and vulnerable civil society'.

The discourse on state and development has been elaborating the dynamics of political economy which involves non-state actors evolved

²⁴ Rasul Bukhsh Rais (ed.), *op.cit.*, Introduction. xiii.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

in the past. Sobhan (2002) highlights the role of state as an important factor in development outcomes.²⁶ He explains that the steel frame of the British colonial Raj was inherited by the bureaucracy in South Asian civil services. Alavi (2002) explains that the growing size of the state machinery took over the neocolonial societies, but this unnecessarily hyper control of bureaucracy and military over economic classes is an outcome of colonial Raj. These two institutions are not answerable to any one, and no evidence of corruption was found in these institutions under the colonial administration.²⁷ But in the post-colonial stage, the military bureaucracy alliance has been instrumental in promoting corruption at all levels of government, especially at the middle and lower levels of government, since the state policies and programs can be implemented only with the assistance of bureaucracy. Alavi adds that such officers misuse their powers unabatedly, and curb the activities related to expression and dialogue in the public meetings. They also set irrational priorities and invite foreign experts to formulate monetary and financial policies which are deleterious for the economy at large. These officers have wasted a great deal of national resources. Public-service institutions can be established only with enormous amount of effort, commitment and diligence, while they can be destroyed easily. In this context, it is unfortunate because the civil-military bureaucratic alliance is incapable of building new institutions.²⁸ Ahmed elaborates the process of formation of the alliance of civil military bureaucracy in Pakistan, and shows how this alliance has played pivotal role in making the state

²⁶ Rehman Sobhan, 'State and Governance as Factors in Development: In Search of a Theory', in S. M. Naseem and Khalid Nadvi (eds.), *The Post-Colonial State and Social Transformation in India and Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.3-19.

²⁶ Hamza Alavi, trans. Tahir Kamran, *Pakistan Riyasat Aur ooska Bohran* (Lahore: Fiction House, 2002), pp.12-3. The article was written in 1972 and appeared first as, 'The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma (eds.), *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia* (New York/London: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp.145-73.

²⁷ Even till August 1959, corruption was not detected in higher bureaucracy. Anwar Iqbal Qureshi, *Economic History of Pakistan* (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1978), p.262.

²⁸ Hamza Alavi, trans. Tahir Kamran, *Pakistan Riyasat..., op.cit.*, pp.12-3. The article was written in 1972 and appeared first as, 'The State in Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', in Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma (eds.), *Imperialism and Revolution...,* pp.145-73.

highly centralized, autocratic and authoritarian.²⁹ Both the military and bureaucracy have antithetical relations with democracy, thus an over-centralized state under bureaucratic decisions kept shadowing the democratic features of the polity.

A number of political economists have tried to explain how the social forces which dominate the state try to design the development strategies which could serve their own interests. However, with changing composition or control of these forces, the development strategies can also be changed. Alavi has written at length about how the post-colonial state has been instrumental for accumulating sufficient power within the state apparatus which has led to the growth of certain classes.³⁰ Sobhan explains this in the context of South Asia.³¹

In his effort to summarize the theories and models explaining relationship of the state and development, Sobhan concludes that the dynamics of successful development remains unexplained. So he holds that: 'We have given these forces driving successful development the name of 'governance'. It is the absence of any understanding of the dynamic of governance that thus leaves development literature in search of a satisfactory theory of governance'.³² Sobhan also discusses aid dependency as a significant outcome of the donors' help coming to the post-colonial state in non-socialist developing countries. He explains that higher the ratio of foreign aid, greater was the power of the state, which gradually grew its power over the traditional and prospective elite groups. Feroz Ahmed holds that foreign aid to Pakistan has been a device of safeguarding imperialist interests in the region and this dependence on foreign aid has kept Pakistan in a perpetual state of backwardness.³³ It is partially true for Pakistan, that land became no more a source of

²⁹ Syed Jaffar Ahmed, 'Defeating Independence: Genesis of Authoritarian State in Pakistan', *Pakistan Perspectives*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp.92-107, and, 'Consolidation of Authoritarianism in Pakistan: 1951-58', *Pakistan Perspectives*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.49-77.

³⁰ See Hamza Alavi, *op.cit.*, for the articles, 'Nauabadiyati Mo'ashron mein Riyasati Control: Pakistan aur Bangladesh', 'Pakistan mein Mutlaq-ul-Ananiyat aur Riyasati Iqtidar ka Jawaz', and 'Riyasat Bohran ki Zad mein'.

³¹ Rehman Sobhan, R., *op.cit.* p.6.

³² *Ibid.*, p.17.

³³ Feroz Ahmed, translated and upaccessed by Kashif Faraz Ahmed, *Samraj aur Pakistan 1947 say 2002 tak* (Lahore: Takhleeqat, 2003). Its Chapter Two discusses this issue at length while other chapters explain how this process took place since 1954.

differentiation and sociopolitical power,³⁴ however new elites emerged who were empowered due to their links with the state.³⁵ Interestingly these elites have been actively engaged in running NGOs, or at least patronizing them. While the hired staff is actually doing the work, the guidance, vision, policies, budgeting, and decision-making is controlled by these NGO elites.

Programs like structural adjustment have been disempowering the state in the Third World, but according to Sobhan, ‘a disempowered state with access to a large volume of aid offers as an inducement to its disempowerment, rapidly degenerates into a predatory state, where state bureaucrats evolve into private entrepreneurs, often without retiring from service, and use their command over the disposition of aid funds for self-enrichment rather than state empowerment’.³⁶ Following the explanations by Alavi about the role of the state in class formation, Sobhan also points out that state has become a source of empowerment and class formation, because through its control over resources and policy intervention the state has stimulated growth of capitalist bourgeoisie. Sobhan holds that:

This process of state empowerment was encouraged by the aid donors, channeling aid to and through the state, which was transmitted to privileged factions of the bourgeoisie through the development finance institutions (DFI). Aid-driven patronage to the new bourgeoisie, in the form of project contracts, commission agencies, consultancies, etc all served to empower the state and make accessibility to the state the critical route to financial advancement for individuals, and eventually, classes.³⁷

Democratic governance and NGOs

The experience of Pakistan regarding democratic governance has been miserable owing to the factors highlighted above. One of its dimensions – realization of human rights of the citizens – has been a terrible mess. The details are available in the media reports, scholarly books and

³⁴ A well-rounded debate on the issue is found in *Pakistan Perspectives*, Special Issue: Feudalism in Pakistan, Vol. 8, Nos. 1 & 2, January-December 2003. The predominant view is that feudalism is not dwindling in its power, but certain notes of difference are also presented in it.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.4-9.

