

## **War Curriculum and its Impact on Pakistan (The Case Study of Afghan Refugees in NWFP)**

*Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat*

The story of migration of the Afghan refugees to areas now called Pakistan is as old as Afghanistan itself. However, the current study is focused on the Afghan refugees who migrated from Afghanistan in the political upheaval which started in 1978 in the form of Saur Revolution followed by Soviet intervention. Further more the study of these refugees in Pakistan should be studied in the special prism of Pak-Afghan relations, which itself is a tragic history of incompatibility arising from its colonial past, dissimilarities of approach of the two peoples about regional and global issues and of consistent denial of each other's view points vital to a meaningful relationship between them. As such, legal or logical principles fail to resolve their disputes in a manner in which they would do in the case of any other two nations. Such being the case, the Pakistanis and the Afghans have been living in a state of constant tension and suspicion since the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

Despite many commonalties between Pakistan and Afghanistan i.e. religion, history, heroes, language and culture, the political elite of both the countries, somehow failed to develop close and cordial relations with each other before the rise of *mujahideen* government in Afghanistan in 1992. Some of the causes of their estrangement were deeply rooted in the colonial era of the Anglo-Russian rivalry, the 'great game', the Anglo-Afghan wars, humiliating treaties<sup>1</sup>, the Pashtunistan issue and the

---

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, *The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan (1917-79): An Appraisal* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1997), p.372. Another major problem that emerged from the partition of the British India was the migration of round about five million non-Muslims from Pakistan to India and around six million Muslims. to Pakistan. The *muhajir* elite (emigrated elite) with their own biases in the higher policy making institutions played a negative role by creating Hindu phobia and India phobia in Pakistan.

super powers rivalry during the Cold War.<sup>2</sup>

### **Afghan revolution and the influx of refugees in Pakistan**

In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan the war clouds there might well have been a blessing for Islamabad. Pakistan was then relatively isolated, internationally. Peeved with Islamabad's alleged nuclear program, the imposition of sanctions by Carter administration in 1978 and again in 1979, the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in April 1979 followed by ransacking of US Embassy in Islamabad, in November 1979, in reaction to the rumoured American involvement in an attack on religious extremists in Saudi Arabia, relations between Washington and Islamabad reached their lowest ebb. Pakistan's economy was in a shamble, and its defense forces were armed with antiquated equipment. Thus Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was not less than a blessing in disguise to bailout Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorial regime from the quagmire of internal and external problems. The entire West led by US along with the Gulf countries promptly reached out to rescue Pakistan with promises of renewed economic and military assistance, and it also quickly boosted Pakistan's sagging prestige.<sup>3</sup>

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan for better or worse in December, 1979 turned newly non-aligned Pakistan into a frontline state to tackle with the Red menace creeping into the neighborhood. Within a few days of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, General Zia convened a meeting of senior officials in Islamabad to deliberate on Pakistan's response. Agha Shahi (the then Minister of Foreign Affairs) prepared a draft policy statement and pinpointed the following three options available for Pakistan:

1. To confront the Soviet Union directly by participating in the Afghan resistance.
2. To acquiesce in the imposed fait accompli and its political implications.
3. To protest the Soviet action for its violation of accepted international norms in the international forums of the United Nations, the Islamic Conference and the Non-aligned Movement and its defensive

---

<sup>2</sup> See for the two humiliating Anglo-Afghan treaties- Treaty of Gandamak of 1879 and the Durand Agreement of 1893 the above book.

<sup>3</sup> Robert G. Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988* (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd, 1991), p. 34.

capability without aligning itself with one side or the other in the superpower's tussle.<sup>4</sup>

The third (political) option was indeed Pakistan's overt choice; and in its public statements throughout the 1980s, the Zia government rarely deviated from it. Quietly, however, but simultaneously, Islamabad chose to supplement the third option with a fourth, covert support to Afghan guerrillas in armed struggle against both Kabul's and Moscow's forces in Afghanistan.

The reasons for the momentous Pakistani decision to become involved, overtly and covertly, on the side of the resistance in the Afghanistan war were multiple. Three reasons stand out in published analysis of this period:

1. Defending the integrity of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan.
2. Mitigating the severity of the Soviet military and political threat to Pakistan.
3. Increasing Pakistan's access to the political, military and economic benefits of alliance with the West.<sup>5</sup>

Well before the Soviet intervention, the Pakistan Army, in conformity with the fourth covert option, was training Afghan guerrillas. There is evidence, indeed, that Islamabad was facilitating a modest level of American covert assistance to the Afghan resistance movement who were fighting the PDPA regime in Afghanistan by late spring 1978 – half year before the Soviet intervention took place.

The era of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was also a period of change and transition in Pakistan. However, the interesting point worth noting in this decade of change was that Pakistan's Afghan policy did not change despite the change in government and leaders.<sup>6</sup> During Zia

---

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.26-7

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> General Zia remained in power till his death. Earlier in February 1985, a gradual return to democracy had brought Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo to power in the non-party elections and martial law was lifted in December, 1985. Prime Minister Junejo shared power with General Zia but was dismissed by the former in May 1988. After Zia's death Ghulam Ishaq Khan (the then Chairman of the Senate) became the President and in the elections of 1988, Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was able to make a comeback, became Prime Minister in December 1988. There were three sets of decision-makers in this decade. The first set was during the martial law government's time (1977-80) when the army was totally in control of policy making in all matters of state. The second set was during the era of controlled democracy (1985-88) when General Zia and Prime

regime, the key actors in policy making were the Chief Martial Law Administrator/Chief of the Army Staff and President (in September 1978 General Zia was sworn in as President), Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee, Finance and Foreign Ministers, Martial Law Administrators/Governors of N.W.F.P., and Balochistan, the Foreign Secretary, CMLA's Chief of Staff and the Director General, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).<sup>7</sup> The basic direction of foreign policy making was General Zia's making and he was personally very interested in overseeing the consolidation and implementation of Pakistan's Afghan policy. He was his own foreign and defense minister. There was a general impression in Pakistan and abroad that the Afghan policy was framed by the military at the behest of the US and that the decision makers were puppets pulled by American strings.<sup>8</sup>

The Afghan resistance movement and the influx of refugees into Pakistan made the game of Zia simpler. In this new 'great game', if the CIA and US *interalia* were interested in punishing the Soviets in Afghanistan to avenge their defeat of Vietnam, Pakistan wanted to gain maximum political, economic and strategic advantages by avenging its historical enmity and grievances over Pashtunistan issue with Afghanistan.

Islamabad's political, economic and military involvement in the new Afghan gambit was so well planned, organized and institutionalized that almost all Afghan refugees living in Pakistan were trapped in this scheme. The main thrust of Pakistan's Afghan policy was basically aimed at the following three points:

1. mobilizing international support against Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan;
2. assisting the people of Afghanistan in the *jihad* against the Soviet forces; and
3. seeking a political-diplomatic solution of the crisis on the negotiating table.<sup>9</sup>

---

Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo shared power in a diarchal political set up. The third set was when the PPP returned to power (1988-90) and power was being shared by the political triad (the prime minister, the chief of army staff and the president).

