

Jenkins' Deliberations on Communal Conflict with the Leaders of Punjab: 1946-47 (Part I)*

Farah Gul Baqai**

Abstract

Jenkins was the last Governor of United Punjab. He held the office of Governor from 8th April 1946 to 15th August 1947. A very crucial period in the history of Punjab. The indepth study of this period is very important to understand the creation of Pakistan and continuous disturbance in Kashmir. However, in this paper the emphasis is on Jenkins deliberations with Punjab leaders during 1946-47. The main leaders of Punjab were Iftikhar Mamdot (President Punjab Muslim League), Mian Mumtaz Daultana (MLA), Firoz Khan Noon (MLA), Tara Singh (MLA), Sardar Baldev Singh (Defence Minister in 1946-1947) and Gopi Chand Bhargava (MLA). This deliberation between Jenkins and Punjab leaders reveals the extent of trust that existed between them.

The last Governor of United Punjab, Evan Meredith Jenkins, witnessed the partition of that province in 1947. He remained as the Governor of Punjab from April 1946 to August 1947. Before his appointment as Governor he had served from 1943-1946 as the Private Secretary of Lord Wavell, the second last Viceroy of India. As he had been in the served the Indian Civil Service since 1920 he knew the whole hierarchy of the administration of India as well as its politicians.

In 1945, after the Second World War, the British were loosing their hold on their colonies which were demanding independence from the imperialists. The colonized countries of Asia and Africa were all engulfed in this wave of independence. Some countries due to their sagacious and devoted leadership got independence; some were still struggling for their freedom.

The Second World War in which thousands of Indians laid down their lives to save the empire ended in 1945. During the war, Britain had

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** Dr Farah Gul Baqai, Senior Research Fellow, NIHCR, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

committed to grant independence to India after the war.¹ The end of the war, therefore, meant freedom for India. However, it did not mean the British were conceding freedom to India as a gift and the Indians had done nothing to achieve it. In fact, the British had realized that after the war it would not be possible for them to keep their hold on India, which had struggled for independence for a century. There were a number of factors that were in play in determining the future course of India. Both the Hindu and Muslim leadership had different ideas for the postcolonial period and in Punjab the thinking of the leadership was entirely parochial.² Especially, in the wake of British departure, a new pattern was to unfold and the leadership of the two communities had to determine their place in the new set up.

In this study, an analysis has been done to find how far Sir Evan Meredith Jenkins, the Governor of Punjab, succeeded in keeping his province safe from the adverse fall out of partition. Did he succeed in his endeavour or not? What were the impediments which stood in the way of the man holding the highest office in the province? Was he a good administrator? Or was he only good at informing his superiors of doomsday scenarios? Was he able to nip the evil in the bud as was expected of him? Did the course of events, in which the British were to leave India to its own fate, overtake him? These questions need to be answered to understand his role in the last days of the Raj.

The focus of this paper is on Jenkins' correspondence with Indian leaders, his meetings, talks and the reports that he communicated to the higher authorities in Delhi and England.

The main leadership of the Punjab at that time consisted of Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot (President, Punjab Muslim League) Mian Mumtaz Daultana (MLA), Firoz Khan Noon (MLA), Tara Singh (MLA), Giani Kartar Singh (MLA), Sardar Baldev Singh (Defence Minister in 1946-47), and Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava (MLA). This paper reveals the extent to which Jenkins was taking the provincial leadership and some other people into confidence. Did they trust him? How sincere was he with them? These are important queries to be answered?

A dispassionate study of the partition would reveal how political motives and uncompromising attitude of the leaders of the majority party had made a farce of democratic institutions and distorted the fine values of the three communities, who were otherwise quite accommodative with

¹ Nicholas Mansergh, *Transfer of Power 1942-47*, Vol. I (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1980), 155 and 171-72.

² *Police Abstract of Intelligence Punjab*, Lahore, para 17, commented by J. M. Dean, Assistant to the DIG of Police, Punjab, 19.

each other in their day-to-day dealings. It would also be instructive to know why the communal rift intensified in Punjab and why Jinnah, ambassador of Hindu Muslim unity, became adamant about a separate Muslim state; what were the factors that such a drastic change came in his stance? The results of the 1937 election provide the background to these political developments. The Congress was in majority in eight of the eleven provinces mainly Bihar, Orissa, C.P, U.P, and Madras. In these five provinces, Congress had a clear-cut majority. In Bombay and NWFP, it had a coalition government, while the Punjab and Bengal had a Muslim tilt. In the Punjab it was Sir Fazl-i-Hussain's Unionist Party and in Bengal Fazl-i-Haq's Praja Krishak Party dominated the political scene. In eight majority provinces, Congress adopted discriminatory policies against the Muslim minorities. In schools, it was obligatory to learn Hindi; in the job market as well as in government offices Hindu candidates were given preference over Muslim candidates. Muslims faced discrimination in every field of life. It was a foretaste of things to come. The Congress policy of excluding all the other parties from the provincial executive set at naught the wishes of the minorities and that meant representation in the legislatures alone would not be a sufficient safeguard. Hindu extremists in Congress disheartened Jinnah, who were not ready to give any concession to the minorities in India. This put Jinnah on the separatist path and gave birth to the demand for Pakistan.³ Now the question arises how far the common man supported this stance of Jinnah. The people who had been living together peacefully for centuries turned into enemies and indulged in such inhuman acts against each other that people were ashamed even to narrate those ghastly events. Both Muslims and non-Muslims acted with brutality and barbarism. They had no mercy for each other. What were the misgivings that caused them to behave like this? As the focus of this study is on the partition of Punjab, the grievances of the local population have to be kept in mind. Their properties were being taken over by Hindu *banias* and their lives had become hostage to rich moneylenders of the province. The illiterate peasants in need of money used to take loans at high interest rates against their landed property and when they could not pay back the Hindu *sahukar* (money-lender) he would ultimately take possession of their land, depriving the Muslim farmer of his property and position. With political change in 1947 reports of Muslim massacre in Bihar, Patna and Calcutta infuriated the Punjabis and Pathans who in retaliation killed thousands of non-Muslims in Hazara.⁴ The situation in Hazara

³ Mansergh, Vol. XII, 790.

