

Liberal Narrative in Pakistan about India, and its Effect on Universities Students' Perception towards Terrorism

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Abstract

The key objective of this paper is to find the relationship between the liberal narratives in Pakistan on relationship with India and its effects on universities students' perception of terrorism. There is a consensus among some prominent scholars that right wing political parties, security establishment and big media houses are producing a kind of national security narrative based on the troika; India as security threat to Pakistan, Islam as rallying cry for national cohesion, and support from great powers to finance ambitious security dominated foreign policy about the neighboring countries that does not help in counter-terrorism at home. This paper has adopted quantitative research method. It is a descriptive study and data was collected from four major public sector universities through survey questionnaires. The liberal narrative on India is weaker in Punjab on all issues. The findings of liberal narratives on India reject the claims of existing literature that there is a positive relationship between liberal narrative about India in Pakistan and counter-terrorism measures in FATA. Three variables researched in case study of Afghanistan reject the existing literature that there is a positive relationship between liberal narrative and counter-terrorism measures.

Key words: Student Perception, Terrorism, Liberal Narrative, Universities' Students, India, Pakistan Relations.

Introduction

This article aims to determine the effect of liberal narrative in Pakistan regarding India on universities students' perception of terrorism. The objective of this study is to illustrate how universities students who have

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liberal opinion about India on trade, security and bilateral relationship perceive terrorism. Some prominent scholars and commentators on terrorism like Hussain Haqqani, Christine Fair, Ahmed Rashid, Amir Rana, Khadim Hussain, Pervaiz Hoodbhoy and Adil Khan argue that Pakistan's security narrative against India undermines its efforts against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. They believe that it is difficult to attain public support for counter-terrorism efforts in the presence of anti-Indian narrative prevalent in Pakistan, because the terrorists also use the same narrative for getting material and financial support from public. They claim that it is almost impossible for Pakistan's security establishment to develop a popular national security doctrine that serves its purposes against the terrorists and India at the same time. So the Pakistani security establishment has to opt for either one of them. This study has conducted field research among universities students to observe the relationship between liberal narrative about India and student perceptions' towards terrorism.

Literature review

There are different opinions among scholars over the relationship between madrasas, universities and terrorism in Pakistan. Educational institutions in Pakistan, especially madrasas, have been at the focus of the United States since 9/11. According to Tariq Rehman, an expert in Pakistan on militancy and terrorism, the madrasas, which were associated with conservatism, ossification and stagnation of Islam earlier are now seen as hotbeds of militancy in the name of Islam. After 9/11, a number of authors, both western (Singer 2001)¹ and Pakistani (Haqqani 2002),² have connected the *madrasas* with militancy. At least three reports of the International Crises Group (ICG) – published 29 July 2002, 20 March 2003 and 16 January 2004 – have taken the nexus between militancy and the *madrasas* as a given.³ The scholars are divided over the role of madrasas in promoting Islamic fundamentalism.

¹ P.W. Singer, 'Pakistan's Madrasahs: Ensuring a system of Education not Jihad', *Analysis Paper # 14*, November 2001. <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/singer/20020103.htm>.

² Hussain Haqqani, 'Islam's Medieval Outposts', *Foreign Affairs*, No. 133 (December, 2002), 58- 64.

³ D. T. Rahman, 'Madrasahs: The Potential for Violence in Pakistan', *Criterion Quarterly*, 11 (2013).

Many published reports (Asia Report No.36),⁴ (Asia Report No.130),⁵ (Kronstadt, 2004)⁶ and scholarly articles, for example, Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey, and Feinberg (2013),⁷ Tellis (2008),⁸ Jacob & Fair (2009)⁹ have claimed that large number of students in Pakistani madrassas are important source of terrorism and suggested various strategies to streamline their curriculum. They claim in their reports and findings that extremist curriculum taught in Pakistani Madrassah develop the same mind set as that of various terrorist organizations.¹⁰ They further claim that radicalization and extremism is not only present in madrassas, but also in Pakistan's higher education institutions.¹¹ According to Khadim Hussain:

Unfortunately, in Pakistan, instead of making learning a positive experience that brings out the best in students, successive governments have tried to harness the academic aspect of curriculum development for the purpose of indoctrination. At no other time has this approach been embraced with more fervour than during Gen Zia ul Haq's era.¹²

He further says that:

That period saw languages, Islamic studies, social studies and even the natural sciences infused with content geared towards developing an isolationist mind set. Moreover ... four main concepts were incorporated into the curricula; the glorification of war, the denigration of other religions, nations, countries and races, the representation of women as

⁴ ICG. 'Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism and the Military,' *International Crisis Group [ICG] Asia Report* No. 36 (29 July 2002).