<sup>7</sup> Mushahid Hussain, *Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers 1990), pp.116-27

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, p.125

<sup>9</sup> Ijaz Khan & Nasreen Ghufraan (eds.), *Pakistan's Foreign Policy Regional Perspective: A Critique*, Conference Proceedings, organized jointly by Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar & Hanns Seidel Foundation Islamabad, 10-11 May 1999, p.75

Though the official policy of Islamabad towards Afghanistan was based on the concept of Islamic brotherhood, neighborhood and humanitarianism, yet its role in the conflict was determined by its secret policy with following objectives:

- to oust the Russians from Afghanistan;
- to topple the pro-Russian Kabul government;
- to suppress and discourage Pashtun nationalism;
- to gain ‘strategic depth’ vis-a-vis the larger adversary – India;
- to destabilize Afghan state institutions;
- to modernize its own army with the western assistance;
- to legitimize and prolong Zia’s rule on the pretext of Afghan *jehad*;
- to divert public attention from domestic politics to external threats,
- and last, but not the least, to reduce Afghanistan to the status of Pakistan’s protégé or at least to let it be governed by her puppets.<sup>10</sup>

Brigadier (Retd.) Mohammad Yousaf revealed in his two books *Silent Soldier: The Man behind the Afghan Jihad* and *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story* that it was General Akhtar who ‘urged Zia to take the military option’ instead of diplomatic option for countering the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. His arguments for ‘military option’ were as follows:

- It would be a *jehad* against the communist infidels;
- it would be Pakistan’s first line of defense in the West, and;
- it would regain for him (Zia) some of his lost international esteem (lost as result of executing Z. A. Bhutto),
- Pakistan would back the *jehad* covertly.<sup>11</sup>

But with the passage of time nothing left covert in dealing with the Afghan issue, as Zia-ul-Haq involved himself and his country in the Afghan affairs to the extent that he told General Akhtar ‘the water in Afghanistan must boil at the right temperature’.<sup>12</sup>

For implementation of this scheme, Islamabad systematically wove an administrative and ideological web for trapping the refugees by taking following steps:

<sup>10</sup> Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, ‘Pakistan’s Strategic role in the Afghan crisis’, *Pakistan*, Journal of Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1993, nos, 27-8, p.37.

<sup>11</sup> See for details Brigadier (Retd.) Mohammad Yousaf, *Silent Soldier: The Man behind Afghan Jihad*, Lahore, Jang Publishers, and *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992). Brigadier (Retd) discussion with the author in Baragali.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

1. The Afghan Cell.
2. The Afghan Refugees Commissionerate and categorization of Afghan refugees into:
  - a. *Muhajireen* or refugees and
  - b. *Mujahideen* or freedom fighters.
3. According to official explanation only refugees lived in settled areas of Pakistan while the *mujahideen* were based in the tribal areas.
4. Islamabad recognized only seven *tanzimat* (parties) of the Afghan *mujahideen* to hijack the entire resistance of the Afghans.
5. Allowing legal and illegal NGOs to tackle refugee issue.
6. Islamists *jehadi* culture was introduced, encouraged and sustained.

### **Refugees and the Afghan Cell**

At the higher level, Pakistan created special Afghan Cell for the Afghan affairs over and above the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

There were two power structures (the formal and the real) in operation during the Zia era. The formal power structure incorporated the civil bureaucracy and the cabinet while the real power structure which included the ‘club’ actually called the shots in all policy decision making. The membership of the club was limited to the key lieutenant generals, including the governors of provinces, the corps commanders, the DG ISI and the VCOAS. The only civilian members of the club were the Finance Minister and later the Chairman of the Senate (Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan) and the Foreign Minister (Sahibzada Yaqub Khan). Every cabinet meeting was preceded by a day or two earlier, by a club meeting, where the real decisions were taken, which were then formalized in the cabinet. On Afghanistan, a committee used to meet every month to review the situation with the club members in attendance plus the governors of NWFP and Balochistan.<sup>13</sup>

General Zia reconstituted the Afghan Cell. Its initial purpose was limited only to collect information on a day-to-day basis and to keep the government updated and to help it formulate policies regarding Afghanistan. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the scope of the cell was widened and it included nearly all the top brass of the civil and military bureaucracy. General Zia presided over its meetings and its members included the VCOAS, the Foreign Minister, the MLAs of NWFP and Balochistan, the secretaries of SAFRON (State and Frontier Regions), Information, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Interior, Director Intelligence Bureau, Director Military Intelligence and Director General

---

<sup>13</sup> Mushahid Hussain, *op.cit.*, quoted interview with Lt. General (Retd) Hameed Gul, pp.125-27.

Inter Services Intelligence. It was a broad body to deal with the Afghan crisis and to formulate policy.

During Benazir's first regime the Afghan Cell comprised same personnel as in the past but it became more assertive than it was during the Zia era. Both the President and Prime Minister presided over its meetings and the role of DG ISI which was transformed in the previous government to that of an advisor, making him a part of the formal power structure in decision making, was restored. The Foreign Office, Cabinet and Defense Co-ordination Committee became active input, conversion and output agencies of foreign policy making.

### **Afghan Refugees Commissionerate (ARC)**

Pakistan from the outset sought to orchestrate much of the conduct of the Afghan war and expected to shape an Afghan peace of its own type. Islamabad authorities worked to control virtually every aspect of the Afghan presence in Pakistan. The activities of resident Afghans as well as the armed efforts of their resistance fighters were expected to accord with the perceived interests of Pakistan; nothing was to occur without the knowledge and approval of Pakistani authorities. This regularly involved close management of refugees and the direction and coordination of Afghan resistance parties based in Peshawar.<sup>14</sup>

In the initial years i.e. 1978-1980, Pakistan managed the refugee problem on an ad hoc basis through the Disaster Relief and Preparedness Cell of the federal government and the home and tribal affairs departments of NWFP and Balochistan. With the mass exodus and the refugee problem becoming worse, a new organization headed by the Chief Commissioner for the Afghan Refugees (CCAR) was created in Islamabad under the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions. A comprehensive administrative hierarchy was established from village level upwards. To check and control the movements of the refugees, to establish refugee camps, to shift the scattered population of the refugees to these camps and to provide them necessary relief assistance, and to handle the situation from their swelling concentration in this area, the Government of Pakistan established the Afghan Refugees Commissionerate (ARC) at Peshawar in April 1980. However, according

---

<sup>14</sup> Frederic Grare, *Pakistan and the Afghan Conflict: 1979-1985*, Oxford University Press, 2003, p.80

to Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai, ARC was established on April 1, 1979 with only three officials and later on the total personnel were 12000.<sup>15</sup>

The refugee organization was divided into various administrative tiers. At the lowest level was the Refugees Tentage Village (RTV), each comprising a maximum of 10,000 refugees or 1500 families. An RTV was placed under a village administrator who was responsible for the day-to-day administration and welfare of the refugees of the RTV. The RTV comprised three main sections, namely accounts, relief and security.

The next tier of administration was the area under an Area Administrator. The area comprised upto 5 RTVs or a population of 50,000. Above the area at the district/agency level was the district/agency administrator for overall coordination of refugee management within the district or agency. There were 17 district/agency administrators in NWFP. At the highest tier, at the provincial headquarters, there was the Provincial Refugees Commissioner who worked under the Home Department of the province.

Finally at the federal government level, there was the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR) for overall coordination of relief assistance work under the States and Frontier Regions Division (SAFRON). The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions had overall responsibility for the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan.<sup>16</sup>

### **Registration process of refugees**

All the incoming refugees were required to be registered on a form prescribed in the Registration of Foreigners Rules and against its item relating to the nationality. They were to be described as 'Afghan Refugee'. The Afghan refugees were introduced to the Pakistani authorities through the representatives of the political parties or *Maliks* of Afghan refugees (Peshawar Seven) which had established their headquarters at Peshawar, NWFP. After proper verification and complete satisfaction, the refugees were registered with the Government of Pakistan on a proforma and shifted to the refugees camps.