⁴ *Police Abstract...*, 21 January 1947.

incited Muslims of Kharal village to attack Sikhs. They fled to Rawalpindi and the number of Sikh refugees rose to 6000 with as many as 5000 taking shelter in the shrine of Panja Sahib Gurdwara of Hasan Abdal in Attock District. Mehr Chand Khanna, Finance Minister of NWFP, visited Rawalpindi and Hasan Abdal to persuade the refugees to return to their homes, but the Sikhs refused saying they would go back when they felt safe. The trouble had not yet spread to Punjab, although a detachment of the Rawalpindi police had to open fire on 10 January to disperse a mob in a village of Murree. Extensive police patrolling had been ordered on the Rawalpindi Hazara border as a precautionary measure.⁵ These actions of the Punjabis and Pathans widened the rift between the Muslims and Sikhs. When Muslim League tried to seek reconciliation with the non-Muslims these incidences came in the way of conciliatory efforts.

On 20 February 1947, the Labour government in England decided to hand over power to the Indians by June 1948. This was the date, which set the ball rolling. After this announcement, the Indian political scenario moved like a torrent towards its logical end. In this chain of events, Punjab and Bengal suffered the most.⁶

The Labour government called Viceroy Wavell back to England. A royal family scion, Louis Mountbatten, replaced him. He reached India on 22 March 1947. He met all the eminent leaders of India and consulted them on the future course of events. In Punjab, as a result of 1946 elections, Muslim League had emerged as a single major party based on its communal identity. Jinnah tried to convince the minorities in the province that after the creation of Pakistan all citizens would be treated equally.⁷ The state would not discriminate against the minorities. In fact, their rights would be jealously guarded. The Sikhs did not believe those words as they had watched the election campaign, which was very communal oriented. From February 1946 to March 1947, the Muslim League had been campaigning against the Unionist government, which consisted of Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus. The Muslim League continued raising the slogans of Islam and Pakistan as the ultimate goals. On 2 March 1947, Khizr Hayat Tiwana resigned, much to the chagrin of the British administration which did not expect his resignation. Jenkins wrote in a letter to Viceroy Wavell, dated 3 March, that Khizr had

⁵ Ibid., 19.

⁶ Madhav Godbole, *The Holocaust of Indian Partition An Inquest* (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2006), 19.

⁷ G.Allana, *Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents* (Karachi: Paradise Subscription Agency, 1968), 513-14.

resigned earlier than was expected. He was perturbed by the Muslim League's continuous agitation against his government and the final blow came when His Majesty's Government (HMG) announced the plan of transfer of power by June 1948. The Muslim Leaguers were jubilant on this action of Khizr Tiwana, which frustrated the non-Muslim community. The Akali leader Master Tara Singh stood on the stairs of the Punjab Assembly building with a *kirpan* in his hand and uttered these bellicose words: "We will annihilate Muslims from Punjab". That utterance of the Sikh leader led to violent incidents in the whole of Punjab. Baldev Singh, who had the portfolio of Defense Minister in the interim government, wrote in the foreword of the booklet, *Punjab the Homeland of the Sikhs*,

The Sikhs will, under no circumstances, consent to live in a theocratic Muslim state, whether it is "Pakistan", or is styled on any other pattern. They stand, as their history too clearly shows, for a free and united India where their rights and privileges are fully secured.⁸

These lines were written by Baldev Singh way back in March 1945. There were Sikhs who under no circumstances were ready to accept Pakistan and so the question of joining with Pakistan's Punjab was next to impossible for them.

Jenkins had requested Mamdot to form the ministry however, he showed his simple majority, of course without the support of the Akalis and Congress members. Jenkins insisted on Mamdot to seek the support of the minorities, which was not possible for him, as Muslim League had fought the elections on communal basis and agitated against the Unionist ministry without let up. Muslim League's main objective was to safeguard the rights of Indian Muslims. However, after the announcement of the date for the transfer of power it was ready to have conciliatory talks with the Sikhs, assuring them of certain concessions if they acquiesced in joining the Muslim majority areas. But the Sikhs were not ready to listen after their massacre in Rawalpindi, in January and February, allegedly at the hands of the Muslims. They simply refused to fall in line with Muslim League's conciliatory efforts. The Muslims were eager to keep Punjab united but Sikhs demanded partition with their share in the pie.

With immense anxiety, different communities were agitating for their rights and share in power, however, it was the collapse of the administrative machinery that caused the colossal loss of lives.

⁸ Harnam Singh, *Punjab: The Homeland of the Sikhs* (Lahore: The Civil and Military Gazette Ltd., 1945).

According to Punjab *Police Abstract*, the resignation of the coalition ministry under Khizar Hayat, late on the night of 2 March, destabilized the provincial set up in an atmosphere where everybody had been talking about civil war and all communities were being exhorted by their leaders to lose no time in preparing themselves for the eventual struggle. In such circumstances, both the communities were equally responsible for what happened as a result.⁹ The spread of communal strife from the cities of Amritsar, Multan, Rawalpindi and Lahore to rural areas was mostly marked in the villages of Multan and Rawalpindi, where, as in the case of cities, special protective and deterrent arrangements had been made. An All Parties Peace Committee was formed in Lahore, but it was more for appearances sake than with any real wish to restore communal harmony.¹⁰

Sikhs against Muslim rule

The Sikhs strongly suspected that Muslim League had an unholy alliance with the British and they would establish Pakistan in Punjab come what may. The Sikh leaders painted a very gloomy picture for their community under Muslim rule in the province. They believed that Muslims would prohibit *jhatka* (sudden slaughter of animals that renders meat non-kosher for Muslims) meat, Persian would be made the official language and Sikhs would be subject to higher rates of taxes and land revenues than Muslims. They accused the Muslim premier of denying canal water to *doaba* areas creating widespread resentment among the Sikh peasantry giving birth to rebels like Babbar Akalis and Bhagat Singh. The Sikhs were told by their leaders to prevent the formation of Pakistan with their blood and devote a son to the cause of the *Panth* (path of Sikh warrior). They vowed that they would not allow Muslim League ministry in the Punjab. They demanded that British had to allocate Punjab to the Sikhs from whom they had taken it. The brutal killing of Babu Labh Singh infuriated Master Tara Singh, and, in a press statement, he repeated that he would not negotiate with Muslim League until they stop the killings and disturbances in general. Baldev Singh wanted Muslims to give assurance that they would protect the minorities. In his opinion, there could be no settlement with the local Muslim League leaders and that the matter would be taken up with Mr. Jinnah himself.¹¹

⁹ *Police Abstract* ..., 8 March 1947, para 140, 101.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 15 March 1947, para 160, 115.