³⁶ Rehman Sobhan, *op.cit.*, p.14.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.9.

particularly in the reports of human rights organizations.³⁸ The issue of non-Muslims' rights as citizens of the state of Pakistan has also been a very complicated one, presenting a dismal picture due to the ideological tilt of the state and the consequent formation of socio-religious groups and networks in the country. The state has, no doubt, played a highly questionable role regarding protection of the minorities in Pakistan if one looks into the history of their sufferings since 1947. Women, as a traditionally dominated section of population in a highly patriarchal culture, have been at disadvantage due to a number of state policies which have been patriarchal in essence since the colonial time. Though women were granted certain rights through legislations in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, their overall status remained poor due to overwhelmingly oppressive cultures, and bias inherent in the social institutions. Undoubtedly, both the civil-military bureaucracy, and the ever-growing religious section, could not establish their intentions and inclination for the uplift of women to the satisfaction of the women rights groups or the international community. That was the environment in which the international movement for women's rights started creating ripples since the mid 1970s. In the years following 1975, a large number of NGOs were formed to work for women's rights and today the NGO movement in Pakistan has its large contingent working for realizing women's rights which a genuine democratic society should offer. Moreover, the NGO sector in Pakistan has been analyzed in its various dimensions by NGORC,³⁹ AKDN,⁴⁰ Khan,⁴¹ Islam,⁴² and Shaheen,⁴³

³⁸ The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan is one such leading and most respected organization which has produced a volume of literature regarding human rights in Pakistan. Its annual reports (*State of Human Rights in Pakistan*) document such details on yearly basis, while its newsletters disseminate such details periodically in English and Urdu.

³⁹ For details see NGO Resource Centre's studies and surveys about the NGOs. These include: *The State of the Citizen Sector in Pakistan, Sahafat aur Awami Tanzeemain, Civil Society in Pakistan, Samaj kay Rahnuma, Making it Happen*, and quarterly newsletters *NGORC Journal* (English) and *Akhbar* (Urdu), apart from directories about NGOs, and some support material for NGOs and for those working with NGOs.

⁴⁰ AKDN, *Philanthropy in Pakistan, A Profile, Harvesting Philanthropy for Development* (Islamabad: Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy, Monograph Series, 2002).

⁴¹ Mahmood Hasan Khan, *Climbing the Development Ladder with NGO Support* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁴² Zahid Islam, *Logon kay Sath Sath* (Lahore: Citizens' Network for Good Governance, 2001).

among others. Among major contributions of the NGOs to society, the ones particularly mentioned include upholding the rights of the disadvantaged sections and service delivery for basic needs.⁴⁴

The power of media, undeniably growing in the recent decades, has also been curbed at many points of time in Pakistan. It is not a story of military regimes only; it started from the very first year of independence – 1947 – and continues to date. The highhandedness of the government can be checked only by civil society organizations, and among these media has proved itself to be very strong. The chronicles of curbs on the print media, as related by Niazi,⁴⁵ provide ample proof to the fact that the centralized and weak regimes bent upon suppressing the channels of expression for the masses. Such regimes have been in crisis due to many reasons, the want of legitimacy being the foremost; and the fear of rising fissiparous ethnic tendencies being no less important in this matter.

A genuine democracy has to deliver equitable prosperity, development and security. Moreover, it has to impart awareness of rights, and to build and reinforce a mechanism which could lead to realization of a whole range of rights generally acknowledged in that society. NGOs engaged in development, service delivery and right-based activism, can lead the society to a higher level of satisfaction of such needs and provision of goods necessary for a democratic society. In this way they can be a tool of achieving democratic governance. It is estimated that there are about 15,000 NGOs actively working in Pakistan, whereas the total number of non-profit organizations is over 56,000. In a sense, this can be taken to suggest that a process is going on

⁴³ Anwar Shaheen, 'An Analysis of the Public Perception about the NGOs' Problems and Prospects in Pakistan' (Karachi: University of Karachi, Pakistan Study Centre, 2000), unpublished monograph.

⁴⁴ Anwar Shaheen, 'Changing Cultural Patterns in Pakistan: 1972-2006, With Special Reference to the Role and Perceptions of the Non-governmental Actors of Change', University of Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, 2010. PhD. Dissertation, unpublished.

⁴⁵ Zamir Niazi has explained and documented such events in his books, namely: *Press in Chain* (Karachi: Karachi Press Club, 1986), translated as *Sahafat Paaband-e-Salasal* (Karachi: Aaj ki Kitabain, 1994, 1st edn., Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2006, 2nd edn.), *The Press Under Siege* (Karachi: Karachi Press Club, 1992, 1st edn., Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2006, 2nd edn.), *The Web of Censorship* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), and *Fettered Freedom* (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2006, 1st edn.).

to promote democratization. It, however, would be a partial truth only, because an in-depth analysis of the nature of the state, and the government-NGO relations reveal that a section of the NGOs has also been serving the vested interests and is appended to the powerful groups who have linkages with the state institutions. This helps such NGOs to have a continuous inflow of funds for their survival in a political environment where they have to work for development as well as advocacy. Unless they are not embedded in the power echelons NGOs cannot serve as a link between the donors (local, governmental, foreign), and the beneficiaries.

The last three decades of NGO activism in Pakistan show that NGOs have confronted with the state (e.g. the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq) on many issues. These issues included in particular the rights of women, children, minorities, peasants and workers. The lawyers' movement for restoration of judiciary in the year 2008, however, presents a different case. It was led by the bar associations, and supported by a variety of civil society groups, including the NGOs though they were not playing a very prominent role. An analyst describes its reasons to be the non-availability of funds to the NGOs for this purpose, since it is generally understood that NGOs have now become totally fund-driven. They work on an issue as long as funds are available, and defer it when funds for it dry up. This aspect, however, needs further investigation, but one thing is clear, and it is this that voluntarism has weakened and now NGOs are basically project-oriented organizations.⁴⁶ That is why they cannot launch any movement unless they are funded for it. They are not ready to put that amount of effort and show commitment to the public interest which is badly needed in the present day society of Pakistan.⁴⁷ This inaction and weaknesses of the civil society have been elaborated by I.A Rehman⁴⁸ and Ahmed⁴⁹ in their articles.

⁴⁶ These are views of Arif Hasan, who has authored a number of books on social change, and highlighted the role of NGOs, especially the Orangi Pilot Project, a reputed NGO based in Karachi since the early 1980s. Regarding unwillingness of NGOs to fight for women's rights and to protest against abuses of women, similar views were expressed by Tahira Shahid Khan, author of *Beyond Honour* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005).

⁴⁷ This view was expressed by Asma Jahangir, a renowned human rights activist of Pakistan, in her lecture delivered in Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, May 2010.

⁴⁸ I.A. Rehman, 'Civil Society aur ooska Bohran', in Syed Jaffar Ahmed (ed.), *Hamza Wahid aur Jehd-e-Hayat* (Karachi: Irtiqa Institute of Social Sciences, 2007), pp.190-204.