⁵ ICG. 2007. 'Pakistan: Karachi's Madrasas and Violent Extremis,' *International Crisis Group [ICG] Asia Report* No. 130 (29 March 2007).

⁶ Allan Kronstadt, 'Pakistan-US Relations: Issues for the 114th Congress,' *Congressional Research Services* (14 May 2015), 1-21.

⁷ M.J. Gelfand, G. LaFree, S. Fahey & E. Feinberg, 'Culture and extremism,' *Journal of Social Issues*, 69:3 (2013), 495-517.

⁸ Ashley Tellis, 'Conflicted Goals and Compromised Performance,' *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2008), 1-64.

⁹ Jacob N. Shapiro & Christine Fair, (2009/2010), 'Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan,' *International Security*, 34:3 (2009/2010), 79-118.

¹⁰ Madiha Afzal, *Education and Attitude in Pakistan*, United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC, 2015) 1-18.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Khadim Hussain, 'Curriculum Concerns,' *Dawn*, 3 November 2014.

lesser humans unable to participate in social, political or even academic fields, the distortion of indigenous history and neglect of indigenous civilisations and personalities known for their intellectual, political and social achievements.¹³

There is also a disturbing consensus among some prominent scholars like Christine Fair, Seth Jones, Hussain Haqqani, Ashley Tellis, Bruce Riedel, Ahmed Rashid, Frederic Grare, Khadim Hussain and Amir Rana who regularly publish on political and strategic developments in Pakistan in reputable journals that state sponsored narrative in Pakistan about India negatively affects the war on terrorism and extremism. According to Rana:

A general argument can be made that Pakistan's power elites have been patronising religious, ethnic, cultural and racial disagreements to further their regime, instead of looking at the diversity of religious, cultural and societal opinion in Pakistan as a sign of inclusiveness and plurality. That has significantly damaged the country's social fabric, mainly its humanistic values such as empathy and compassion, which safeguard individuals and societies from hate and aggression.¹⁴

He further says that:

Pakistan's far-right religious groups have been known for mobilising their street power whenever the country has faced a crisis in its ties with its neighbours or Washington. The Pakistan Defence Council is the most recent example of such an alliance of religious groups. Among other things, it has been used to whip up public sentiment against the US for conducting drone strikes inside Pakistan, the Salala check-post attack in 2011, and the Raymond Davis affair that saw an American spy kill Pakistani civilians in Lahore.¹⁵

According them, state does not only use these organizations to promote specific kind of narratives against India, but also counter nationalist and secular narratives at home through religious groups. According to Rana:

The institutions of religious education may have not completely eroded the nationalist ethos of the Baloch but they have at least provided them a sense of connectivity with

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Muhammad Amir Rana, 'Ignoring the seeds of extremism,' *Dawn*, 2019, 22 September 2019.

¹⁵ Ibid.

the broader religious communities in Pakistan. The Tableeghi Jamaat is one of the instrumental organisations connecting the Baloch with the wider national, religious and social discourses in the country. Banned terrorist groups such as the Jamaatud Daawa and Al-Rehmat Trust were also encouraged to expand their networks in the province, especially in the insurgency-infested areas.¹⁶

However, there are very few authentic works that have studied the relationship between universities' students and terrorism. Large number of terrorist incidents by universities' students inside and outside Pakistan makes it necessary to conduct a comprehensive research to find out the attitude of them towards terrorism. This article analyses how liberal narrative about India affects students' perceptions towards terrorism in Pakistan.