Marching of Punjab towards disaster

In his notes of 4th March Jenkins wrote about the deteriorating communal situation of the last two days. The Muslim Leaguers were jubilant on the resignation of Khizr Hayat on the night of 2nd March. The Sikh held their meeting at Kapurthala House and decided not to accept any Muslim League government in Punjab. The Muslim League flag was taken down from the roads and buildings of Lahore and Muslim League badges worn by Muslims were snatched and torn. The Hindu students quarreled with police in which 30 policemen were injured.¹² The resignation of the coalition ministry, on 3rd March, took Congress circles by surprise but they lost no time and aligned themselves with anti-Muslim League elements in an attempt to prevent the formation of a government consisting solely of the members of one community. A Lahore District Congress Committee arranged a massive rally of about one lakh audience. The speakers were MLA's like Tara Singh, Ch. Lehri Singh, Master Kabul Singh, Dr. Gopi Chand and Giani Kartar Singh. The speeches called for a united front against Pakistan and they blamed the British for encouraging the Muslim League agitation; the governor was accused of having intrigued with the Muslim League and it was decided to organize large public meetings to be known as "Anti-Pakistan Conferences".¹³ On the same day Hindu and Sikh leaders issued a statement that said:

Under no circumstances are we willing to give the slightest assurance of support (sic) to Muslim League in the formation of a Ministry, as we are opposed to Pakistan in any shape or form.¹⁴

Jenkins told Mamdot that communal disharmony was causing him great anxiety. There had been serious clashes and arson in Murree, Taxila and other places in close proximity to Hazara and dislocation of mail and road traffic. Military and police were dealing with the situation in Rawalpindi and outside; they had done all that was possible with the forces at their disposal to bring the situation under control.¹⁵ In a meeting with Mamdot, Jenkins discussed the communal problem in Lahore and elsewhere in Punjab. Jenkins insisted that he (Mamdot) should negotiate with Sikhs, as time was running out and it was important that Muslims

¹² *Jenkins Papers*, Microfilm.no.1616 (IOLR 3/1/176), 4 March 1947, NDC, Islamabad, 18.

¹³ *Police Abstract...*, para 141, 102.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, para 149, 106.

reached some agreement with Sikhs before the opportunity was lost.¹⁶ In his report of that day (4th March) Jenkins wrote that he had discussed the killing of a number of Muslims at Shalmi and Lahori gate with Mamdot who had told Jenkins that Muslims had maintained peace in Lahore for the last 34 days, but non-Muslims had been violent from the very first day of their agitation. Jenkins insisted that the truth was yet to be ascertained when the full report about the killing was received.¹⁷

Jenkins inquiry of Mamdot's parliamentary position

Jenkins inquired from Mamdot about his parliamentary position. Mamdot confided to him that he had Muslim majority and support of a few other members. Jenkins believed that the Muslim ministry with a few insignificant supporters would not last for more than six weeks.¹⁸

The Members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly were to meet by 20th March. Jenkins' assumption was that there would be hostile, and possibly, violent demonstrations against the new government. He wanted Mamdot to give him complete list of his supporters. Yet, even if he (Jenkins) was satisfied, he might still not be able to appoint him as chiefminister. On the other hand, Muslim League was adamant that the result of elections dictated that it should be allowed to rule the province. The Punjab administration with the help of Congress, Akalis and the Unionist party assumed the ministries and started their government; the Muslim League agitated and continued their struggle till independence. They continued to demand their fair share in the Punjab government, which they were denied rendering them subservient to an influential minority. Jenkins alleged that it was the Muslim League, which had caused the disorder, and it was Muslim League's responsibility to restore peace in the province.¹⁹ On the other hand, Muslim League thought there was little weight in Jenkins' claim that he had maintained peace for ten months since taking over as governor on 10 April 1946 which the Muslim League agitation had spoiled.

In a meeting of 5th March Mamdot assured Jenkins that he would form the ministry in Punjab. He had the support of 100 members. He brushed aside Jenkins apprehensions that he would not be able to run the provincial government without the support of opposition. Mamdot

¹⁶ Ibid. *Jenkins Papers*, 4 March 1947, 2.

¹⁷ Ibid. Report of Jenkins, Iftikhar Mamdot to Jenkins.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Lionel Carter (ed.), *Punjab Politics 3rd March-31 May 1947 at the Abyss Governors' Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007), 232-34.

referred to that apprehension as theoretical speculation. He believed that without being involved (practically) one should not have tried to reach a conclusion.²⁰

Mamdot gave the following figures in his support: M.L 80 plus, 3 other Muslim members, 4 members of Scheduled Caste, 1 European and 2 Indian Christians. The number was most likely to go up to about 100 before the legislature resumed its session. Mamdot stressed that he could prove his majority on the floor of the house.²¹

Mamdot wrote to Jenkins on 5 March 1947 assuring him of his majority. The important point to note in that letter were the last few lines: "As for the risk which to my mind does not exist that the Ministry might fall as soon as it faces the Assembly", he said that such a risk was a theoretical possibility, which would be there in the formation of any ministry at any time. Moreover, he said that normal constitutional procedure should not, however, be deviated from. Mamdot requested Jenkins to permit him to submit the names of ministers for his approval for the new cabinet.²²

Jenkins had himself written to Wavell on 3rd March that technically speaking Mamdot commanded majority in the Punjab parliament and he should have been allowed to form the ministry but without minority support he could not last for more than a few weeks, and he had no choice but to enforce Section 93 of India Act 1935 from the outset.²³

Jenkins, in his manuscript notes, mentioned his interview with Malik Firoz Khan Noon in which the latter had said that League would not oppose Section 93 that most sensible Leaguers thought it to be inevitable. He wished a return to Unionism in some form — a coalition between Muslims and Sikhs. He did not think a purely Muslim government would succeed — he practically admitted that Mamdot had only 83 votes in total. In fact Mamdot's cabinet consisted of himself, Daultana, Noon and Shaukat. He (Noon) thought that Jenkins could only bring the parties together. He did not want that any of those facts should be made public, since he had not discussed them with Mamdot. For the future, Noon thought that the return of the Unionists was impossible. He

²⁰ *Jenkins Papers*, Notes of Jenkins, 5 March 1947. Nawab Iftikhar Hussain met him at 1:00 p.m.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Mamdot letter to Jenkins, 5 March 1947, 24. Rukhsana Zafar (ed.), *Disturbances in the Punjab 1947* (Islamabad: National Documentation Centre, 1995), 69.