Democratic governance in Pakistan

a. *The fate of democracy in Pakistan*

The post-colonial state in Pakistan adopted many features – laws, institutions, and policies – of the colonial administration. The first constitution of the country was developed nine years after its independence. Out of total 64 years (1947-2011), Pakistan has been under direct military rule for about 33 years, though the military leaders have been changing their postures from military to civilian form, or trying to devolve power to the local levels in order to claim legitimacy and create a constituency for them. When the elected representatives of people were in power, the effective role of army in decision-making was behind the scene, but it was very much there. Pakistan started its journey with a parliamentary form of government, but various governments during the period of 1947-1971 could hardly be characterized as ‘parliamentary democracy’. For the first time a parliamentary system was established following the adoption of 1973 constitution. Asserting this, Alavi (1983) describes that change in the government in the 1950s led to either a ‘civilian coup *d’etat*’, or a military coup *d’etat* (1958). It adopted a civilian character under the military ruler—General Ayub Khan in the post-1962 years, whereas the regime under General Yahya Khan was a military regime though his cabinet included the civilian ministers. The elected government of the PPP (1971-77) weakened the elite character of the bureaucracy, but the army continued to remain a powerful institution; it demonstrated its power and position when it dethroned the PPP government in July 1977. Once in power, the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq tempered with the constitution and made it presidential from a parliamentary one. The General Musharraf regime (1999-2008) did the same. It also changed the constitution from parliamentary to presidential one. It also introduced a devolution plan in 2000. Since the ultimate objective of devolution is to ensure a ‘just, efficient, accountable, transparent, cost-effective and economical (in an aggregate sense) service that promotes democratic governance and enhances human security’,⁵⁰ the devolution plan was welcomed by a sizable section of the civil society.⁵¹ Its success needs to be evaluated in this context, though it is beyond the scope of this paper. The civil society

⁴⁹ Syed Jaffar Ahmed, *Civil Society ki yeh Khamoshi Kiyon?* (Karachi: Pakistan Peace Coalition, 2003).

⁵⁰ Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Foqia Sadiq Khan and Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, *Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan Ignoring the Power Structure* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.6.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.140.

organizations, later on, participated enthusiastically in imparting awareness about, ensuring participation in the local bodies' elections, and enhancing capability of the elected representatives at the grass roots level.

b. Declining power of the state

In the recent two decades, the worsening conditions of security inside and outside the country have put question marks on the competence of the state to hold its territories under control. Since the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, involvement of Pakistan in its affairs and the war against the Soviet forces, and later the situation emerging after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre in the US, have contributed to the weakening of the state's capacity to deliver. It is true regarding human security, development, welfare and uplift of the poor sections, and maintaining law and order in the country, which is essential to ensure success of the development process at work. Abundance of literature is available on growing menace of terrorism, religious extremism, and discrimination on ethnic, gender, sectarian and racial basis. The problems associated with indulgence of the state in a cross-border war are no more confined to the borders. The militancy and lawlessness have been curbing civil liberties and now the state itself is in crisis. It is not able to establish its writ in the areas where the militants have got control. Though the security forces have been launching operations in such areas, the situation is still not under total control. Not only the state of uncertainty, threats to life and property, and fears about future have been checking investments in the country and healthy functioning of the economy, but the very fact of growing militancy and insecurity has rapidly undermined the efforts to combat such anti-development processes.

c. The crisis of democracy in Pakistan

Democracy in Pakistan has been suffering due to many reasons. Alavi (1983, 2002), Feroz Ahmed (2003),⁵² Waseem (2005),⁵³ Kamran (2008),⁵⁴ Masood (2009),⁵⁵ and many others have analyzed the nature of

⁵² Feroz Ahmed, *op.cit.*

⁵³ Mohammad Waseem, 'Causes of Democratic Downslide', in Veena Kukreja and M.P. Singh (eds.), *Pakistan Democracy, Development and Security Issues* (Karachi: Paramount Publishing Enterprise, 2005), pp.39-58.

⁵⁴ Tahir Kamran, *Governance and Development in Pakistan* (Lahore: South Asia Partnership-Pakistan, 2008).

state and the problems of democracy in Pakistan. Mubarak Ali (2009)⁵⁶ has elaborated the crisis in the context of the ideology adopted by the state after the demise of its founder. Qureshi (2005) explains the confusion related to choice between secular or theocratic, and a democratic or militaristic ideology for the state, since ideology defines the very nature of a state. He declares that the threat of describing Pakistan as a failed state is one major reason lying in this confusion of ideology.⁵⁷ Rehman (2009), analyzing the nature of the state in Pakistan, asserts that state in Pakistan was in the image of a colonial state at the time of its creation, where a highly centralized bureaucratic network controlled it. This model lasted only till 1958, when all hopes of democracy were shunned and Pakistan became a garrison state, which also collapsed in 1969. He adds that failure of the state to safeguard its boundaries and its people resulted in its dismemberment in 1971, when it shrunk physically, by losing a part of it, which now is an independent country, Bangladesh.⁵⁸

As major reasons behind democratic failure, one may refer to the high incidence of corruption and denial of merit in government sector employment. Though the parliament is there and an elected government is in the office, yet the challenges faced by the government to ensure the continuity of democratic governance and an unhindered process of development are growing to enormous proportions. The issue of rising militancy in Pakistan due to its involvement in the Afghan war since 1979 and the growing menace of Talibanization have been crucial factors in undermining the state's capacity for democratic governance. These are discussed by various authors, including Jalal (2008),⁵⁹ Masood (2009),⁶⁰ Yousuzai (2009),⁶¹ Siddiqua (2005),⁶² and Ziring (2005).⁶³ In the year

⁵⁵ Wajahat Masood, *Pakistani Riyasat ko Darpesh Bohran* (Karachi: Pakistan Peace Coalition, 2010), Education for Peace Project, Essay No. 9.

⁵⁶ Mubarak Ali, *Pakistan in Search of Identity* (Karachi: Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, 2009).

⁵⁷ Saleem M.M. Qureshi, 'Pakistan: Islamic Ideology and the Failed State?' in Kukreja and Singh (eds.), *op.cit.*, pp.87-107.

⁵⁸ I.A. Rehman, 'Pakistan at 61: Neither a Nation nor a State', *Pakistan Perspectives*, Vol. 14, No. 2, p.19.

⁵⁹ Ayesha Jalal, *Partisans of Allah, Jihad in South Asia* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2008).

⁶⁰ Wajahat Masood, *Taliban ya Jamhooriyat Pakistan Dorahay Par* (Lahore: Nigarshat, 2009).

⁶¹ Aqeel Yousufzai, *Talibanization, Afghanistan say FATA, Swat aur Pakistan tak* (Lahore: Nigarshat, 2009).