Narratives in Pakistan about India

There are primarily three narratives in Pakistan about India. The dominant narrative is that of the conservative forces that include Pakistan's security establishment. According to Hussain Haqqani,

The emphasis on Islam as an element of national policy empowered the new country's religious leaders. It also created a nexus between the 'custodians of Islam' and the country's military establishment, civilian bureaucracy, and intelligence apparatus, which saw itself as the guardian of the new state.¹⁷

They basically have a neo-realist perspective of international politics. They believe that there are structural problems between India and Pakistan. India, as regional hegemon of the region, will not accept the parity of Pakistan in any sphere of life and will do everything to damage the integrity, sovereignty and independence of Pakistan as a nation state. They give example of India's role in the dis-integration of Pakistan in 1971, when East Pakistan became Bangladesh with the assistance of Indian help. They recommend that Pakistan should never take its eyes off the Indian capabilities and always enhance its defence capabilities to deter Indian overt or covert aggression. They consider the acquiring of nuclear weapon as great equaliser, but not sufficient to ignore advancement of Indian army or navy military capabilities. They are in favour of allocating large chunk of budget to the security forces to make

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 18.

Pakistan's defence invincible and formidable. They consider security as supreme value, and survival as the ultimate objective of the state.

The second narrative in Pakistan about India is that of the liberal forces, which includes Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and other regional parties like Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Awami National Party (ANP) and Balochistan National Party (BNP). It is important to mention one point that Pakistan's Muslim League (PML), which had been the flagbearer of the conservative forces, especially Nawaz section, is slowly moving to liberal domain after the emergence of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI), which has more conservative position on strategic issues. The primary objective of these forces is civilian supremacy, parliament as the center of power and cordial relationship with India to focus resources on human and infrastructure development. They don't support India's occupation of Jammu and Kashmir and its purchase of sophisticated weapons, which leads to instability and arms race in the region, but they suggest that Pakistan should establish normal relationship with India, especially urge on trade and business relationship, without compromising on strategic issues.¹⁸ They also don't support militant struggle in Kashmir and urge that Pakistan's support to the right of self-determination movements in Kashmir should be limited to diplomatic and political one in order to develop an effective case at the international level the Palestinian model. They also urge the security establishment to allow proper functioning of democracy to turn the country into a normal state. They support trade, economic, business, cultural and political connection with India in order to create regional peace.

The third narrative in Pakistan is that of the religious forces, which have radical position on policy towards India. They are the strongest supporter of the Kashmir cause in India. They urge on Pakistani security forces that they should equip the Kashmir movement for the right of self-determination. They also urge the Indian Muslims and other Muslim Ummah to actively support the Kashmir cause. They consider it holy struggle against the infidel and urge the Muslims to join jihad in Kashmir. They don't only send material and financial support to the Kashmir cause, but also join the insurgency to fight the Indian forces in Kashmir. Therefore, India has always been accusing Pakistan for supporting unrest in Kashmir.

There had been a strong alliance between the religious and security forces in Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir in 1990s, and Pakistan openly declared the struggle in Kashmir as movements for the

¹⁸ Hassan Askari Rizvi, 'Different Narratives of Pakistan,' *Dawn*, 14 August 2013.

right of self-determination.¹⁹ Pakistan's security establishment changed its position and broke alliance with the religious forces after tremendous pressure from the International community especially from the United States after the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. According to Steve Coll, a prominent American scholar on terrorism, 'On January 12, 2002, in a lengthy speech that was broadcast on Pakistani national television, Musharraf denounced religious extremists, pledged to reform Islamic schools in Pakistan, and announced a formal ban on five jihadi groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad'.²⁰ Since then Pakistan has been reluctant to openly support the religious forces perspective on the Kashmir issue. The religious forces in Pakistan support strong army and consider the liberal parties agents of the west and India. They reluctantly support democracy and favor the supremacy of the security forces rather than the civilian ones. They consider Pakistan's nuclear weapons as great asset to protect integrity, sovereignty and independence of the country from the India and United States. They call Pakistan's nuclear bomb as 'Islamic bomb' for the protection of Muslim ummah against the infidel forces.