²² *Jenkins Papers*, 5 March 1947, 32.

²³ *Ibid.*, Jenkins letter to Wavell, 3 March 1947, 4.

could not contemplate the idea of an undiluted Muslim ministry; he asked Jenkins for his views, and rejected the idea of general elections that had attracted him for a time. In fact Noon thought that the alternatives were a coalition government or imposition of Section 93 of Indian Act.²⁴

On his return from a tour of Multan and Rawalpindi Jenkins met Mamdot and Mumtaz Daultana at the Governor's House and gave them an account of areas where Muslims were the aggressors. The two agreed with Jenkins' views, both Daultana and Mamdot wanted reconciliation with Sikhs and Hindus.

Jenkins told them that Hindus were bitter over the Multan episode in which Muslims had killed a number of Hindus. Similarly, in Rawalpindi Muslims had committed atrocities and they (Hindus) strongly believed that the only solution of that communal bitterness was division of Punjab.²⁵

Jenkins persuasion for the meeting of the three communities

Jenkins had a meeting with Sardar Baldev Singh on 11 March 1947. He had a long talk with him from 5.00 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. During the meeting, they were joined by Sardar Swaran Singh. The Sikhs were angry and were not in a mood to negotiate with Muslim League. After much persuasion, Sardar Swaran Singh and Sardar Baldev Singh agreed that if the Muslim League took steps to stop the outrages and were authorised by their high command to negotiate with the minorities of Punjab, the Sikhs would be prepared to attend the meeting convened by Jenkins.

The meeting was to be between the three parliamentary leaders, Mamdot, Sardar Swaran Singh and Bhim Sen Sachar. They could bring one associate each with them. Jenkins contacted Mamdot and arranged the meeting on the next day.

There was little doubt that the Sikhs were intent only on reprisals and the Muslims had little chance of maintaining a united Punjab. The Sikhs' demand was partition and especially an immediate partition of the province. They were not clear about the boundary but what was clear was that they demanded a good deal more than the Muslims could ever be expected to concede. Sardar Swaran Singh produced a cyclostyled questionnaire and a writing pad, alleged to have been found by H.S Badri Dass in the High Court. The questionnaire invited Muslims to give information to an unspecified authority on various subjects, which indicated revolutionary intentions. The writing pad contained what

²⁴ Carter (ed.), 238-39.

²⁵ *Jenkins Papers*, 10 March 1947.

purported to be a note on a revolutionary organisation. Those documents were taken over by DIG/CID.

When the talks were over, Jenkins asked the DIG/CID to contact Mamdot that night and to make an appointment to meet him next day at 10.30 a.m. He told the DIG/CID to explain to Mamdot the conditions on which the Sikhs would be prepared to negotiate.²⁶ Those conditions were as under:

- a. Muslim leaders would do their utmost to stop disturbances in Rawalpindi, Attock and Multan.
- b. Obtain permission from their authority that they would negotiate freely as Punjabis both on short term and long term issues.

On the first condition Mamdot said that he had sent Maulana Daud Ghaznavi to Rawalpindi and *en route* he would stop at places like Gujranwala, Wazirabad, Gujrat and Jhelum. He would also visit Campbellpur in addition to Rawalpindi. Nawab Ashiq Hussain was to tour Multan, and by then he had proceeded to Multan. He would be assisted by Mian Allah Yar Khan Daultana, who was then in Multan.

On the second condition he (Mamdot) could not commit anything. Daultana was awaiting availability of air passage to Bombay to meet Mr. Jinnah. According to *Police Abstract* Mumtaz Daultana flew to Bombay to meet Mr Jinnah and returned to Lahore on 18th March. Since then Punjab Muslim League leaders had been engaged in further private discussions and Mamdot had issued a formal invitation to Master Tara Singh to co-operate with him in restoring communal peace. While efforts continued to form a stable ministry, the Punjab Muslim League Council directed Muslims to observe 'Pakistan Day' quietly and not to take out rallies.²⁷

Jenkins asked Mamdot about the instructions he expected Mr Jinnah would give. Mamdot replied that he had no idea. Mamdot then mentioned a number of League grievances. Several League workers were under arrest. Although carrying of sheathed swords in public was allowed, Muslims were being arrested if found carrying sheathed swords while the Sikhs were free to display their *kirpans*. On All-India Radio it was announced that sheathed swords were allowed but Muslims were being arrested on carrying even sheathed swords. Mamdot had received a telegram, which he gave to Jenkins mentioning the possibility of Sikhs' reprisal at Eminabad.

Jenkins responded that he had taken note of Mamdot's grievances but, at the same time, he repeated that Hindus and Sikhs were

²⁶ Ibid., 11 March 1947, 70-71.

²⁷ *Police Abstract*, para 177, 130.

complaining that Muslim police were victimizing them. Therefore, it was necessary to arrest Muslims carrying arms. Jenkins explained the history of *kirpan* controversy and said that government could not do anything about it. He noted that he would make enquiries about Sikhs' reprisal at Eminabad.²⁸

Jenkins arrangements for the safety of minorities

Lala Bhim Sen Sachar on 12 March 1947, requested Jenkins to arrange more police pickets as the situation had deteriorated. He predicted that Malakwal (a place near Mandi Bahauddin) would be attacked by rioters. He requested for more non-Muslim police. Jenkins told him that the I.G had 2,000 vacancies and would gladly recruit non-Muslims if they were suitable. About Sachar's request for inquiry into police excesses, Jenkins told him that they were dealing with a national disaster and, in those disastrous times, they could not go for witch hunting in deciding who was guilty and who was innocent. Sachar then changed his tone and said what he meant was that law and order should be restored. Sachar had complained against Dildar Hussain Shah against whom Gyani Kartar Singh too had earlier complained. Jenkins thought it was the I.G's duty to look into Dildar Hussain Shah's matter.

Sachar asked for the appointment of a new officer on the investigation of criminal cases arising from rioting. He complained that police had wantonly fired on the Ganga Ice factory and shot at some *chowkidars* who had annoyed them. Jenkins told him that actually there was firing from inside the factory targeting the police who had returned the fire. Sachar complained about firing at Ch. Chhajju Ram Auhkh's house, Jenkins told him it was the result of a fight in the neighbourhood. Then he said that one Sardar Khazan Singh had fired a shot to frighten away a mob and that the gun was taken away by police. Jenkins thought it was quite right. Sachar said that a certain Jagan Nath Sharma who had a licence for a weapon was away in Calcutta but his weapon, apparently a revolver, had been removed from his house. Jenkins said that there was nothing wrong in that. He then cited the case of the Mahavidyalaya, whose weapons were recovered by the police on Rajgarh Road.