2011, one would find Pakistan in the grip of terrorist forces, anti-state elements, which have established their control in large parts of its tribal areas, as well as have infused into the length and breadth of the settled areas. The capacity of the state to exercise authority over the people inhabiting its territory is fast declining. It happened so because in the post-1971 phase the state forsake caring for the interests of the communities and classes inhabiting its territory. It gradually became more and more oppressive; its writ was challenged in Balochistan and FATA. Here one can refer to Rehman's conclusion that, 'Pakistan no longer qualifies as a state as defined in Westphalian papers because it does not have monopoly of power to enforce law and order throughout its territory'.⁶⁴ Therefore, the democratic character of the polity has been dwindling, and the sovereignty of people has been totally lost. Moreover, the state is facing difficulty in delivering what under a democratic order is naturally expected. Thus this role would ultimately be delegated to other sectors of the society. The civil society, no doubt, depending on its vibrancy, has the capacity to maintain a balance in the society. The NGO sector, as a component of it, can ensure good governance, development and human rights, provided it could overcome its own weaknesses which emerge from the environment it works in as well as from its own internal characteristics.

Limitations of the civil society (1980-2010)

The civil society in Pakistan has also been under-developed. The major reasons behind this have primarily been of two types: one related to nature of the state, and the other related to the nature of the society. The state, owing to its authoritarian character, has been suppressing some of the most sincere efforts of the civil society, be it for the religious minorities, human rights, freedom of press or judiciary, or to the plight of the under-privileged. There were also movements launched in favour of peace, and against arms race in the region. Violations of women's rights have been protested off and on. The worth-mentioning achievements of the civil society have been in the domain of women's rights, and to some extent children's rights. Landmark examples from the history of civil society action in Pakistan have been those of the students' and labour movements of the 1960s, 1970s, and the lawyers' movement of the

⁶² Ayesha Siddiqua, 'Pakistan: Political Economy of National Security', in Kukreja and Singh (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp.123-36.

⁶³ Lawrence Ziring, 'Pakistan: Terrorism in Historical Perspective', in Kukreja and Singh (eds.), *ibid.*, pp.168-206.

⁶⁴ I.A. Rehman, *op.cit.*, p.20.

recent years. There have been movements for upholding political rights as well, when the state was outright violating them. The movements against the martial law regime of Ayub Khan in the early and late 1960s, and those against the Bhutto regime, all had their focus upon restoring democracy, thus civil society has been asserting its character as a guardian of democracy at various times.

The development scenario 2012

Pakistan has poor development indicators. It is the sixth largest nation in terms of population—as of 184.7 million in mid year 2011-12— but is 145th in the UNDP ranking of Human Development Index.⁶⁵ According to the UNDP data for 2011, Pakistan's life expectancy has fallen from 67.2 years in 2010 to 65.4 years. While 23 per cent of the total population was undernourished; the government was spending only 0.8 per cent of GDP on health in 2010. Despite high food insecurity situation Pakistan is among the nine countries which will contribute to the half of the world projected population increase, and is expected to have 309 million people by 2050.⁶⁶ The infant mortality rate and maternal mortality rate are among the highest in the region and the world. Combined gross enrolment ratio in education is 39.3 per cent, while mean years of schooling for adults is 4.9. The government was spending 2.9 per cent of GDP on education. The proportion of people living below 1.25 dollar a day was 22.59 per cent. Gender inequality indicators are

⁶⁵ This index called 'HDI represents a push for a broader definition of well-being and provides a composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education and income'. The UNDP annual report for 2011 ranked Pakistan at 145 among 187 nations, and its ranking has bit lowered as compared with the previous year, however performance regarding multidimensional poverty, which is the fate of 49.4% population in Pakistan, is reported to be encouraging, though another 11% are at the risk of slipping into this category due to precarious conditions. Intense deprivation is fate of 53.4% people, while 27.4% are living in severe poverty. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/299822/pakistan-slips-down-development-ranking-un-report/>, accessed 12 July 2012. Population projections are confusing due to the official figure estimated as 180.71 million as of mid-year 2011-12. *Pakistan Economic Survey 2011-12*, p.162. Pakistan's fertility rate at 3.4 and population growth rate at 2.03 per cent are the highest in South Asian region and Asia, *ibid.*, pp.163-4.

⁶⁶ Cf. UNO, 'Projections of Population Growth', *Dawn, World Population Day Supplement 2012*, 11 July 2012, p.1.

also depressing as being ranked 115 among 187 nations.⁶⁷ The official figures are slightly different from those of the UNFPA and UNDP. The rate of GDP growth in the year 2011 was lower than the growth rate of population (2.05%), whereas the growth of GDP in the recent decade (2000-2010) has not been inclusive and pro-poor, so it could not reduce the absolute number of poor people. Inflation was 20.77 per cent in 2008-9, and increased steadily rising in the following years. In the same period, food inflation has gone high, poor governance⁶⁸ and floods being the major two reasons. The massive floods during 2010 and have also crippled the growth of the economy, and it is likely to continue affecting for many years due to rebuilding and rehabilitation expenditures. The damage estimate of 2010 floods has been of 855 billion rupees,⁶⁹ while the 2011 floods inflicted another loss worth 324.5 billion rupees⁷⁰ The target of MDGs for reducing poverty to 22.6 per cent till 2015 is not achievable, not only in view of the recent shocks to the economy, but also due to the poor state of governance.

II

This section discusses the issue of democratic governance and the role of the NGOs in Pakistan in the last four decades. It largely relies on the data collected for an unpublished thesis of the author, dealing with implications of the role of the non-governmental actors in Pakistan from 1972-2006.⁷¹ The findings of the study are presented in the following pages.

⁶⁷ <http://tribune.com.pk/story/299822/pakistan-slips-down-development-ranking-un-report/>, accessed 12 July 2012.

⁶⁸ Authorities and controlling network of the food items (wheat, sugar, milk, cereals, fruit, cooking oil, etc.) have either jointly mismanaged to gain high profit, or failed to check smuggling, or made wrong decisions about the amount of storing and exporting staple food items. Some other factors related to import prices of fuel and food items. *Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-11* (Islamabad: Finance Division, Economic Adviser's Wing, Government of Pakistan, 2011), pp.94-5.

⁶⁹ The flood has caused damage to housing, agriculture, environment and the infrastructure of governance, transport, communication, irrigation, energy, education, health, water and sanitation, and financial sector. For details see *ibid.*, pp.221-2.

⁷⁰ *Pakistan Economic Survey 2011-12, op.cit.*, p.254.