Liberal Narrative about India in Pakistan: The narratives in Pakistan about India dates back to debates among Muslims in British India. Some of the Muslim leaders like Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan adopted territorial nationalism and did not use religion for collective identity. They supported Indian National Congress for right of self-determination from the British colonialism. Others were feeling that Muslim had different identity from Hindu; therefore, they should have their own independent state.²¹ According to Haqqani, 'coalescing in the All-India Muslim League led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, these Muslim nationalists asserted that India's Muslims constituted a nation separate from non-Muslim Indians and subsequently demanded a separate homeland in areas with a Muslim majority'²². The creation of Pakistan in 1947 validated the acceptance of two nation theory, which was presented long before the movement for the right of self-determination by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan.

¹⁹ Abubakar Siddique, *The Pashtuns: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan*, (London: Hurst, 2015), 256.

²⁰ Steve Coll, 'The Stand Off: How Jihadi groups helped provoke the twenty-first century's first nuclear crisis,' *The New Yorker*, 6 February 2006.

²¹ Haqqani, *Pakistan between Military and Mullah*, 8.

²² *Ibid.*, 17.

When Pakistan was finally established in 1947 after an intense struggle on the basis of religious differences, it immediately started facing a hostile security environment and immense early problems. The early problems left the country with little to develop a polity based on modern liberal values. According to Haqqani:

The partition plan of 3 June 1947 gave only seventy-two days for transition to independence. Within this brief period, three provinces had to be divided, referendums organized, civil and armed services bifurcated, and assets apportioned. The telescoped timetable created seemingly impossible problems for Pakistan, which, unlike India, inherited neither a capital nor government nor the financial resources to establish and equip the administrative, economic and military institutions of the new state. Even more daunting problems arose in the wake of the partition. Communal rioting led to the killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. A tidal wave of millions of refugees entered Pakistan, confronting the new state with an awesome burden of rehabilitation.²³

Three days before Independence of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah addressed Pakistan's constituent Assembly. His speech is the strongest evidence with liberal section in Pakistan that Jinnah believed in secular politics. He said:

You are free, free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. As you know, history shows that in England conditions some time ago were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some states in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we are not starting in those days.²⁴

The evolution of Pakistan as a state with early problems, regional insecurities, and international struggle for power between two blocks did

²³ Haqqani, *Pakistan Between Military and Mosque*, 14

²⁴ Muhammad Ali Jinnah First Presidential Speech to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (11 August 1947) available at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealc/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_assembly_1947.html.

not allow it to take regular route to a normal state. Those early problems played an important role in weakening the liberal discourse in the country on national security, education, and politics.

The first difference between the liberal and conservative forces is on the issue of security paradigm. The liberal forces are against the troika; India as security threat to Pakistan, Islam as rallying cry for national cohesion, and support from great powers to finance ambitious security dominated foreign policy. The liberal forces are against current security paradigm, which does not allow the meager resources to focus on industrialization, infrastructure building, health, education or other internal problems. There is a strong concern among the liberal forces that as long as Pakistan defines its national interest in term of security, it will always remain a crippled economy, scattered society, and disturbed polity. According to Haqqani:

The focus on rivalry with India as an instrument of securing legitimacy and authority for the new Pakistani state defined the locus of political power within Pakistan and influenced the relationship between the state and its citizens. Pakistanis were being conditioned to believe that their nationhood was under constant threat and that the threat came from India. Within weeks of independence, editorials in the Muslim League newspaper, Dawn, 'called for 'guns rather than butter,' urging a bigger and better-equipped army to defend 'the sacred soil' of Pakistan.' This meant that protecting Pakistan's nationhood by military means took priority over all else, conferring a special status upon the national security apparatus. It also meant that political ideas and actions that could be interpreted as diluting Pakistani nationhood were subversive.²⁵

The liberal parties and section of academia, journalist and civil society activists are of the opinion that the present security dominated paradigm will not only damage Pakistani society, but will also badly affect its security. If Pakistan continues its security competition with India, it will hurt its ability to focus on economy, which is excessively important for proper functioning of the state. Pakistan's security competition with India also increases the role of military in domestic politics at the expense of other institutions, which will eventually affect the growth of democracy, as it has already badly curtailed the proper functioning of democratic institutions. Thirdly, they believe the current paradigm will empower religious and conservative forces at the societal level because