---

<sup>15</sup> The three officers were: Sher Muhammad Khan, Sher Zaman Ghamzhan (later on Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai) and Syed Fida Yunis. The office of ARC was in the Chief Minister office as there was no CM and it worked under Governor through Chief Secretary. Discussion with Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai in Pearl Castle Guest House, Peshawar, 18 August 2004.

<sup>16</sup> See *Official Hand Book on Refugee Management in Pakistan 1981*, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1981, pp.9-12. See also The daily, *Muslim*, Islamabad, 22 June 1983.



After registration the family was given a 'Refugee Pass Book' which contained the following information:

1. Identification.
2. Details of family members.
3. Record of issue of relief items.
4. Record of issue of food items.
5. Record of disbursement of maintenance allowance.
6. Medical record.
7. Record of arms, vehicles and animals.<sup>17</sup>

This pass book was not an identity document nor did it confer the right of nationality on the refugees. Officially all possible care was exercised to avoid double registration and the members of each house were carefully checked to eliminate chances of exaggerated/inflated figures. But reports of malpractices and bribes were common in the refugee organization. In 1983, the total corruption cases registered in ARC were 1267.<sup>18</sup> No figures were very accurate for various technical reasons, but according to UN sources, there were more cases of over-enumeration resulting from bogus or multiple registrations by those claiming dependents eligible for ration. Just as it served the refugee's interest to exaggerate their numbers, Pakistani authorities were motivated to raise the figures on which foreign aid was based. Larger numbers also helped to dramatize the acuteness of the refugee problem. However, special registration was granted by the Commissioner Afghan Refugees, to the widow, dignitaries and students.<sup>19</sup> The more privileged Afghan national were granted special maintenance allowance at the discretion of the provincial government. They were categorized into three grades:

A grade included political figures and high ranking government officials etc.

B grade included civilian government officials.

C grade included civilian officials and recommended ones.<sup>20</sup>

For the proper and correct assessment of the refugee population the following documents were maintained at the Refugee Tentage Village level:

- A. Record of registration.

---

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* p.20.

<sup>18</sup> Dilshad Khan, *The Afghan Refugees in NWFP*, unpublished MA thesis, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1984, p.38

<sup>19</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum, *Pakistan and Afghanistan, Resistance and Reconstruction*, Westview Press, 1994, pp.54-5

<sup>20</sup> Dilshad Khan, *op.cit.*, p.29

### B. Individual reference card.

A Refugee Pass book was issued to each head of the family on the basis of registration. The refugee identity documents were:

1. Ration book
2. *Shanakhti* Pass (Identity Pass)
3. Vehicle identity card of those employed with NGOs.
4. Party Card.<sup>21</sup>

Almost all the refugees camps were located in NWFP and Balochistan and all possible efforts were made by the government to restrict their movement to these two provinces. No refugee pass book for the receipt of the relief and maintenance allowance was issued to those who slipped over to the provinces of Punjab, Sindh and Azad Kashmir. However, later on the Government of Pakistan established a Refugee Camp in District Mianwali, Punjab.

### Demography

The northeastern part of Pakistan and the southeastern Afghanistan have long history of extended family and are knitted into ethnic, linguistic, cultural and tribal relations and affinities. Seasonal migration of the nomadic Pashtun tribes from and to Indian (now Pakistani) plains was ceased for about two years in 1961 when Pakistani government closed its border with Afghanistan.<sup>22</sup> In the early 1970s, Afghan refugees from famine were also accepted by Pakistan. Even a few hundred political dissidents took refuge in Pakistan following the coup of 1973. The refugee influx of the staggering dimension actually started with the April 1978 Revolution, and the situation changed radically when the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in December 1979. Within a few days of the Soviet forces, the refugee figure soared to almost 400,000. The exodus continued unabated ever since. The figure in 1990 stands at 3.2 million registered refugees while over 0.5 million were unregistered. Of this 778526 were males, 854629 were females and 1657808 were children.

---

<sup>21</sup> *Report of UNHCR*, sub-office Peshawar, Protection Section, April 14-18, 2003, p.6.

<sup>22</sup> In 1961 Pak–Afghan relations deteriorated over infighting between Khan of Khar and Nawab of Dir resulting in armed clashes between Afghan and Pakistan’s border forces. The result was the closure of the diplomatic mission of Pakistan in Afghanistan in August 1961 followed by Kabul’s decision in September 1961 to sever diplomatic relations with Pakistan and closing the border to all traffic between the two countries. The border remained closed for almost two years to all traffic in both directions and diplomatic relations also remained severed. See for more details Dr. Fazal–ur–Rahim Marwat, *op.cit.*, p.296.

There were about 450000 unregistered refugees not living in camps.<sup>23</sup>  
The year-wise build up of the Afghan refugee population was as under:

**The year-wise build up of the Afghan Refugee population is as under:**

<b>Date/Event</b>	<b>Numbers</b>
■ July, 1973 (Sardar Daud's <i>coup d'état</i> )	A few hundred only
■ April, 1978 Revolution	109,900
■ December, 1979 Soviet Intervention	402,100
■ July, 1980	Over 1 million
■ May, 1981	Over 2 millions
■ January, 1982	Over 2.5 millions
■ December, 1982	Over 2.8 millions
■ December, 1985	Over 3 millions
■ January, 1990	Over 3.2 millions
■ Unregistered	Over 0.5 million
■ Total:	3.7 millions

1

6

The refugees were lodged in some 342 Refugee Tentage Villages (RTVs) located at a safe distance from the border as required by international law. The RTVs were scattered in the 24 districts and agencies of the Frontier and Balochistan provinces and Mianwali district of the Punjab.

Of the 3.3 million registered refugees, the largest number, 2243365, was sustained by NWFP alone, while 850636 were lodged in the Balochistan province. To relieve pressure on the meager resources of NWFP, about 179526 refugees were shifted to Mianwali district of Punjab.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> *Defence Journal*, Karachi, Vol. IX, 1983, p.7.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p.7.

**Location of Camps**

Areas	No. of Camps	Refugees No.
Peshawar (1&2)	60	549,000
Kurram	34	347,936
Bajaur	25	198,691
N.Waziristan	24	183,507
Citagi	18	171,987
Gulistan	14	186,276
Loralai	11	105,100
Pishin	14	168,982
Abbottabad	18	182,495
Kohat	1	232,285
Kot Chanpwa	1	179,526

**Refugees Camps in NWFP**

Settled Distts:	Camps	Total Population	Male	Female	Children	Families
Bannu	7	73748	15997	19250	38502	10655
Chitral	3	38269	8762	12201	17306	6578
Dir	10	89350	25487	16682	47181	15691
D.I. Khan	11	87618	17976	24246	45396	12923
Kohat	18	232385	58592	66007	107786	32234
Mansehra	9	71792	9032	14232	48528	10810
Mardan	17	106648	22386	28029	56233	17994
Peshawar-1	31	284890	79057	73670	132163	58284
Peshawar-2	29	227928	56170	541192	117566	42231
Swat	2	14027	2468	4155	7444	2530
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>1370150</b>	<b>317976</b>	<b>345508</b>	<b>706666</b>	<b>233782</b>

**Tribal Agencies**

Settled Distts:	Camps	Total Population	Male	Female	Children	Families
Bajaur	25	198612	47096	58544	92972	28575
Kurram	34	347746	97000	99690	151056	50785
Malakand	3	55197	7646	14436	33115	7942
Mohmand	2	15589	3354	4127	8108	2588
N.Waziristan	24	183531	48257	43997	91277	26130
Orakazai	2	13418	2693	4943	5782	1983
S. Waziristan	6	57884	11895	14220	31769	9170
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>871977</b>	<b>217941</b>	<b>239957</b>	<b>414079</b>	<b>127146</b>
<b>TOTAL N.W.F.P</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>2242127</b>	<b>535917</b>	<b>585465</b>	<b>1120745</b>	<b>360928</b>

### **Legal status of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan**

It may be noted that Pakistan is not a party to some basic Refugees/Statelessness/ International Human Rights instruments, including the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967 New York Protocol, the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the two 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights.<sup>25</sup> The entry, stay and movement of foreigners, including asylum seekers and refugees, in Pakistan were regulated by the Foreigners Act No. XXXI of 1946, the Official handbook on Refugee Management in Pakistan (1981), two additional circulars of 1997 and February 2001.<sup>26</sup> The *Official Handbook on Refugee Management in Pakistan* 1980 issued by Chief Commissioner for Afghan refugees states:

1. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has granted asylum to Afghan nationals fleeing their country in the wake of political repression and occupation by foreign troops. The asylum has been granted entirely on humanitarian grounds and for reasons of cultural, ethnical and religious affinity.
2. This action has been taken in accordance with universally accepted principles & practices, the 1951 UN Convention relating to Refugees, supplemented by the Protocol of 1967 as well as the relevant provisions of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.