Sachar requested that non-Muslim police should be used in Hindu areas. Jenkins informed him that the district police were not organized communally and that the recruits were from all communities.

²⁸ Carter (ed.), 242-43.

Jenkins solution to communal rift: Punjabis should think in terms of Punjab only

In the end, Jenkins and Sachar discussed the general situation. Jenkins then narrated what he had gathered from the attitude of Muslim League and the Sikhs, and told Sachar that they were facing a disaster which was far beyond politics; and selfish interests should not further aggravate it. Jenkins thought that the Congress like the League was chained closely to their high command who did not care a bit of what happened to Punjab and that unless the leaders themselves got down to the nitty-gritty of making a settlement as Punjabis, there would be no progress. Sachar was friendly and he told Jenkins that he would meet him once a week.²⁹ This theory of Jenkins that Punjabis should think in terms of Punjab only, did not impress the leaders, as they believed that their respective people had gone too far down the road to be swayed by appealing to their basic identities.

Jenkins in his notes of 20 March 1947 wrote that Ghazanfar Ali Khan came to meet him and talked about a new central ordinance. According to this ordinance, the houses of different communities would be inspected by the opposite religion's group police force. Ghazanfar Ali had his apprehensions on the practicality of the ordinance. He thought that non-Muslims would face resistance if they went into a Muslim village and demanded house search, similar would be the case when Muslims would visit Hindu or Sikh dominant villages. It would further divide the society and that ordinance was supposed to be extended to military units, which would create cleavage within the armed forces and would be harmful for the security of various communities in Punjab and elsewhere.

The important point that Jenkins discussed in his notes was that he met Malik Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana [the ex-premier of Punjab] on 20 March 1947. Khizr gave him an important hint that several of the Muslim Unionists would be joining Muslim League. The Schedule caste and Christians too would be joining Muslim League. Khizr himself did not intend to join Muslim League as he had already made plans to visit Europe in the summer from May onwards.³⁰ He (Khizr) thought that Muslim League with the backing of few Schedule caste or Christian members could not work at all. There would be immediate blood-shed on a much wider scale than hitherto. According to Jenkins, Khizr was very

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 244-45. Note by Jenkins of interview with Sachar on 12 March 1947, probably at Governor House. Sachar met Jenkins at 6 p.m.

³⁰ *Jenkins Papers*, 3 March 1947, 3.

pessimistic about the future of Punjab. In his view, no stable government would be possible in Punjab without an agreement at the centre.³¹

Evacuation of non-Muslim women from Jhelum

Gokul Chand Narang wrote to Jenkins dated 21 March 1947 beseeching his assistance for security during the Shalamar fair and evacuation of Hindus and Sikhs in military vehicles from the villages around Jhelum and requested for the recovery of women abducted from Jhand.³²

Gokul Chand Narang came to meet Jenkins on the afternoon of 22 March 1947. Jenkins assured him that proper precautions had been taken for security of Shalamar fair. For the Jhelum evacuees special arrangements had been made. Measures had been taken to recover the abducted women. His apprehension about 23 March celebrations by the Muslims were dismissed by Jenkins as misplaced. He told Narang that Muslims were not receiving arms from Kohat and NWFP. Jenkins confided in him that arrangements had been underway to recruit 4,000 policemen who would all be non-Muslims. Narang asked for permission to give a statement to the press in this regard, but Jenkins refused until the I.G of Police had cleared that.³³

Giani Kartar Singh and Sardar Jagjit Singh Man had a meeting with Jenkins on 24 March 1947 for over an hour in the afternoon. They had discussion on fourteen points concerning the condition of Sikhs in West Punjab. Giani stressed that there was a need for more camps for refugees. The Patiala, Kapurthala and Faridkot states would accept 7,000 to 8,000 refugees.

On the recovery of abducted women he said that they would be around four hundred. A large number of Sikh refugees were to be accommodated in *gurdwaras*. Giani stressed that I.G of Police should recruit non-Muslims on priority basis and for it, the recruiting officer should make special efforts; he was not against Muslim quota in police as such. He did not insist on the recruitment of prosecution officers under the circumstances when division on communal basis was looming on the horizon. His main stress remained on recruitment of non-Muslims.

Giani stressed that a Sikh should be appointed as A.D.M. or D.S.P in Amritsar, but Jenkins informed him that he was pressed by all communities on the issue of appointments of police and each community

³¹ Ibid., 131.

³² Ibid., 134-35.

³³ Ibid., 139-40.

desired that officers of their community should spearhead the administrative jobs.³⁴

Malik Firoz Khan Noon had a meeting with Jenkins to discuss the communal impasse in Punjab. Jenkins' understanding of Malik Firoz Khan Noon was similar to that of other Muslim leaders; he (Firoz) did not quite realize what would be the consequences of the massacre of non-Muslims³⁵

Malik Firoz Khan Noon's mention of opening a food supply in Rawalpindi annoyed Jenkins who replied that he would not be worried if Muslims of Rawalpindi went without food as they themselves had destroyed the food-depots. Nevertheless, when his anger subsided the next day, he said he would see to that.

Non-Muslims *hartals*' were still common in Rawalpindi division. Each day they appealed for observing *hartals* (strikes). Firoz Khan said that the non-Muslims wanted to pressurize the authorities. Jenkins advised him that Muslim League should change its stance towards the Sikhs and Hindus who had suffered in the riots of January and February initiated by Muslims in Rawalpindi division.

Firoz Khan told Jenkins that Muslims felt strongly about Sikhs being allowed to carry *kirpans* under the Arms Act. Jenkins said that Muslims could not get away with 4000 corpses of non-Muslims. He said he would not interfere with Sikhs' privileges as long as he remained the administrator of Punjab. Asked how could Muslim League's efforts for reconciliation with the non-Muslims succeed, Jenkins told Firoz that Muslims would have to repent for what they had done to the non-Muslims in the early part of 1947 in Rawalpindi.³⁶

Jenkins confers with Punjab leaders for reconciliation

Jenkins met Sardar Swaran Singh and Giani Kartar Singh on 26th March to discuss the problems of Sikh refugees and relief efforts.³⁷ The Darbar Sahib Committee in Amritsar had employed around 80 Sikh ex-soldiers at Rs.40 per month per person, with free rations, to protect the *gurdawaras* and auxiliary properties. In Rawalpindi, the Singh Sabha had set up an enquiry office with Niranjan Singh as in-charge to collect evidence about the recent riots. Recruitment to the Akali *fauj* also picked up.