²⁵ Haqqani, *Pakistan Between Military and Mosque*, 17.

of harmony in their narratives with the security establishment. They urge that if Pakistan does not change its priorities from security to economy, it will lag further behind other regional countries Bangladesh, Iran and even Bhutan. According to Hoodboy:

Bangladesh and Pakistan are different countries today because they perceive their national interest very differently. Bangladesh sees its future in human development and economic growth. Goal posts are set at increasing exports, reducing unemployment, improving health, reducing dependence upon loans and aid, and further extending micro credit.... For Pakistan, human development comes a distant second. The bulk of national energies remain focused upon check-mating India. Relations with Afghanistan and Iran are therefore troubled; Pakistan accuses both of being excessively close to India. But the most expensive consequence of the security state mind-set was the nurturing of extra state actors in the 1990s.²⁶

Method

This paper implies quantitative research method to determine the influence of liberal narrative about India on students' perception toward terrorism. It is a discreet study and data is collected from 4 universities through survey. Convenient sampling technique was used at the beginning. 588 students were selected in 4 universities. The following was the distribution of sample students; 152 from University of Balochistan (UOB), 221 from University of the Punjab (UOP), 112 from University of Peshawar; and 103 students from University of Karachi (UOK). Students were selected from BA/BSc and MA/MSc programs. They were randomly selected from entire population of the university. They were not either entirely from art or science faculties, but an attempt has been made to include the entire university students. The survey questions contain of two sections; the first section was about bio-data of students and second part about the perception of terrorism. Student responses were acquired on three degree Likert scale. Reliability and validity were confirmed through pilot surveys. The value of Cronbach's Alpha was 0.861, which was statistical significant and acceptable.

The author personally visited universities to collect the data from respondents. The data was analyzed by using SPSS. The descriptive and inferential statistical techniques were used to analyse the data. The

²⁶ Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, 'Why Bangladesh Overtook Pakistan,' *Dawn*, 10 February 2019.

frequencies, mean, and standard deviation are acquired in descriptive and Chi-square test was applied as inferential statistics.

Results

This section of the paper presents firstly the respondents' profile, average and frequency of their responses and perspectives on terrorism and relationship with India; then secondly it also discusses the opinion of different ethnic groups. It shows how different ethnic groups in Pakistani students perceive relationship with India.

Respondents' profile

Table 1 and Table 2 show the mean and standard deviations of the responses about the causes of terrorism. All ethnic groups were given almost equal opportunity to express their perceptions. Almost same proportion was seen between the representation of graduate and post graduate students. The highest means were observed on the statements of Administrative reforms FATA and Support friendly relationship with India (3.77 each), and Military operation against Taliban (3.70).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Students

Category	Types	Frequency	Percent
Gender	Male	281	47.8
	Female	307	52.2
Program	BA/BSc	276	46.9
	MA/MSc	312	53.1
Province	Balochistan	153	26.0
	KPK	81	13.8
	Punjab	218	37.1
	Sindh	107	18.2
Ethnicity	Punjabi	234	39.8
	Pushtoon	184	31.3
	Baloch	61	10.4
	Sindh	27	4.1
	Mohajir	82	13.9
Universities	University of Balochistan	152	25.9
	University of Punjab	221	37.6
	University of Karachi	103	17.5
	University of Peshawar	112	19.0

This research also determines the effect of liberal narratives on universities' students from different ethnic background. The research illustrates whether there are differences between ethnic groups worldview and understanding of issues or not. They were asked to express their opinion on five variables given below in the discussion section. Their opinions were taken on Likert scale ranged from strongly agree/ agree, neutral, disagree/strongly disagree. Opinions of the above mentioned section of students (ethnic groups) is matched with opinion on terrorism place them in different categories; liberal, or non-liberal. The questionnaire was designed in such manner at the beginning to help the research to divided people in different groups and then determine their opinion about terrorism.

Discussion

The following section discusses the results of comprehensive survey conducted among students of various backgrounds on the issue of terrorism and the liberal narrative about India. It determines how liberal narrative in Pakistan affects students' perception on India and terrorism, whether it is positive or negative.