Following steps may be taken to control the activities of refugees:

- They should be encouraged to stay united in their tribal/sub-tribal groups. Rival factions/tribes may be kept at different places.
- Keeping in view the security and political interests, a code of conduct should be prescribed which should be binding over the refugees and its violation may result in discontinuance of relief assistance and/or their expulsion back to Afghanistan.

---

<sup>25</sup> Christos Theodoropoulos, 'The Development of Refugee Law in Pakistan', *International Human Rights Perspective*, Vol. II, No. I, Human Rights Studies Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Peshawar, January, 2003, pp 43. See also *Report of UNHCR*, sub-office Peshawar, Protection Section, April 14-18, 2003, p.6.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6. Pakistani government Circular of February, 2001 states that 'all Afghan nationals, without refugee cards/refugee permits issued by UNHCR/ CAR or without visas on their passports are considered as illegal immigrants and treated as per the Foreigners Act and laws applicable to foreigners.

- Provincial governments may impose any reasonable restriction on movement of refugees in tribal areas/settled districts as demanded by dictates of security.
- Afghan refugees in general and their leaders in particular are not allowed to hold any press conference, issue statements or meet national or foreign journalists without permission.
- Fraternalization between refugees and foreigners in Pakistan is to be discouraged.<sup>27</sup>

One additional circular in 1979 provides that

- Provisions of the foreigners act and rules pertaining to foreigners residing in Pakistan do not apply to Afghan refugees.
- During temporary stay all laws for local citizens apply to Afghan refugees.
- Movement outside the camp is considered as legitimate.<sup>28</sup>

Most of these rules and regulations were violated both by refugees, refugee parties and the ARC authorities in one way or the other. All arriving refugees from Afghanistan were constrained to become affiliated with one of the Afghan political groups or 'Peshawar Seven' in order to be certified as refugees. To qualify for rations from the Pakistan government, they had also to settle in a government designated camp area. In effect, the procedures served as an endorsement of the 'Peshawar Seven' by the Pakistan government and, more accurately, allowed a bias in favor of those who could best organize the camps. By carrying out relief work of various kinds, these parties could cultivate support among the refugees. In the formative phase of the Afghan imbroglio, *Jama'at-e-Islami* Pakistan and its affiliated organizations and institutions also had good access to the camps. The party's presence with Islamic ideological objectives and government policy of Islamization and *jihad* mania facilitated the growth of Islamist groups among the refugees in the camps.

All secret agencies of Pakistan and the Refugees Commissionerate openly favored *Hezb-e-Islami* of Hekmatyar and particularly during the commissionership of Mr. Abdullah, an ideologue of the *Jama'at-e-Islami* of Pakistan, a close liaison was established between secret agencies, *Jamaat* and *Hezb*. Many camp officials provided easier registration and earlier assistance to individuals

---

<sup>27</sup> *Official Handbook on Refugee Management in Pakistan*(1981) issued by Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1981, pp.6-8.

<sup>28</sup> UNHCR, Norwegian Refugee Council Training, sub-office Peshawar, Protection Section, April 14-18, 2003, p.6.

identified with Hekmatyar's party. Licenses for trucks owned by the Afghan refugees were facilitated for those who joined the *Hezb*.<sup>29</sup> Even UN monitored funds were regularly diverted to the *Hezb*, enabling it to gain more than its fair share of rations, tents and other relief aid. To please the *Hezb* and other hard-line parties, and also to ensure that any Afghan nationalist ideas were kept to a minimum, Pakistani government gave the Islamists a stronger voice in the educational program in the camps and later in the cross border transfer of educational materials and establishment of schools inside the war zone. Overall control in each camp was put in the hands of officials of the ARC but even it was with the approval of the most favored political groups of the refugees. The *Maliks*, *mullahs* and party commanders were involved to get people on the ration list and to offer other favors. Expected to get along with the ARC authorities, the *Maliks* were more the choice of Pakistani officials than the refugees. The traditional elders were replaced with *mullah* and *Maliks* of their own choice in the camps by 'Peshawar Seven' with the consent of Pakistani authorities. In this vicious circle of vested interests, the clerics gained increased respect in their role as deputies to the *mujahideen* leadership. Often serving as intermediaries, they participated in carrying unifying message of Islam, *jihad*, and inspiring and consoling refugees and resistance fighters.

### **Islamic ideological status of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan**

Various arguments and counter arguments were put forward by the refugee leaders, parties and their Pakistani supporters to interpret the 'Push and Pull factors' of the migration. Some of the ideological and religious causes for the massive refugee concentration in Pakistan and Iran can be summarized as below:

*Hijrat* or migration is a fundamental phenomenon in Islam. *Jihad* (holy war) and *hijrat* (migration) are two Islamic concepts, which became absolute obligations at any historic juncture of an Islamic society, particularly when it falls under aggression by a foreign and an infidel power. The Holy Quran in many places teaches migration and considers it as a supreme devotion and sacrifice. It says in LIX, 8:

And (it is) for the poor fugitives who have been driven out from their homes and their belongings, who seek bounty

---

<sup>29</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum *op.cit.*, p.57 quoted from John Fullerton, 'A Rift among Rebels', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 October 1982, p.20.

from Allah and help Allah and His messenger. They are the loyal.<sup>30</sup>

The code of Islam necessitates succor under such circumstances.

*Sura Anfal* lays down the law as:

Those who believed and left their homes and strove for the cause of Allah, and those who took them in and helped them—these are the believers in truth. For them is pardon, and a bountiful provision.<sup>31</sup>

The verse ‘*Yuhajiro Fi Sabilillah*’ (do migrate for the sake of God) is repeated many times in the Holy Quran. The Holy Prophet of Islam (pbuh) was forced by his enemies to migrate from Makkah to Madina where he was later joined by most of his followers.

Being Muslims, the people of Afghanistan began to seek refuge parallel with the rise of the communist system in their homeland. The imposition of an alien Marxist- Leninist ideology, Sovietization process, introduction of unpopular reforms and attempts to de-Afghanize some aspects of social, educational and political life and cultural institutions and political victimization of opponents and even neutral by the PDPA regime were some of the causes of the unprecedented migration of the Afghans.

There was also an impression during those days that Moscow was embarked upon an open policy of forcing people to flee and depopulate the countryside. Louis Dupree, an eminent specialist, described this policy as a ‘policy of migratory genocide’.<sup>32</sup> This policy forced different segments of the Afghan population to seek refuge in neighboring countries.