³⁴ Ibid., 145-46.

³⁵ Ibid., 151

³⁶ Ibid., 151-52. Firoz Khan Noon meeting with Jenkins, 24 March 1947.

³⁷ Ibid., 155-57. Sardar Swaran Singh and Giani Kartar Singh meet Jenkins on 26 March 1947.

In Jullunder the Sikhs were more disturbed by the death of Babu Labh Singh (President of Shiromani Akali Dal) than by the news of Sikh casualties in Attock and Rawalpindi riots. Refugees from Rawalpindi had started reaching the central districts and it was natural that Sikhs would be infuriated when they heard the refugees describe their sufferings at the hands of Muslims.³⁸

Muslim League leaders like Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (MLA), Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan, Salar-i-Ala of Muslim League National Guards (MLNGs) visited Amritsar, Multan and Rawalpindi. They urged Punjab League leaders to do all they could to bring the disturbances under control.³⁹

Muslim League was eager to help the administration in Punjab as it wanted a way out of the political and constitutional deadlock; but, it did not know how to proceed since it was difficult to pacify the Sikhs who had demanded the partition of the province. They refused to live with the Muslims after the Rawalpindi massacre. Jenkins held on to his belief that Muslim League was not following the right path by pursuing a communal approach. Jenkins was for the unity of Punjab but Muslim League had nullified his efforts by pursuing policies that he thought wrong. Looking at from the non-parochial angle a united Punjab suited even the Sikh community. "Punjab could prosper only if it retains its present boundaries", said Jenkins.⁴⁰ He thought it better to find a solution acceptable to the majority of Punjabis rather than to adopt a center plan. Jenkins advised:

If the Muslims seriously wanted reconciliation with the Sikhs, they must act as it is necessary to act after a serious personal quarrel. They must go to the Sikhs preferably in the first instance to some one like Sardar Swaran Singh—admit the blame for events in the Rawalpindi Division and ask what they can now do to put things right. Hair splitting about the degree of blame attributable to the different communities would get the Muslims nowhere.⁴¹

Sardar Swaran Singh, Dr. Gokul Chand Narang, Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava, and Lala Bhim Sen Sachar saw Jenkins on 31 March 1947 and discussed with him matters such as the recruitment of non-Muslims in the police cadre which the Muslim police high ups were discouraging.

³⁸ *Police Abstract*, para 176, 130.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Mansergh, Vol. X, 45.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 46.

The atrocities and excesses committed against non-Muslims in Rawalpindi and other places of west Punjab were also discussed. The question of paying adequate compensation to the aggrieved was raised which Jenkins approved. The provision of security to non-Muslim grain dealers was also agreed upon in the face of harassment by Muslims. The problems relating to rehabilitation of non-Muslim refugees was also discussed.

Jenkins' concern for the army

It was a matter of satisfaction for Jenkins that the army had no communal structure that could have greatly complicated things in Punjab and probably the whole country. It meant the Muslims were not thinking in terms of some bigger adventure. He said, "The Army, though it did well while the disturbances were at their height, was now likely to develop a communal outlook". Many Punjabi troops were Muslims belonging to affected districts. Jenkins narrated that the army, like the police, had in his opinion done very well indeed, Muslim officers commanded non-Muslims and vice-versa. Jenkins was particularly anxious that nothing should be said to cast doubts regarding the impartiality of the army. He said, "...we owed much to the co-operation of the Military commanders and their troops, and it would be disastrous if Punjab forfeited their good-will". There was not a single unit which had a fully Muslim force and Muslim command.⁴² Jenkins, however, complained about Sikh leader Master Tara Singh who instigated riots in Delhi, Cawnpore and Calcutta. He argued that the excessive display of weapons by Sikhs had forced Muslims to demand for arming themselves with swords, though there was prohibition on keeping weapons of any sort. Sardar Swaran Singh protested against politicizing Master Tara Singh and said that Muslims might also be allowed to keep swords. He pointed out that in Rawalpindi division Sikhs were not allowed to carry *kirpans*; whereas Sikh never used his *kirpan* for any unlawful act.⁴³ This assertion by Sardar Swaran Singh is not supported by facts. On the contrary, Bhag Singh, was making preparation for the defence of the Sikhs by manufacturing *kirpans* which were to be supplied to different districts according to their requirements.⁴⁴ This is recorded in *Police Abstract*.

⁴² *Jenkins Papers*, Jenkins meeting with Sardar Swaran Singh, Dr. Gokul Chand Narang, Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava and Lala Bhim San Sachar, 31 March 1947.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 171-76.

⁴⁴ *Police Abstract*, 3 May 1947, para 319, 234.

Gurdawaras and Sikh militants

According to N.D.T. Sutton, Assistant to the DIG Police, Punjab, dated 5 April 1947, the leading politicians representing the three major communities in the Punjab appear to have come to the conclusion that a civil war was inevitable. No one made the slightest effort to suggest a peaceful approach and the campaign of vilification and preparation for war continued apace. Punjab was taking on the air of an armed camp. This utter dearth of statesmanship and the attendant dangers were gradually stirring the concern of the conscientious who realized that the policy of drift could only lead to a blood bath, and they had pinned their hopes on the talks in Delhi between the Viceroy and the representatives of two major communities.⁴⁵

The *Police Abstract* of Punjab explained the situation in these words:

Communal incidents real or imagined, continue to be reported without respite, gave rise to immediate panic and heightened mistrust. It was not surprising that a growing number of people of all communities betray an increasing annoyance at the continual jingoism of their political leaders and pin all their hopes of peace on a solution, imposed if necessary, from New Delhi.⁴⁶

Administrative flaws

Malik Firoz Khan Noon had a meeting with Jenkins in which he told him about the false cases against the Muslims. Jenkins explained to him that it was natural when so many disturbances were taking place in the province. However, Firoz Khan Noon thought that disturbances had subsided, but institution of false cases against Muslims was still a disturbing factor. The Muslims were not satisfied with the investigation of Bhag Singh (Advocate). Jenkins thought Bhag Singh was not a communal-minded person, though he (Bhag Singh) was active in the manufacturing of *kirpans* and supplying them according to demand. In fact, he was disliked by both Congress and the Muslim League. Firoz Khan Noon insisted that a British magistrate should decide cases arising from disturbances and petty cases should be dropped. He was critical of police harassment of Muslim population.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Ibid., 153.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 12 April 1947, 171.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 197. Carter (ed.), 118, 266-67. Jenkins wrote time of meeting in his notes of 3 April 1947.