⁷¹ Anwar Shaheen, 'Changing Cultural Patterns ...', *op.cit.*

1. Rise of the NGO sector in Pakistan

It is generally understood that the NGO sector has grown at a fast pace largely due to political factors operating at the domestic and international levels particularly in the mid-1970s and afterward. The process was boosted by the participatory development paradigm of the 1980s, both at micro and macro levels. At the macro level the neo-liberal policies favored its growth while at the micro level an NGO was taken as an enterprise in the new environment hence the sector continued expanding and was diversifying. Though NGOs have been facing certain hindrances, coming in their way mostly from the government and the conservative religious sections who wished to curtail, regulate, or undermine NGOs' activities, since they suspected the NGOs of having a hidden agenda. Nevertheless, such discouragement could not restrict the NGOs' growth and working significantly. (See Figure A). The data presented in Figure B shows perception of the social analysts about overall contribution of the NGOs to various aspects of change and development. It shows that the foremost areas of NGOs' activity have been women's rights, education and health.

2. Development issues in Pakistan

Like most other Third World countries, the issue of development in Pakistan is related to social, psychological, political, economic, cultural, religious, and gender-related factors. Moreover, the governments try to hide their weaknesses in their documents showing performance of the economy and achievements of the development programs and their distributional impacts. The politically designed income support programs also present a challenge to assess their real impacts.

3. Role of the NGO sector in enhancing development in Pakistan

Data presented in Table 1 shows perception of the NGO functionaries regarding trends of change in development-related aspects. The data presented in the column labeled as 'Situation in Pakistan', can be explained as follows:

- **Definite increase** has been perceived in mechanization of the production process; modern technical knowledge and training for production; poverty; entrepreneurship training; access to market; trend of seeking jobs abroad; women working in un-conventional fields; and trend of self-help.
- **Moderate increase** has been perceived in the following aspects: use of modern sources of energy; expansion in employment opportunities; role of middleman; easy availability of credit; trend of saving and development of underdeveloped regions. (See Figure D).

Role of NGOs in this change has been given in the following. The 'response percent' is obtained by calculating the percentage of total responses in favour out of total responses (for or against) a particular category, thus the effect of 'no response' is eliminated. The percentage of responses favouring the indicators is given in descending order. The shades of opinion are listed under 'very much role', 'somewhat role' and 'no role', as follows.

Role of the NGO sector in changing development-related aspects of Pakistan as perceived by the NGO functionaries

a. Very much role	Response Percent
Trend of self-help	48.3
Women working in non-conventional fields	45.8
Trend of saving	41.7
Easy availability of credit	40.8
Development of backward regions	40.0
Entrepreneurship training	38.3
Expansion in employment opportunities	37.4
Modern technical knowledge and training for production	28.3
Access to market	25.0
Poverty	24.2
Mechanization of the production process	23.3
Role of middleman	20.8
Use of modern sources of energy	11.7
Trend of seeking jobs abroad	10.8
b. Somewhat role	
Access to market	49.2
Mechanization of the production process	44.2
Entrepreneurship training	43.3
Modern technical knowledge and training for production	40.6
Expansion in employment opportunities	40.6
Role of middleman	40.0
Development of backward regions	39.2
Use of modern sources of energy	39.2
Easy availability of credit	38.3
Trend of seeking jobs abroad	38.3
Trend of saving	33.3
Trend of self-help	32.5
Women working in unconventional fields	32.5
Poverty	30.0

c. No role

Trend of seeking jobs abroad	37.5
Use of modern sources of energy	28.3
Poverty	23.3
Mechanization of the production process	19.2
Role of middleman	19.2
Modern technical knowledge and training for production	16.7
Easy availability of credit	11.7
Access to market	10.8
Trend of saving	10.0
Expansion in employment opportunities	9.2
Development of backward regions	9.2
Trend of self-help	7.5
Entrepreneurship training	6.7
Women working in unconventional fields	0.8

Role of the NGO sector in changing development-related aspects of Pakistan as perceived by the social analysts

a. Very much role**Response Percent**

1. Trend of self-help	28.6
2. Role of middleman	20.4
3. Women working in unconventional fields	18.4
4. Entrepreneurship training	16.3
5. Trend of seeking jobs abroad	14.3
6. Expansion in employment opportunities	12.2
7. Use of modern sources of energy	12.2
8. Poverty	10.2
9. Easy availability of credit	10.2
10. Trend of saving	8.2
11. Development of backward regions	8.2
12. Mechanization of the production process	8.2
13. Modern technical knowledge and training for production	6.1
14. Access to market	6.1

b. Somewhat role

1. Access to market	55.1
2. Entrepreneurship training	53.1
3. Women working in unconventional fields	49.0
4. Easy availability of credit	49.0
5. Development of backward regions	44.9
6. Tend of self-help	38.8

7. Modern technical knowledge and training for production	36.7
8. Expansion in employment opportunities	32.7
9. Role of middleman	30.6
10. Poverty	30.6
11. Trend of saving	30.6
12. Use of modern sources of energy	28.6
13. Mechanization of the production process	26.5
14. Trend of seeking jobs abroad	24.5
c. No role	
1. Mechanization of the production process	42.9
2. Trend of seeking jobs abroad	38.8
3. Trend of saving	38.8
4. Poverty	36.7
5. Expansion in employment opportunities	36.7
6. Use of modern sources of energy	34.7
7. Development of backward regions	24.5
8. Easy availability of credit	22.4
9. Access to market	18.4
10. Trend of self-help	12.2
11. Entrepreneurship training	12.2
12. Women working in unconventional fields	10.2
13. Role of middleman	0.6
14. Modern technical knowledge and training for production	0.6

Data presented in Table 3 and Figure C shows the following trends are perceived by the NGO functionaries in socio-political aspects of Pakistani society.

- **Definite increase** has been perceived in: preventive health measures; modern methods of treatment; modern educational facilities; modern housing facilities; investment in children's education; rural-urban migration; problems of *katchi abadis* (illegal, low-income settlements); use of items of comfort and luxury; class-consciousness; people's participation in development programs; social mobility; awareness of rights among the people; freedom of thought; and voluntary social service.
- **Moderate increase** has been perceived in: better standard of nutrition; new patterns of recreation; awareness of environmental issues; power of the weak sections; economic opportunities for disadvantaged regions; improved opportunities for the minorities; democratic attitude; control of traditional power structure; control of

family/clan on individual's life; access to legal justice; sectarianism; social cohesion, unity and harmony.

- **Moderate decrease** has been perceived in: promoting merit in place of nepotism; religious tolerance; and the practicing of moral values.

According to the perception of social analysts given in Table 4, and Figure D the following trends are seen.

- **Definite increase** has been perceived in: modern educational facilities; rural-urban migration; awareness of environmental issues; sectarianism; using items of comfort and luxury; and, awareness of rights among the people.
- **Moderate increase** has been perceived in: preventive health measures; modern methods of treatment; investment in children's education; problems of *katchi abadis* (illegal, low-income settlements); freedom of thought; voluntary social service; class consciousness; people's participation in development programs; social mobility; modern housing facilities; new patterns of recreation; improved opportunities for the minorities; democratic attitudes; and, dominance of traditional power structure.
- **Moderate decrease** has been perceived in the following aspects: promoting merit in place of nepotism; economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes; power of the weak sections; control of family/clan on individual's life; social cohesion, unity and harmony; religious tolerance; practicing the moral and values.
- **Weak increase** in access to legal justice is perceived.
- **Unclear trend** is perceived in better standard of nutrition.