A constant process of desertion and defection and an increase in the human toll aggravated the situation further. The PDPA regime resorted to indiscriminate conscription of the youth for compulsory army service. The frustrated Afghan youth had no choice but to flee the country. Here in Pakistan the early arrived refugees considered themselves more ideological and dedicated Muslims than those who migrated later on. Even the treatment of the refugees leaders and political parties with the new refugees was discriminatory. The new comers were labeled with different accusations for instance *Khalqi*, *Parchami*, opportunists, secular etc. While the late arrivals on the other hand,

---

<sup>30</sup> Marmaduke Pickthall, *The Meaning of The Glorious Quran* (Karachi: Taj Company Ltd, 1984), LIX: 8.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, 74.

<sup>32</sup> *WUFA*, 6:2 (March-April, 1991).



accused the leaders as agents of the secret agencies of Pakistan and the West.

### **NGOs and the Afghan refugees**

The concept of non-governmental organizations got its roots in the NWFP during the Afghan crisis and the influx of refugees. These Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) or NGOs together with international agencies were permitted by Pakistani government to work among the refugees. The *Official Handbook on Refugee Management in Pakistan* (1980) in chapter 11 describes the PVOs as follows:

1. Significant sources of relief assistance are the private voluntary organizations both within and outside Pakistan. Acceptance of such assistance is based purely on humanitarian grounds and must be devoid of any political, social or religious strings or conditions.
2. International voluntary organizations are forbidden to approach the provincial government directly with offers of aid. All such requests are to be made to the federal government (States & Frontier Regions Division) who would process such offers in the normal manner. Likewise provincial government must also direct the PVOs to the federal government for acceptance or otherwise of relief assistance.
3. It is the policy of the government not to accept any expatriates to work in the Refugee Tentage Villages except for essential administrative staff for coordination and overall control.
4. The operation of PVOs is to be restricted to non-sensitive /settled areas of both the provinces and subject to any other conditions that the federal government may consider expedient to impose on such PVOs.
5. Direct distribution of relief goods by representatives of PVOs to Afghan refugees is forbidden. All such relief goods must be channeled through recognized government agencies. However, donors may be present at the time of distribution if they so desire.
6. Supervision/monitoring of relief work by the expatriate donors in the sensitive areas of NWFP and Balochistan may be undertaken only with permission of the government.
7. Other factors affecting acceptance of offers from the PVOs are:
  - a. They may operate only in the areas and to the extent agreed to by the federal government.
  - b. Overall coordination amongst different PVOs is the responsibility of the federal government.

- c. Field visits of expatriate are to be undertaken strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed mutually between the government/PVOs.
- d. Recruitment of Pakistani staff for field work is to be done through the federal/ provincial governments, as applicable.
- e. Procurement of relief goods available within the country must be done through local trade/industry.<sup>33</sup>

It was in June 1980 that Zia government restricted their activities especially in the tribal areas. However the International Rescue Committee was allowed to set-up a medical program in the refugee camps. Some religious parties and Arab associations in Pakistan were trying to convince government officials that western volunteer organizations were engaged in Christian missionary activities or that they were communist.<sup>34</sup> Foreigners faced long delays in obtaining official permission from Pakistani authorities to work for PVOs and many did so illegally on tourist visas. The officials in NWFP were more cooperative as compared to Islamabad. The Pakistani army, police and refugee administration, often in connivance with members of Afghan resistance parties were reported to be operating scams to sell relief supplies, weapons and favors.<sup>35</sup> During 1980-83, Mr. Abdullah, the Afghan Refugees Commissioner (NWFP), was also discouraging foreign NGOs to work in the refugee camps. But for various reasons and due to internal and external pressure in 1983 round about seventeen PVOs were registered. By the end of decade, 75 foreign organizations (45 from Europe and 14 from North America) maintained offices in Pakistan and were engaged with the refugees. The UN related projects and NGOs provided employment to 6000 local people.<sup>36</sup>

There were 51 unregistered Pakistani, Afghan and Arab NGOs where as many as 136 groups were working in Peshawar with different aims and objectives.<sup>37</sup> Almost all refugees parties in Peshawar were patronized by the NGOs by employing its members and sympathizers either to know their secrets or for carrying their own mission. Even the educated elite and liberal Afghans were employed by the NGOs and

---

<sup>33</sup> *Official Handbook, op.cit.*, pp.45-6.

<sup>34</sup> Some of the NGOs for instance SERVE and Shelter International were reportedly involved in missionary activities and there were reports that they succeeded in converting some poor refugees to Christianity.

<sup>35</sup> Marvin G. Weinbaum *op.cit.*, p.59 quoted from *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 September 1988.

<sup>36</sup> The daily *Dawn, Karachi*, 13 May 1989.

<sup>37</sup> The *Herald, Karachi*, March 1993, p.84.

arrested for the time being the brain drain from Peshawar. Some of the NGOs were publishing anti-Soviet and anti-communist literature in Pashtu, Dari, English, Urdu, Arabic and Russian. Almost all anti-communist books and articles were translated in Pashtu and Dari for the Afghans in Pakistan. The US Information Centre (USIS) in Peshawar was in close liaison with almost all Afghan NGOs. Most of the Afghan NGOs had their own publications in local languages as well as in English. Some of the Afghan NGOs in Peshawar for instance the Writers Union Free Afghanistan (WUFA) and later on Afghanistan Study Centre (ASC) and Afghan Information Centre (AIC) Peshawar, produced some quality journals and newspapers in Pashtu, Dari and English and even produced to some extent unbiased literature on Afghanistan and Afghan problem. The NGOs and PVOs of the Middle Eastern countries working in NWFP with different names and in different fields were all involved in creating a *jehadi* culture, Arabization and Wahabism among the refugees and eventually penetrated these germs to different parts of Afghanistan.

### **Afghan refugees educational system**

Initially ARC in collaboration with UNHCR launched a comprehensive program for education (or in other words indoctrination) of the children of the Afghan refugees. An Educational Cell headed by the additional commissioner of the Afghan refugees was responsible to look after the education program. Besides UNHCR other NGOs involved in the education of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan were:

<b>Name of the NGO</b>	<b>No. of Schools</b>
Swiss Aid for Afghans	14
Okenden International	84
IRC Secondary Education	3
GTZ schools	49
IRC Home Schools	49
IRC Female Schools	30
Education Cell	81
Afghan Institute for Learning	5
GTZ Home School	9
SAVE USA	48
UNHCR	2000 schools <sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> Record of Educational Divisional Officer, EDO, and Peshawar. See also Dilshad Khan, *op.cit.*

There were four types of educational institutions for Afghan refugees:

1. Camp schools & *madrassas* (religious seminaries): These schools were run by the Education Cell of the ARC along with UNHCR. In December 1983, total primary schools for boys were 438. In May 2003, total schools for boys and girls were 102. The syllabus was introduced by Pakistan with more stress on religious indoctrination and not on national aspirations of the Afghans.
2. *Maktabs* (schools) and *madrassa* (seminaries) run by the Afghan refugees political parties were of two types:
  - a. Modern schools with modern sciences and religion.
  - b. *Shariat* or religious schools.