Ch. Lahri Singh (Minister for Public Works) also met Jenkins, he was anxious about the situation in Gurgaon. He thought retired military officers should be reinstated to keep Gurgaon and Rohtak peaceful. He talked about the political situation in Punjab and its future. He requested him as the Governor of Punjab to bring the three parties to some settlement so that Punjab could remain united, something that Jenkins himself wanted. But it was impracticable because Punjabi leaders had become so communal in their outlook that they would not listen to reason.⁴⁸

The general atmosphere was tense and anxiety prevailed among the public. People wanted successful outcome of the talks in Delhi between the Viceroy and the political leaders. But they knew that it was their wishful thinking as the gulf of differences had widened between the provincial political and communal leaders. The influx of refugees and incidents of communal strife which continued to occur in many districts were sufficient to keep Punjab in acute tension.⁴⁹

A pamphlet signed by a number of Sikh leaders narrated the woes of Sikhs in Muslim majority areas of Rawalpindi, Attock and Jhelum. The pamphlet mentioned that “thousands of innocent Sikhs were murdered in cold blood. Loot and arson in Attock and Jhelum districts, villages upon villages were destroyed and razed to the ground”. “In order to establish Pakistan the atrocities committed against Sikhs in the Punjab since 5th March 1947 have not come to light because of censorship on news. Although the Sikh population was small in the District of Attock, Rawalpindi and Jhelum they owned valuable property in these places”. It added that all “the Sikhs of these districts except few” have been killed.

Their properties were looted, their houses burnt, women outraged and many young girls converted to Islam. Their woeful tale was worth Jenkin's patient hearing. But all what was done was according to a pre-arranged plan. At first, the Muslim took Sikhs into their confidence on the pretext of providing them shelter from being attacked. Later, they were forced to part with their money in order to pay to the *goondas* who threatened to attack and loot. Besides spears, swords, guns and bombs were also used. *Lambardars* were the ring-leaders of the *goondas*. Only the lives of those Sikh women were saved who agreed to their conversion to Islam. The others either committed suicide or were burnt alive. The souls of all those innocent women demanded justice. The *goondas* had brought camels and bullocks-cart to take away the booty. About thirty thousands Sikh lives were saved by the military, and all of

⁴⁸ *Jenkins Papers*, 199-200. Ch. Lahri Singh came to meet Jenkins at 12.00 noon on 4 April 1947.

⁴⁹ *Police Abstract*, 19 April 1947, para 253, 189.

them were shifted to relief camps. Those who owned lacs of rupees were now living a miserable life. There were thousands of Sikhs in relief camps including women and children. They were in need of everything. Thousands of young girls needed clothing.⁵⁰

The details of atrocities committed by Muslims on Non-Muslims in Potohar and N.W.F.P. were given and an appeal for preparation for revenge was issued.

Sd/-

1. Tara Singh (Master)
2. Harkishan Singh (Bawa)
3. Bhag Singh (Advocate)
4. Jogindar Singh Mann (M.L.A.)
5. Gurbachan Singh (M.L.A.)
6. Indar Singh (M.L.A.) Cawnpore.
7. Mohan Singh Jathedar Sri Akal Takht Sahib
8. Buta Singh (Sir) (Lyallpur)
9. Udham Singh Nagoke
10. Jagjit Singh Mann., (M.L.A.)
11. Pritam Singh Gujran (Pardhan Shrimoni Riasti Akali Dal)
12. Santokh Singh, (ex-M.L.A.)
13. Kartar Singh Giani, (M.L.A.) (Pardhan, Shrimoni Akali Dal)
14. Baldev Singh Hon'ble (Defence Minister) Delhi
15. Jaswant Singh Duggal (M.L.A.)
16. Ujjal Singh (M.L.A.)
17. Narotam Singh (Advocate) Hissar
18. Hukam Singh (Advocate), Montgomery⁵¹

In this pamphlet, an appeal was made for collection of fifty lakh rupees for fighting Pakistan in which Sikhs thought they had buried their dead. Every house, every *mohalla*, every village was to contribute one rupee per head. Also in every house one handful of flour was to be set apart for the Guru's fund at the time of kneading flour.⁵²

Jenkins confided to Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, India and Baldev Singh, Defense Minister of India, that he was of the opinion that the attack on non-Muslims was predetermined and organized. Muslim League leaders were inciting their followers to violence. No action was taken against them when they had launched civil disobedience movement. Thus, the trouble continued to grow which finally resulted in the resignation of the coalition ministry.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 219-21. *Jenkins Papers*, MF. no.1616, Carter (ed.), 118-122.

⁵¹ Ibid., 222-24.

⁵² Shahid Hamid, *Disastrous Twilight* (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), 159.

Baldev Singh maintained that it was partly the fault of the administration which encouraged such circumstances and then allowed the Muslims to commit violence. He said that the gulf created between the two communities was unbridgeable. He even told Jenkins that he had written directly to His Majesty's Government on the subject.⁵³

In his notes of 9 April, Jenkins wrote about his talks with His Highness the Raja of Faridkot. He said that in that meeting they discussed Master Tara Singh and Baldev Singh and their violent propaganda from which it could be inferred that they intended to attack Muslim population in the province. Jenkins believed that during those crucial times it was necessary that both the fellows should take a moderate line. Retaliation would do no good to any one but could bring untold harm. Jenkins said that no matter what decision Delhi took, Punjab must maintain its peace. The Sikhs screaming for revenge were making it impossible by their bellicose stance. Jenkins asked about the federation of Sikh states. The Raja of Faridkot replied that it was still under consideration as the leading spirit of that project was he himself and ruler of Nabha. The Sikhs would like a federation of states under Patiala, to which the Sikh districts of Punjab could later accede. The Raja agreed with Jenkins that Tara Singh and Baldev Singh were extremely violent. He promised Jenkins that he would try his best to make the Sikh Akalis cool down. He and other Sikh leaders later co-operated with Congress to have their own states amalgamated with India.⁵⁴

Baldev Singh wrote a letter to Jenkins, dated 7 April 1947, in which he narrated that during his visit to Punjab he was overwhelmed by the sufferings of the Sikhs. He blamed the irresponsible behaviour of the Muslim League for the atrocities. The coalition government resigned because of Muslim League defiance. It was rumoured that large quantities of arms were being smuggled into the Punjab from the Frontier and tribal areas.⁵⁵ The outcome of the disturbances was the manifest desire of the Hindus and Sikhs to increase their representation in the ranks of the Punjab Police.⁵⁶ Baldev Singh thanked Jenkins for recruiting non-Muslims in Punjab Police which was reassuring for the minority community.⁵⁷

⁵³ Ibid., 160.