Table 2: Support for Kashmir's Independence from India
(percentage in parentheses)

Question	Kashmir's Independence from India				
Ethnicity	Punjabi	Pashtun	Baloch	Sindhi	Mohajir
Opposed/Strongly Opposed	18 (7.7)	14 (7.6)	9 (14.8)	1 (25.9)	6 (7.3)
No preference	7 (3.0)	13 (7.1)	9 (14.9)	2 (7.4)	3 (3.7)
Agreed/Strongly Agreed	209 (89.3)	157 (85.3)	43 (70.5)	24 (88.9)	73 (89.0)
Total	234 (100.0)	184 (100.00)	61 (100.00)	27 (100.0)	82 (100.0)
Chi-Square	19.1666**(0.14)				
Cramer's c	0.128				

The results reveal that university level students perception on this particular issue /matter is independent of ethnicity (Chi-sq = 19.167; p-value>0.10).

Table 3: Support for Economic Relationship with India
(percentage in parentheses)

Question	Economic relationship with India				
Ethnicity	Punjabi	Pashtun	Baloch	Sindhi	Mohajir
Opposed/Strongly Opposed	63 (26.90)	28 (15.20)	13 (21.30)	4 (16.70)	25 (29.40)
No preference	78 (33.30)	14 (7.60)	1 (1.60)	5 (20.80)	17 (20.0)
Agreed/Strongly Agreed	93 (39.70)	142 (77.20)	47 (77.0)	15 (62.50)	43 (50.60)
Total	234 (100)	184 (100)	61 (100)	27 (100)	82 (100.0)
Chi-Sq	84.612 (.000)				
Cramer's c	0.268				

Next question was about whether Pakistan government should have/initiate economic relations with India, the hypothesis of economic relations is strongly rejected with a very high value of (Chi-sq =84.6 ;p-value \leq 0.01) .

Table 4: Support for Friendly Relations with India
(percentage in parentheses)

Question	Friendly Relationship with India				
Ethnicity	Punjabi	Pashtun	Baloch	Sindhi	Muhajir
Opposed/Strongly Opposed	77 (32.90)	33 (17.90)	17 (27.90)	7 (25.90)	21 (25.60)
No Preference	71 (30.30)	28 (15.20)	7 (11.50)	3 (11.10)	19 (23.20)
Agreed/ Strongly Agreed	86 (36.80)	123 (66.80)	37 (60.70)	17 (63.00)	42 (51.20)
Total	234 (100)	184 (100)	61 (100)	27 (100)	82 (100)
Chi-Sq	44.634 (0.000)				
Cramer's c	0.195				

Interestingly, in line with the results found in economic relationship, a significant association was seen (Chi-sq = 44.6; p-value $0 \leq .00$) between opinion of friendly relations and economic relations.

Table 5: Support for Armed Struggle in Indian-held Kashmir
(percentage in parentheses)

Question	Supporting Armed Struggle in Indian Kashmir				
Ethnicity	Punjabi	Pashtun	Baloch	Sindhi	Mohajir
Opposed/Strongly Opposed	46 (19.7)	55 (29.90)	28 (45.9)	8 (29.6)	26 (31.7)
No Preference	39 (16.7)	23 (12.50)	11 (18)	9 (33.30)	15 (18.3)
Agreed/ Strongly Agreed	149 (63.7)	106 (57.6)	22 (36.1)	10 (37)	41 (50)
Total	234 (100)	184 (100)	61 (100)	27 (100)	82 (100)
Chi-Sq	29.419 *** (0.000)				
Cramer's c	0.158				

A strong significant association was seen (Chi-sq = 29.419; P-value < 0.01) between students ethnicity and their perception about the support of armed struggle in Kashmir.