Following were some of the religious institutions established by refugee parties:

- *Madrassa Hijrat Aw Jihad* (seminary of migration and holy war)
  - *Dawat wa Jihad Pohentoon* (University of Islamic propagation & holy war)
  - *Madrassa Abu Hanifa*.
  - Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani School.
  - *Darul Hufaz Madrassa* (for memorization of holy Quran).
  - Ahmad Shah Abdali *Pohentoon*.
  - *Islami Pohentoon*.
  - *Uminatul Mumineen* for females.<sup>39</sup>
3. Pakistani schools & *madrassas* for the Afghan refugees: Special seats were reserved for Afghan refugees in almost all educational

---

<sup>39</sup> Prof. Dr. Mohammad Rahim Elham & Dr. Michael Hirth, *A Report of Afghan Refugees Islamic Madrassa in the Timergara Area NWFP, Pakistan* (A Pilot Study), serial no II, Basic Education for Afghan Refugees, Peshawar, 1994, pp.12-13 has cited figures of some 19 to 26 madrassas in Timergara area with students from 70 to 500. Each had three goals:

- 1: The students of particular ethnic groups had to be educated.
- 2: Support for their fight for the liberation of Afghanistan.
- 3: The missionaries that were preaching the true Islamic rules and principles needed to be facilitated.

These madrassas were funded by Saudi Red Crescent, *Lajnat Al- Qatar* (LQO) and Afghan political *tanzimat* or parties. The LQO for Orphans was an Islamic charity organization which started program for Afghanistan in 1991-92. LQO supported orphanages in the following areas:

Jalalabad city Afghanistan: 750 orphans.

Chawki District, Afghanistan: 150 orphans.

Munda Refugees Camp, Peshawar.

Kacha Gari Refugees Camp, Peshawar.

institutions of NWFP. Some of the seats reserved in the professional colleges were as follows:

Medical colleges	:	51 seats
Engineering colleges	:	31 seats
Other colleges	:	146 seats
Other schools	:	340 seats
Islamic University, Islamabad	:	78 seats
Vocational training centres for boys	:	5
Technicians in the community centres	:	150
Carpet weaving centres	:	13

There was tremendous increase in the local Pakistani private schools with Islamic and Arabic names in the Peshawar district of NWFP. In 1976 the total private registered schools in Peshawar district were only 45, while in 1978 the figure reached 73 and in 1980 the total was 97. But the unregistered private schools were in hundreds. Some of Islamic and Arabic names of the private schools included the *Hira* Academy, the *Suffa* Academy, *Albadar* Public school, *Al-Falah* Public School, *Almaaz* Public school, *Alsafwaan* Childern Centre, *Iqra* Childern Academy, *Islamia* School, *Qurteba* Public School, *Rauzatul Athfaal* Academy, *Seena* Public School, *Al-Asar* Childern Academy etc.<sup>40</sup>

The Islamic nature of the Afghan resistance highlighted the close relationship of religion and politics and encouraged both locals and refugees in the province by establishing round about one thousand Islamic *madrassas* and *darul ulum* with the aid of Middle Eastern countries to provide ideological base for the Afghan *jihad*. The *Frontier Post*, Peshawar, 17 July 1992 reported that Rs.15, 969 million had been distributed amongst the 42 *deeni madaris* only from 1984-85 to 1990-91

---

<sup>40</sup> *Defence Journal*, Karachi, XV: 8 (1989), p.84. See also list of Educational institutions established by GTZ/BEFARe (primary schools):

Primary schools for boys	:	190
Primary schools for girls	:	75
Mixed schools (Co-education)	:	55
Total male students	:	82489
Total female students	:	29754
Middle and secondary schools funded by ARC:		
Middle school for boys	:	64
Middle school for girls	:	15
Secondary school for boys	:	21
Secondary school for girls	:	02
Total male students	:	7447
Total female students	:	543

out of the provincial *Auqaf* fund. Most of the Arab donors injected the sectarian ideologies in the refugees through these religious institutions only to gain their own ends. In all Pakistani educational institutions, Pakistan Studies and Islamiyat were introduced as compulsory subjects to make the young generation more Islamic and Pakistani and ‘to defend the ideological frontiers’ of Pakistan.

4 Educational institution established by voluntary organizations:

- a. *Adara Ahyah-ul-Ulum /Jama'at-e-Islami* Pakistan schools: 425
- b. The *Ahyah-ul-Ulum /Jaamat-e-Islami* distributed 9, 50,000 copies of the Holy Quran and other literature of *Ikwanul-Muslimin* in the refugee camps.<sup>41</sup>

Generally three types of textbooks were published under the Afghan refugee educational curriculum:

1. Text books published by the fundamentalist parties, which were highest in number and distribution.
2. Text books published by the Afghan Refugees Commissionerate with the assistance of UNHCR.
3. Text books published by NGOs.

According to the *Washington Post* investigators, over the past 20 years the US has spent million of dollars producing fanatical school books, which were then distributed in Afghanistan. These books were developed in the early 1980s under an AID grant to University of Nebraska-Omaha and its Center for Afghanistan Studies. ‘The primers, which were filled with talk of *jihad* and featured drawings of guns, bullets, soldiers and mines, have served since then as the Afghan school system’s core curriculum. Even the *Taliban* used the American-produced books, though the radical movement scratched out human faces in keeping with its strict fundamentalist code. According to the *Post*, these

---

<sup>41</sup> According to Dr. Sher Zaman Taizai these copies of the Holy Quran were printed in Saudi Arabia and provided by CIA to Zia government for distributing what they called ‘subversive literature’ in Central Asian Muslim states. See also the monthly *Qaumi Digest*, Lahore, October 1981, p.147. The years 1980-1990 saw tremendous increase in the annual *Ijtima* or gathering of *Tablighi Jammats* in Raiwind ( its headquarter at Lahore). Surprisingly majority of the participants were from NWFP, FATA and Pashtun belt of Balochistan. The membership of *Jammat-e-Islami* Pakistan also increased in this period. If *Tablighi Jammats* was nourishing the people through there simple teachings, the *Jammat* provided ground for the middle and intellectual class with justification of *jihad* and militancy in the anti-Soviet *jihad*.

violent Islamist schoolbooks, which ‘served...as the Afghan school system’s core curriculum’ produced ‘unintended consequences.’<sup>42</sup>

The books had unnecessary material and were not written with the purpose of education but for ideological propaganda. At the primary level the material in the mathematics books was such:

- If out of 10 atheists, 1 Muslim killed 5, 5 would be left.
- 5 guns + 5 guns = 10 guns
- 15 bullets - 10 bullets = 5 bullets, etc.

Generally all these books were written with the purpose of keeping children away from normal life activity and developments. The text books of Dari and Pashtu start with *Hamd* (praise of God) and *Naat* or praise of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and ended with the four orthodox caliphs and their biographies and also mentioning *mujahid*, guns, bullets, atheism, martyred and *ghazi*.<sup>43</sup>

Even the books of organic chemistry and zoology were more on the subjects of Islamic studies than science. Text books provided by NGOs were also much more suitable for *madrassas* (religious schools) than normal schools.

The text book of history for class three published by ARC mentioned in the chapter of the world history the story of the Ship of *Hazrat* Noah and the story of Habel and Qabel and the history of Afghanistan as:

Afghanistan is an Islamic country. The people of Afghanistan started believing in Islam about 1400 years back during the times of *Hazrat* Usman. And it is due to the blessings of Islam that the people of the country live peacefully since then. So in the light of Quran and the teaching of the prophet Muhammad (Sm), we must strive for the protection and development of our religion and country till the day end, and must follow it to the last of our lives.<sup>44</sup>

With the rise of *Taliban* in Afghanistan new books were published with out pictures of living beings. The basic idea was that the picture of any living thing will ask for a spirit in the next world and photos/pictures of living beings are *haram* (forbidden). In the Dari books of the primary classes which again have been in the centre of these

---

<sup>42</sup> *The Washington Post*, 23 March 2002.