⁵⁴ Carter (ed.), 269-70. In his notes of 9 April 1947 Jenkins wrote about his talks with His Highness Raja of Faridkot at 3:00 p.m.

⁵⁵ *Jenkins Papers*, 226-28.

⁵⁶ *Police Abstract*, 19 April 1947, para 265, 196.

⁵⁷ *Jenkins Papers*, 228.

* Federation of States under Patiala, see *ibid.*, 136.

Jenkins was requested to plead the Sikh case

Giani Kartar Singh wanted Jenkins to plead the Sikh case with Viceroy Mountbatten but Jenkins wanted to know what the Sikhs actually wanted. He (Giani) argued that if the British could settle the cases of Hindus and Muslim, why could not they do the same for the Sikhs. Jenkins asked him that if the Muslim League and Congress co-operated in the Constituent Assembly, would the Sikhs support that or would they stay out of that. The Giani replied that the Sikhs were still dissatisfied with the statement of 16 May 1946. He said the Sikhs would go to the Constituent Assembly if they were given the same right of communal veto as had been granted to the Muslims in the Assembly. Giani Kartar Singh wanted immediate partition but Jenkins pointed out that that would be extremely difficult as then the Hindu Jats would also demand their own "Jat State". Giani said that the Sikhs had no intention of coercing Hindu Jats. The Hindus might have their own state; he would raise no objection. The Sikhs only wanted a non-Muslim state. Such a state would be amalgamated or federated with the Phulkian states, and would be free to join Hindustan or Pakistan or to remain completely independent and to make a separate treaty with Her Majesty's Government.

Giani Kartar Singh said that the Muslim League had only rhetoric about United Punjab but practically they had done nothing; their whole scheme was based on communalism and Muslim dominance in Punjab. He appreciated British efforts to develop Punjab in the last century of their rule.⁵⁸

Sikh's efforts to punish Muslims

Jenkins reminded Giani Kartar Singh of Sikhs' intention to oust Muslims from Punjab and referred to the two pamphlets in Gurmukhi in this connection. He also mentioned Sikhs' call to raise a fund of fifty lakh rupees to buy weapons and fight the Muslims. Giani laughed heartily at this and said Sikhs would not attack Muslims as long as the British were ruling.⁵⁹

Giani Kartar Singh again visited Jenkins. Jenkins gave him two letters from the Viceroy; one was for Giani and the other was for Tara Singh. These were probably invitations to the two leaders for a meeting with the Viceroy. Giani pleaded that Sikh cause must be given importance by His Majesty's Government and it would be grossly unjust if the British left without any appropriate provisions for them.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Mansergh, Vol. X, 185.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ *Jenkins Papers*, 252-56. Giani Kartar Singh visited Jenkins on 10 April 1947.

Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Shaukat Hayat Khan called on Jenkins as they had visited Multan while Shaukat had visited Amritsar, Ludhiana and Hoshiarpur also. The following main points were taken up for discussion.

Daultana said that at Multan non-Muslims were the aggressors. Jenkins pointed out that the casualties told a different tale. In the rural areas Muslims had behaved quite decently. The attacks on Hindu landlords had economic motives. Twelve hundred Muslims had been arrested. Daultana asserted that the arrested persons were innocent. Jenkins refused to agree with Daultana's assessment.

Daultana mentioned reports about women who were molested at Lahore Railway Station. The report he mentioned stated that they were Muslim women who were molested in the belief that they were Sikh. He believed that in those incidents non-Muslim volunteers were involved. Daultana asserted that Muslim League had the impression that the administration was very hostile towards them. They thought press censorship was unfair, inflammatory statements by non-Muslims were allowed but reactions by Mamdot and other Muslim Leaguers were not published in the newspapers. They complained about this communal bias.⁶¹

Jenkins views about Sikhs

The Sikhs were a very important community of Punjab. Their number was not very large. They were about twenty eight million according to 1941 census. However, they were a compact militant community. Jenkins thought of Punjab having three parts representing the three communal groups bound together in a loose federation. He thought that a total break-up or partition would be harmful for Punjab in the long run.⁶²

Mamdot and Shaukat met Jenkins on 19 May 1947. They complained about the general situation in Punjab. They said all their efforts to make peace with Hindus and Sikhs had failed. The Muslim League felt that British officials were against them. In Lahore firearms were openly used by Sikh students of the Sikh National College. The Sikhs were preparing for a big operation and they were supplied with arms owned by Allen Berry and Co, the firm which provided transport and arms to the Sikh *gurdawaras*. Jenkins was not satisfied with Shaukat and Mamdot's arguments against the Sikhs. He argued that most of the casualties were caused by the Muslims; Jenkins observed that the Sikhs undoubtedly talked foolishly and truculently. Mamdot told Jenkins that

⁶¹ Ibid., 241-45. Mian Mumtaz Daultana and Shaukat Hayat Khan called on Jenkins, 11 April 1947.

⁶² Ibid., 249-51.

the Muslim League tried to patch-up with the Sikhs but Tara Singh refused to meet any member of the Muslim League. Jenkins then told them about Tara Singh's letter to him (Jenkins) in which he wrote that the League was responsible for the killing of members of his community including women and children. He (Jenkins) therefore thought that Tara Singh was justified in refusing to meet the Muslim League leaders. Later Jenkins had talks with Sardar Swaran Singh about Muslim League's anxiousness for reconciliation. The Sardar's reply was that deeds would be more to the point than words.⁶³

⁶³ *Jenkins Papers*, 304-6. Mamdot and Shaukat met Jenkins on 19 May 1947.