4. Role of the NGO sector in changing the socio-political aspects in Pakistan

Data illustrated in Figures, E, F, G, and H shows the role of NGOs in enhancing development and socio-political situation regarding rights and opportunities for the people. It is further explained in the following as well.

Role of the NGO sector in changing socio-political aspects of Pakistan as perceived by the NGO functionaries

a. Very much role	Response Percent
1. Voluntary social service	61.7
2. People's participation in development programs	50.0
3. Awareness of rights among the people	45.8
4. Freedom of thought	44.2

5. Social mobility	42.5
6. Awareness of environmental issues	40.0
7. Preventive health measures	40.0
8. Modern educational facilities	38.8
9. Modern methods of treatment	36.7
10. Investment in children's education	35.8
11. Problems of <i>katchi abadis</i>	33.3
12. Improved opportunities for the minorities	30.0
13. Democratic attitude	30.0
14. Social cohesion, unity and harmony	30.0
15. Access to legal justice	26.7
16. Practicing the moral values	26.7
17. Class-consciousness	25.8
18. Better standard of nutrition	25.8
19. Power of the weak sections	25.0
20. Religious tolerance	23.3
21. Control of traditional power structure	22.5
22. Control of family/clan on individual's life	22.5
23. New patterns of recreation	21.7
24. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged regions	20.0
25. Promoting merit in place of nepotism	15.8
26. Rural-urban migration	15.0
27. Using items of comfort and luxury	14.2
28. Modern housing facilities	14.2
29. Sectarianism	13.3

b. Somewhat role

1. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged regions	49.2
2. Control of family/clan on individual's life	44.2
3. Better standard of nutrition	43.3
4. Power of the weak sections	43.3
5. Democratic attitudes	40.8
6. Access to legal justice	39.2
7. Religious tolerance	38.3
8. Modern methods of treatment	38.3
9. Preventive health measures	36.7
10. Class-consciousness	36.7
11. Awareness of rights among the people	36.7
12. Promoting merit in place of nepotism	36.7
13. Problems of <i>katchi abadis</i>	35.8
14. Awareness of environmental issues	35.8
15. Control of traditional power structure	35.8

16. Improved opportunities for the minorities	35.0
17. People's participation in development programs	33.3
18. Modern educational facilities	32.5
19. Using items of comfort and luxury	31.7
20. Social cohesion, unity and harmony	31.2
21. Rural-urban migration	30.8
22. Practicing the moral values	30.8
23. Freedom of thought	30.8
24. Modern housing facilities	30.0
25. Social mobility	30.0
26. New patterns of recreation	30.0
27. Investment in children's education	29.2
28. Sectarianism	25.8
29. Voluntary social service	21.6

c. No role

1. Sectarianism	33.3
2. Problems of <i>katchi abadis</i>	30.8
3. Using items of comfort and luxury	26.7
4. Promoting merit in place of nepotism	26.7
5. Modern housing facilities	25.8
6. Investment in children's education	25.8
7. Religious tolerance	20.0
8. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged regions	20.0
9. Class-consciousness	19.2
10. Practicing the moral values	19.2
11. Control of traditional power structure	19.2
12. New patterns of recreation	17.5
13. Rural-urban migration	15.0
14. Access to legal justice	14.2
15. Control of family/clan on individual's life	14.2
16. Social cohesion, unity and harmony	14.2
17. Power of the weak sections	13.3
18. Better standard of nutrition	11.7
19. Democratic attitudes	10.0
20. Freedom of thought	8.3
21. Modern educational facilities	7.5
22. Modern methods of treatment	5.8
23. Social mobility	5.8
24. People's participation in development programs	4.2
25. Preventive health measures	4.2
26. Awareness of environmental issues	4.2

27. Voluntary social service	2.5
28. Awareness of rights among the people	0.5
29. Improved opportunities for the minorities	0.5

Role of the NGO sector in changing socio-political aspects of Pakistan as perceived by the social analysts

a. Very much role **Response Percent**

1. Awareness of environmental issues	34.7
2. People's participation in development programs	30.6
3. Awareness of rights among the people	28.6
4. Voluntary social service	28.6
5. Improved opportunities for the minorities	24.5
6. Democratic attitude	24.5
7. Access to legal justice	24.5
8. Social mobility	24.5
9. Sectarianism	24.5
10. Modern educational facilities	22.4
11. Dominance of traditional power structure	21.7
12. Problems of <i>katchi abadis</i>	20.4
13. Control of family/clan on individual's life	20.4
14. Preventive health measures	20.2
15. Investment in children's education	18.4
16. Social cohesion, unity and harmony	16.3
17. Religious tolerance	16.3
18. Power of the weak sections	12.2
19. Freedom of thought	12.2
20. Modern methods of treatment	10.2
21. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes	10.2
22. Rural-urban migration	10.2
23. Using items of comfort and luxury	10.2
24. Modern housing facilities	10.2
25. Better standard of nutrition	8.2
26. New patterns of recreation	8.2
27. Class consciousness	6.1
28. Practicing the moral values	4.1
29. Promoting merit in place of nepotism	4.1

b. Somewhat role

1. Better standard of nutrition	46.9
2. Problems of <i>katchi abadis</i>	46.9
3. Preventive health measures	42.9

4. Modern educational facilities	42.9
5. Modern methods of treatment	40.8
6. Freedom of thought	40.8
7. Class consciousness	38.8
8. Power of the weak sections	36.7
9. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes	34.7
10. Investment in children's education	34.7
11. Awareness of environmental issues	34.7
12. Voluntary social service	34.7
13. New patterns of recreation	34.7
14. Awareness of rights among the people	34.7
15. Access to legal justice	32.7
16. Religious tolerance	32.7
17. Social cohesion, unity and harmony	32.7
18. Dominance of traditional power structure	31.3
19. People's participation in development programs	30.6
20. Rural-urban migration	30.6
21. Sectarianism	28.7
22. Modern housing facilities	28.7
23. Promoting merit in place of nepotism	28.6
24. Improved opportunities for the minorities	28.6
25. Practicing the moral values	28.6
26. Democratic attitudes	26.5
27. Control of family/clan on individual's life	26.5
28. Social mobility	26.5
29. Using items of comfort and luxury	22.4

c. No role

1. Using items of comfort and luxury	44.9
2. Promoting merit in place of nepotism	42.9
3. Modern housing facilities	38.8
4. Rural-urban migration	34.7
5. Practicing the moral values	30.6
6. New patterns of recreation	28.6
7. Economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes	28.6
8. Power of the weak sections	26.5
9. Control of family/clan on individual's life	26.5
10. Religious tolerance	26.5
11. Investment in children's education	24.5
12. Class consciousness	24.5
13. Social cohesion, unity and harmony	22.4
14. Democratic attitudes	22.4