<sup>43</sup> All such text books were studied by the author. See also speech of Fauzia Jehanian in a seminar of refugee school teachers in Peshawar on 2 November 2002.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

attacks, the alphabet 'D' is explained with the word '*dihqan*' (peasant) and a picture of headless peasant working in the field along with headless bull, and his daughter bringing food for his father was also headless.<sup>45</sup>

### **Ideological literature of PDPA and Afghan refugees**

The PDPA regime in Afghanistan produced ideological propaganda literature in Pashtu with notions of 'class struggle', nationalism and internationalism. The novels and stories of Noor Muhammad Taraki (the head of new regime and an eminent Pashtu writer) were republished and distributed free on both sides of the Durand Line. The Kabul regime also tried to establish *Khalq* party in the tribal area and made close contacts with the *Mazadoor Kissan* Party of NWFP.<sup>46</sup> The settlement of Afghan refugees in the Frontier contributed a lot to the Pashtu literature and journalism. A major achievement was made in the field of common Pashtu script. It was due to Afghan crisis that Pashtu service was started from BBC and VOA. Besides few Pashtu dailies, there were weeklies and numerous periodicals published by both local and refugees organizations. During these years more than 2500 books in Pashtu and Dari as well as a large number of anti-Soviet propaganda material had been published by different organizations and institutions in lower Pashtunkhwa or NWFP & Pashtun area of Balochistan.<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> Interview with Ajmal Khattak, dated 7 December 1989, Peshawar, and discussion with Afrasiyab Khattak, an eminent intellectual, writer, politician and human rights activist.


<sup>47</sup> The nationalist forces, which were either pro-Kabul or neutral, were sidelined by Zia regime and Islamic fundamentalist forces were encouraged to ally itself with the Afghan *mujahideen* in the name of Islam and Islamic brotherhood. Pashtu dailies, weeklies, periodicals and books started from various places of NWFP. The writings of Pashtun refugees were anti-Soviet anti-communism and pro-*mujahideen* while the local Pashtu publications were also ideologically influenced. Ironically the Pashtu literature produced during this period was more diversified in form and contents. Some of the nationalist Pashtun refugees writers like Azizur-Rahman Ulfat, Bahuddin Majrooh were assassinated in Peshawar by unknown assailants and the other were forced to leave Pakistan.

Though the government tried to use its entire force for suppressing Pashtun nationalism on both sides of the Durand Line on the pretext of Islam and *jihad* but the nationalist, leftist and democratic forces tried to resist politically, and in the literary circles, the government policies against peaceful resolution of the Afghan crisis. But neither Islamabad, nor Afghan



From calligraphy to art and from handicrafts to Pashtu music all improved and changed the style due to the arrival of Afghan artists, singers and musicians. With the arrival of refugees, Pashtu film industry and video-audio business increased manifold. In short if the Afghan war politically damaged the cause of Pashtun nationalism in Pashtunkhwa for

## One Page from *Jehadi* Book



the time being, it accelerated and regenerated the cultural nationalism, which will prove more effective than politics in future.

### **Some major characteristics of the Afghan refugee literature**

- Most of the literature was ideological–socialist & Islamic
- Ideological polarization was at peak on both sides of the Durand Line.

---

*mujahideen* were ready for political and peaceful resolution of the Afghan crisis.

Among the positive fallout of the Afghan crisis were the cultural, economic and ideological cosmoses of Afghan/Pashtun with other nationalities of Pakistan. Among the negative fallouts one could underline the growing tendencies of *mullahism*, extremism, militancy, sectarianism, drug mafia and the spreading of Kalashnikov culture in the entire country. Zia wanted to tame ‘disloyal’ writers whom he declared as ‘equivalent to water logging and salinity’ through the Academy of Letters (1979-88) but he failed to buy the conscience of the writers and turning it into a tool of the government. See for biography of Noor Muhammad Taraki, appendix- B.

- Children were trained & indoctrinated in their narrow ideological schemes with Islamic fundamentalism & sectarianism not Afghan/Pashtun nationalism.
- Schools up to universities were opened for the *jihad* & resistance.
- Curriculum was war oriented: 2+2 = 4 Guns
- Kalashnikov & heroin culture developed and boosted.

There were other 11 independent organizations of the Afghans in Peshawar producing anti-Soviet literature and some translations from old history books etc. During this period, 129 books in Pashtu were produced for *jihad* and resistance with the contents: Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, *jihad*, revolution and resistance.

### Afghan Kids & Kalashnikovs



### Children of war or war generation: *inqilabi* (revolutionary) and *jehadi* (holy warriors)

At the height of migration in the 1980s, children constituted nearly 50 per cent<sup>48</sup> of the total Afghan refugee population in terms of numbers and it was estimated that 90 per cent of the refugees were from rural areas.

It was tragic and unfortunate that schools and all other educational institutions were used by both ideological regimes of Kabul and Islamabad in the 1980s and 1990s as bases for recruitment of youth for the war. In fact one of the reasons why the youth and adults left Afghanistan was fear of conscription by anyone of the groups, the PDPA or the *mujahideen*. This had adverse effects on the minds of the youth, which pervades even to date. The objectives related to the development of the individual were superseded by new objectives to wage war against each other. For instance *Hezb-e-Islami* of Hekmatyar recruited members

<sup>48</sup> Dr. S.B. Ekanayake, *Education in Doldrums Afghan Tragedy*, 2000, p.142

from where tribal structures have broken down or which have a mixture of groups from different tribes. The boys who grew up in refugee camps did not represent any social group inside Afghanistan. Thus refugee parties were depending on the revolutionary Islamic schools in refugee camps in Pakistan for their recruits. On the other hand, the key source of recruitment inside Afghanistan to fight against *jehadis* was the government tribal boarding schools in Kabul, that taught an official ideology, which was different from that of the popular culture. For the refugee parties the largest such numbers were not from Afghanistan but from the camps of refugee settlements in Pakistan. Among the 'Peshawar Seven' parties the *Hezb* of Hekmatyar gained access to these camps and built a network of schools with the aim of recruiting refugee youth for the front.<sup>49</sup>

It is also very bizarre that both armies were funded by foreign sources running into billions of US dollars and Russian rubles and whatever the country could export at that time. The aftermath of these wars was that education of the country (Afghanistan & Afghan refugee) suffered not only in terms of destruction of educational institutions but also orchestration of social evils in the minds of the children, spreading corruption and diverting the attention to '*jehads*' for solving political problems. Education in the camps was directed at developing skills and attitudes needed to fight *jihad*. The whole curriculum was directed at achieving these objectives which remain unchanged to date. This major flaw in the education of Afghan refugees could have been removed by positive changes in the curriculum of schools in the refugee camps.<sup>50</sup>

Thus the two groups, one supported the Soviets and the other opposed their invasion, through their struggles became victims of this catastrophic idealism, two types of fundamentalism i.e Marxism/Leninism & Islamic radicalism. As a result, a large number, who were fortunate to escape, took the cause to the lands of refuge, while considerable number of anti-PDPA regime conservatives were killed and imprisoned. The progressive elements faced the same fate during the *mujahideen* government. One could also see another phenomenon during the same periods in the refugee camps in Pakistan. Here schools in the refugee camps were used as centres to build up support to the cause of the resistance groups of the *mujahideen* in the same way as the communists did inside Afghan schools to propagate their ideology. The inclusion of concept of *jihad* in the school curriculum by university of

---

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p.157

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p.158

Nebraska, Omaha, USA is clear example of this trend. Both strategies brought about a disaster, unprecedented in Afghan history, vis-à-vis the development of education in the country, aggravating the culture of war and resulting in avalanche of refugees. In this debacle, USA cannot absolve itself from the past sins of creating extremists, fundamentalists and Ben Ladens.<sup>51</sup>