Table 5: Students' Perception of Terrorism in FATA

Question	Operations					Peace deal				
Ethnicity	Punjabi	Pashtoon	Baloch	Sindhi	Mohajir	Punjabi	Pashtoon	Baloch	Sindhi	Mohajir
Opposed/Strongly Opposed	22 (9.4)	34 (18.5)	7 (11.5)	8 (29.8)	17 (20.7)	44 (18.8)	33 (17.9)	16 (26.2)	10 (37)	27 (32.9)
No Preference	76 (32.5)	54 (29.3)	20 (32.8)	1 (3.7)	10 (12.2)	75 (32.1)	55 (29.9)	22 (36.1)	4 (14.8)	11 (13.4)
Agreed/Strongly Agreed	136 (58.1)	96 (52.1)	34 (55.7)	18 (66.7)	55 (67.1)	115 (49.1)	96 (52.2)	23 (37.7)	13 (48.1)	44 (53.7)
Total	234 (100)	184 (100)	61 (100)	27 (100)	82 (100)	234 (100)	184 (100)	61 (100)	27 (100)	82 (100)
Chi-Sq	30.760*					23.163**				
Cramer's c	0.162					0.14				

Analysis

1. The behavior of Pakistani students from different ethnic backgrounds is not overwhelmingly influenced by the liberal narrative on India as shown in the above tables. The only two variables which are positively related to terrorism are support for economic relationship and friendly relationship with India. On the other two issues like Kashmir Independence and support for armed struggle majority of students from all ethnic groups are not influenced by the liberal narrative. It shows that liberal narrative is strong on the former and weak on later issues. The first one is positively related to military operations in FATA and the second one with peace talk with the Taliban. It confirms the existing literature claim that negative narratives against India discourage counter-terrorism policies in Pakistan.
2. The ethnic and demographic landscape of Pakistan is mixed and confusing. The five major ethnic groups living in Pakistan have different opinions from each other on the issues of terrorism and relationship with India. The results reveal that university level students perception on first variable, which is Kashmir's independence is independent ($\chi^2 = 19.167$; $p\text{-value} > 0.10$) of their ethnicity as all ethnic group of students are massively in favour of 'Kashmir's Independence from India'. The reason behind such support is consensus among all narratives on Independence of Kashmir from India. There is a massive difference between students who support and those who don't as shown in Table 1. The variable of support for Kashmir's Independence is positively related to military operations in FATA as shown in tables 1 and 5. It is against the existing literature that claims negative narrative about India decreases support for counter-terrorism measures in Pakistan.
3. The striking feature of the second variable on economic relationship with India, there is a massive support among Pashtun and Baloch students (77.2) and (77) respectively. It shows that liberal narrative's economic aspect is stronger in small provinces than Punjab that is at the focus of religious and conservative narratives aligned with the security establishment. This trend is more similar to support for military operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The finding of this variable confirms the existing literature that support for economic relationship increases support for counter-terrorism measures.
4. On friendly relationship with India, the results are again the same as on good economic relationship as shown in table 3, which further increases the validity, reliability and credibility of the data. The

liberal narrative has to focus on the population centers in Pakistan like Punjab and Karachi to make significance at the political level.

5. The result of the fourth variable as shown in table 4 again confirm the previous findings that liberal narrative does not have a lot of support in Punjab. There is stronger level of support for armed struggle among Punjabis and Pashtuns on the issue of armed struggle in Kashmir (63.7) and (57.6) respectively with a significant difference with opponent of the armed struggle. These findings are again similar to peace talks with the Taliban in FATA, which again confirms the existing literature that support for armed struggle in Kashmir increases support for peace deals with militants at home.

Conclusion

The above discussion shows that liberal narrative is successful in influencing students' perception on economic and friendly relation in Pashtun and Baloch as shown in table 2, and 3, but it failed badly on support for armed struggle in Kashmir, which is negatively associated with peace in Pakistan and confirms the critical literature on Pakistan's foreign policy towards India. The liberal narrative is weaker in Punjab on all issues, which should be taken seriously, because Punjab is political capital of Pakistani politics. The above discussion also confirms the existing literature that there is a positive relationship between liberal narrative about the India as shown by table 2 and 3, in Pakistan and counter-terrorism measures in FATA as shown in in table 5. It is also been witnessed that negative narrative damage counter-terrorism measures in the country as witnessed in table 1 and 4. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that Pakistan powerful civil and military institutions should adopt liberal narrative on India to counter the threat of terrorism in the country.