15. Freedom of thought	22.4
16. Modern methods of treatment	22.4
17. Social mobility	22.4
18. Better standard of nutrition	22.4
19. Improved opportunities for the minorities	22.4
20. Dominance of traditional power structure	17.4
21. Sectarianism	15.3
22. People's participation in development programs	14.3
23. Problems of <i>katchi abadis</i>	14.3
24. Access to legal justice	14.3
25. Voluntary social service	12.2
26. Modern educational facilities	12.2
27. Preventive health measures	12.2
28. Awareness of environmental issues	10.2
29. Awareness of rights among the people	10.2

Discussion

The study quoted in the preceding pages has tried to evaluate the NGO sector from different angles. In a situation where the present level and pace of development is unsatisfactory and the factors further deteriorating this situation are emerging from many sources (human; nature; citizens; government; international environment, etc.), as shown in Figure I, role of any agency which has the potential to improve the situation is important. The NGOs are providing a good range of practical needs to the people. They are also active for their strategic needs which ultimately result in empowerment for demanding good governance. (See Figure J). As democratic governance requires awareness, assertion, and realization of rights, the role of NGOs is found important. Moreover, on many other counts, such as contact between the government and people, access to legal justice, awareness of rights, and opportunities for the minorities and disadvantaged regions, The NGOs have made noteworthy contribution. In view of multifaceted and interlinked nature of the processes of democracy, governance, and access to grassroots communities, the NGOs have adopted different approaches and strategies to fulfill their goals. Since the role of governmental agencies is not satisfactory for what they have done so far in provision of both practical and strategic needs, NGOs deserve real approbation. The NGOs have created awareness and confidence among the people and their benefits have become known in the communities, more efforts for setting up NGOs and achieving needs have been seen hence the process is escalated and the sector is expanding under its own momentum. NGOs have also changed the order of values in the cultural map of the society. The values

undergone change due to the effect of NGOs or civil society organizations are related to the family, elders' control, role of religion, morality, tolerance, voluntarism, self-help, patriarchy, gender equity, son-preference, access to power and justice, tolerance, wealth, class consciousness, and economic and political participation. NGOs' contribution in promoting gender equity has also been well documented by this study, rather gender has been identified as the most significant area of the NGOs' activity, in terms of decreasing discrimination, deprivation, and exploitation, and promoting women's equal rights as human beings. The main focus of NGOs has been to end violence against women in all its forms and to increase women's participation in various economic, political, social, cultural, and community activities. The prospects for NGOs are also expected to be considerably bright.

Conclusion

This paper can be concluded on the note that whether it is through devolution, or empowering the grassroots organizations, or strengthening of the civil society at large, democratic governance can be the only or the most effective way to promote development activities which are sustainable, participatory, equitable, and gender-neutral. The NGOs can deliver best in a democratic environment but the governments, which make NGOs as their appendages, should look into the internal dynamics of the sector in order to push for correcting the imbalances inherent in it. To this end, the people should be imparted the ideas of self-organization and self-help, coupled with realization of their basic rights by the state. For this purpose, there should be a sufficient number of well functioning institutions in both the governmental and the non-governmental sectors.

Appendix

Table: 1

**Extent and Nature of Change in Development-related Aspects
of the Pakistani
Society and Role of the NGO Sector in It: Perception of the NGO
Functionaries**

(percentages, N = 120)

S.No.	Nature of Change in Development-related Aspects	Situation in Pakistan (Response in favor of)			Role of the NGO Sector (Response in favor of)			Your NGO's Role
		Increase	Decrease	No change	Very Much	Some- what	Nil	Yes
1	Mechanization of the production process	85.8	3.3	5.0	23.3	44.2	19.2	25.8
2	Modern technical knowledge and training for production	81.7	5.0	5.8	28.3	40.6	16.7	37.5
3	Use of modern sources of energy (solar, bio-gas, etc.)	61.7	10.0	20.8	11.7	39.2	28.3	18.3
4	Expansion in employment opportunities	63.3	15.8	16.7	37.5	40.6	9.2	46.7
5	Role of middleman	40.8	37.5	12.5	20.8	40.0	19.2	23.3
6	Poverty	66.7	19.2	10.8	24.2	30.0	23.3	36.7
7	Easy availability of credit	77.5	10.8	0.5	40.8	38.3	11.7	30.0
8	Entrepreneurship training	75.8	6.7	11.7	38.3	43.3	6.7	41.7
9	Access to market	75.8	9.2	9.2	25.0	49.2	10.8	32.5
10	Trend of seeking jobs abroad	79.2	8.3	5.8	10.8	38.3	37.5	11.7
11	Women working in unconventional fields	82.5	7.5	0.5	45.8	32.5	0.8	40.0
12	Trend of self-help	73.3	12.5	0.5	48.3	32.5	7.5	59.2
13	Trend of saving	66.7	15.0	9.2	41.7	33.3	10.0	40.0
14	Development of underdeveloped regions	69.2	8.3	14.2	40.0	39.2	9.2	49.2

Table: 2

**Extent and Nature of Change in Development-related Aspects
in the Pakistani Society and Role of the NGOs in It:
Perception of the Social Analysts**

(percentages*, N = 60)

S.No.	Nature of Change in Development-related Aspects	Situation in Pakistan (Response in favor of)			Role of the NGO Sector (Response in favor of)		
		Increase	Decrease	No change	Very Much	Some-What	Nil
1	Mechanization of the production process	85.0	0.0	6.7	10.0	27.0	41.7
2	Modern technical knowledge and training for production	85.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	40.0	27.0
3	Use of modern sources of energy (solar, bio-gas, etc.)	61.7	6.7	20.0	11.7	13.3	36.7
4	Expansion in employment opportunities	56.7	27.3	6.7	13.3	36.7	33.3
5	Role of middleman	53.3	10.0	20.0	26.7	26.7	28.3
6	Poverty	73.3	16.7	3.3	10.0	33.3	38.3
7	Easy availability of credit	56.7	20.0	13.3	0.8	46.7	27.0
8	Entrepreneurship training	70.0	0.8	13.3	16.7	53.3	15.0
9	Access to market	71.7	0.8	10.0	6.7	53.3	23.3
10	Trend of seeking jobs abroad	80.0	0.8	8.2	11.7	28.3	41.7
11	Women working in unconventional fields	76.7	0.5	10.0	20.0	21.7	10.0
12	Trend of self-help	71.7	0.8	6.7	28.3	46.7	11.7
13	Trend of saving	55.0	20.0	15.0	0.8	31.7	41.7
14	Development of under-developed regions	55.0	13.3	21.7	10.0	46.7	25.0

- *Note: Percentages in the sets of columns under each item do not add up to 100 due to no responses, not shown in the table.*

Table: 3

**Extent and Nature of Change in Socio-political Aspects of the
Pakistani
Society and Role of the NGO Sector in It: Perception of
the NGO Functionaries**

(percentage, N = 120)

S.No.	Nature of Change in Socio-political Aspects	Situation in Pakistan (Response in favor of)			Role of the NGO Sector (Response in favor of)			Your NGO's Role Yes
		Increase	Decrease	No change	Very Much	Some what	Nil	
1	Better standard of nutrition	44.2	27.5	14.2	25.8	43.3	11.7	37.5
2	Preventive health measures	69.2	14.2	8.3	40.0	36.7	4.2	51.7

3	Modern methods of treatment	75.8	7.5	6.7	36.7	38.3	5.8	44.2
4	Modern educational facilities	73.3	8.3	9.2	38.8	32.5	7.5	46.7
5	Modern housing facilities	66.7	11.7	11.7	14.2	30.0	25.8	17.5
6	Investment in children's education	67.5	10.8	0.5	35.8	29.2	10.0	42.5
7	New patterns of recreation	58.3	13.3	15.0	21.7	30.0	17.5	22.5
8	Awareness of environmental issues	62.5	10.8	12.5	40.0	35.8	4.2	45.0
9	Rural-urban migration	84.2	0.5	3.3	15.0	30.8	30.8	10.8
10	Problems of <i>katchi abadis</i>	70.0	14.2	6.7	33.3	35.8	10.8	27.5
11	Using items of comfort and luxury	76.7	10.8	3.3	14.2	31.7	26.7	12.5
12	Promoting merit in place of nepotism	30.8	38.3	25.0	15.8	36.7	26.7	31.7
13	Power of the weak sections	43.3	25.0	25.8	25.0	43.3	13.3	34.2
14	Economic opportunities for disadvantaged regions	35.8	26.7	26.7	20.0	49.2	13.3	31.7
15	Class- consciousness	66.6	13.3	11.7	25.8	36.7	19.2	36.7
16	People's participation in development programs	73.3	10.0	10.0	50.0	33.3	4.2	47.5
17	Social mobility	68.3	10.8	10.0	42.5	30.0	5.8	36.7
18	Improved opportunities for the minorities	59.2	8.3	25.8	30.0	42.5	10.8	36.7
19	Religious tolerance	33.3	44.2	15.8	23.3	38.3	20.0	33.3
20	Awareness of rights among the people	81.7	6.7	8.3	45.8	35.0	0.5	51.7
21	Democratic attitudes	49.2	25.8	16.7	30.0	40.8	10.0	40.0
22	Control of traditional power structure	42.5	33.3	15.0	22.5	35.8	19.2	31.7
23	Freedom of thought	70.8	12.5	11.7	44.2	30.8	8.3	45.0
24	Volunteer social service	70.8	15.8	6.7	61.7	21.6	2.5	59.2
25	Control of family/clan on individual's life	25.0	56.7	13.3	22.5	44.2	14.2	32.5
26	Access to legal justice	35.0	31.7	25.0	26.7	39.2	14.2	28.3
27	Sectarianism	65.0	18.3	8.3	13.3	25.8	33.3	25.0
28	Social cohesion, unity and harmony	35.0	32.5	25.0	30.0	31.2	14.2	37.5
29	Practicing the moral values	25.8	49.2	18.3	26.7	30.8	19.2	40.0


Figure: A

Table: 4

**Extent and Nature of Change in Socio-political Aspects
of the Pakistani
Society and Role of the NGOs in It: Perception of the Social
Analysts**

(percentages*, N= 60)

S. No.	Nature of Change in Socio-political Aspects	Situation in Pakistan (Response in favor of)			Role of the NGO Sector (Response in favor of)		
		Increase	Decrease	No change	Very Much	Some what	Nil
1	Better standard of nutrition	41.7	35.0	10.0	11.7	48.3	21.7
2	Preventive health measures	58.3	15.0	10.0	20.0	48.3	10.0
3	Modern methods of treatment	66.7	11.7	0.5	10.0	50.0	18.3
4	Modern educational facilities	70.0	11.7	3.3	23.3	48.3	10.0
5	Modern housing facilities	66.7	13.3	0.5	11.7	36.7	33.3
6	Investment in children's ducation	66.7	10.0	0.8	23.3	36.7	21.7
7	New patterns of recreation	66.7	0.8	10.0	10.0	36.7	17.0
8	Awareness of environmental issues	75.0	3.3	0.8	31.7	41.7	10.0
9	Rural-urban migration	83.3	3.3	1.7	10.0	35.0	35.0
10	Problems of <i>katchi abadis</i>	66.7	18.3	3.3	23.3	5.0	16.7
11	Using items of comforts and luxuries	71.7	10.0	0.5	10.0	27.0	41.7
12	Promoting merit in place of nepotism	23.3	42.3	21.7	0.5	31.7	42.3
13	Power of the weak sections	35.0	40.0	13.3	13.3	40.0	28.3
14	Economic opportunities for disadvantaged classes	55.0	18.3	13.3	13.3	38.3	26.7
15	Class consciousness	55.0	15.0	18.3	16.7	38.3	20.0
16	People's participation in development programs	61.7	20.0	0.5	27.0	36.7	13.3
17	Social mobility	40.0	23.3	25.0	21.7	36.7	20.0
18	Improved opportunities for the minorities	33.3	43.3	11.7	21.7	33.3	25.0
19	Religious tolerance	33.3	43.3	11.7	13.3	36.7	23.3
20	Awareness of rights among the people	73.3	0.8	0.5	26.7	41.7	11.7
21	Democratic attitudes	45.0	28.3	15.0	20.0	33.3	25.0
22	Control of traditional power structure	50.0	23.3	15.0	18.3	38.3	23.3
23	Freedom of thought	45.0	23.3	20.0	15.0	45.0	20.0
24	Volunteer social service	60.0	13.3	0.8	33.3	35.0	11.7
25	Control of family/clan on individual's life	23.3	41.7	15.0	26.7	26.7	21.7
26	Access to legal justice	38.3	23.3	15.0	21.7	38.3	13.3
27	Sectarianism	60.0	13.3	0.5	20.0	35.0	20.0
28	Social cohesion, unity and harmony	30.0	40.0	0.8	16.7	38.3	21.7
29	Practicing the moral values	21.7	45.0	13.3	3.3	35.0	31.7

- Note: Percentages in the sets of columns under each item do not add up to 100 due to no responses, not shown in the table.


Figure: B

Figure: C




Figure: D

Figure: E




Figure: F

Figure: G