With the assistance of Pakistan *jehadi* parties of refugees had 250 schools with 43,000 students and a staff of 15,600 teachers and administrators. The graduates of these schools formed the core of Hekmatyar's force. Most of the *Hezb* leadership was a product of modern education received from Afghan universities. It is very strange and pathetic to note that products of education and schools of the Afghans fought each other to destroy their own nation.<sup>52</sup>

On the other hand, a number of private schools were established and the number seems to be multiplying quickly, especially in the cities of Peshawar, Quetta and Islamabad. Although, Islamabad had no refugee camps, nearly 30 private schools were functioning for Afghan children, which was an indicator to the number of refugees living outside the camps. This was also a reflection of the quality of life of the refugees since they have to pay for the education of their children in these private schools. In addition, Afghans who were not in the refugee camps attended local Pakistani public and private schools. The daily *Frontier Post*, Peshawar, has revealed that the Afghan refugees have developed a deep acumen in English reading, writing and speaking skills through a large numbers of English Learning Centres established in rented houses. The Afghans were interested in learning English language for seeking employment in the NGOs or going abroad. They need English for psychological reasons, seeking employment in Pakistan and traveling abroad. Thus both in the camps and outside the level of interest and participation of the students was much higher than those inside Afghanistan.<sup>53</sup>

It would be of interest to note that children in schools inside Afghanistan were following the traditional forms of learning and the number of schools decreased or in a situation of no growth in areas either controlled by PDPA regime or *mujahideen*. But educational opportunities on modern lines for the refugee children increased and widened in NWFP. These included access to education in computer technology, English, business management and other skills development education.

---

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p.157

<sup>53</sup> The daily *Frontier Post*, Peshawar, 9 February 1999.

Furthermore accessibility of education for both sexes at all levels was another advantage the refugees enjoyed, with both positive and negative impact on their attitudes. For many Afghan women, life in exile opened new horizons through contacts with people and things previously unknown in Afghanistan.<sup>54</sup> The life in Pakistan virtually opened up the world of knowledge to most of the refugees and now after the Bonn Conference, the Pakistani breed of the Afghans are playing a constructive role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.<sup>55</sup> Even though all the children of the refugees may not avail of these opportunities, their awareness of the role of the education and the importance given to education for both sexes has a great-influence and motivation in developing positive attitudes for behavioral change amongst the adults.

Funding from UNHCR for education was confined to the camps and limited to the primary cycle. Since 1999, UNHCR has provided nearly US \$ 100,000 to the Afghan University, established in Peshawar. Over the last few years funding for refugees has declined affecting the education programs, currently amounting to around US \$ 700,000, which came especially from the government of Japan.<sup>56</sup>

### **Militant camaraderie**

To provide new recruits to the '*jihad*' fronts and for religious indoctrination, 'Pakistan ideology' was reinterpreted by explaining the new role of Pakistan army: 'Army role is not only limited to defend Pakistan's geographical boundaries but rather to defend ideological frontier of the country'. Zia-ul-Haq in his Islamization drive granted concessions to *madrassa* and religious institutions by taking following steps:

1. The degrees and certificates of religious schools and seminaries were made equivalent to secular institutions.
2. Islamic studies and Pakistan studies were made compulsory and introduced at all levels in schools and colleges.
3. The students of religious seminaries were given the same concessions in the tickets [for journey in buses] as for the other students of the secular institutions.
4. Mosque primary schools were opened. It should be noted that in such a backward areas like Malakand there were 141 mosque schools and

---

<sup>54</sup> Interview with Palwasha, Peshawar, 12 June 1999.

<sup>55</sup> Dr. S.B. Ekanayake, *op.cit.*, p.162; In the post Bonn Afghanistan, the more skilled and active lot of the youngsters are from Pakistan.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, p.162

50 *madrassas* during 1981-91. In six *madrassas* out of 900 students about 300 were Afghan refugees.<sup>57</sup>

5. All government employees were bound to pray during office time.

Zia's Islamization drive did increase the Islamic content in all courses. In 1988, the Federal Ministry of Education (Pakistan) elicited the opinions of citizens about the changes to be made in educational policies. A large number of people suggested more Islamization, more inculcation of nationalism and, some advocated military training. Among the more radical views were:

- Music should not be taught in schools as a subject.
- Only Muslim teachers should be appointed at least up to secondary level.
- Anti-Islamic teachers should be expelled from colleges.
- Lady teachers should not be allowed to have their hair cut.
- Islamic studies, Pakistan studies, economics, and military training should be compulsory subjects at college level.
- The concept of '*jehad*' should be given more emphasis in books of Islamiyat.
- Teachers should be disallowed to speak against Pakistan ideology in the classroom.<sup>58</sup>

The overall effect of Zia dictatorial regime's education and other policies was:

1. they revived religious symbolism and lent legitimacy to religious groups;
2. they gave a new status to religious schools; which were allowed to award degrees,
3. and they provided funding to these schools.

Thus, the religious groups made a transition from the periphery to the mainstream in education and politics. In short, an articulate section of the middle class, probably brought up on ideological school courses supported an ideology which used religion to create Pakistani nationalism and militarism in the society. Though war is not 'biological

---

<sup>57</sup> Zafar Ali, *Deeni Madaris of Malakand Agency* Unpublished MA thesis, Pakistan Study Centre, University of Peshawar, 1999-2001, pp.104,107,110,119,132, 143. In November 1994, in Islamic *madrassa* of Maulvi Noor Muhammad in Wana, South Waziristan Agency there were more than three hundred Central Asian students. Interview with Dr. Syed Wiqar Ali Shah Kaka Khel, Associate Professor, Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University of Islamabad, Peshawar, 2 May 2004

<sup>58</sup> Dr. Tariq Rahman, *Language, Education and Culture* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.81-3.

necessity' as conceived by many, but in the case of Afghanistan it was necessity of many if not of all. Internal and external secret agencies created and propagated war mongering in the name of *inqilab* (revolution), *jihad* and even peace (in case of *Taliban*).

In such a conducive Islamic religio-ideological atmosphere the life in Pakistan led to militarization of children particularly rural refugee children of the camps. Ideological training of the refugee children in schools and *madrassas* created a new militant political culture among the refugees which was more suited to war and not for peace.


It was reported that 'the *Khudamudeen Madrassa* is training students from Burma, Nepal, Chechnya, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia and Kuwait. Out of 700 students at the *Madrassa*, 127 are foreigners'. Nearly half the student's body at *Darul Uloom Haqania* (Akora Khattak) was from Afghanistan and some from Central Asia. It was reportedly expanding its capacity to house 500 foreign students.<sup>59</sup>

Apart from 'refugee camp syndrome' economic hardships, non-education culture, medical problems led to psychological problems among the Afghan refugee children. Most of the Afghan kids have no idea about society or what their role is. They are only trained to fight and to kill. Commenting on the fallout of the Afghan war, the Afghan Youth Organization in Quetta city reported: 'The new generation is forgotten and their future is dark. Now the two monster militarism and Mafia have opened their mouths to swallow them. They are forced to feed only by the means of war but the majority of the Afghan youth themselves wish

---

<sup>59</sup> Jessica Stern, *Pakistan Jihad Culture*, 2000, p.4. 'Between 1980 and 1981, Haqqaniyah expenditures increased by an astonishing 107 per cent, most of which came from the Provincial Zakat Council funds, and the number of enrolled Afghan students increased from 37 per cent to 60 per cent. This was about the time that ideology and history was consciously rewritten. *'Al Haq'*, the monthly periodical of the Haqqaniyah *madrassa*, made barely any mention of *jihad* prior to 1979. The majority of articles dealt with various aspects of religious practice, with the occasional diatribe against the shias. Come the Afghan war, and the magazine became a war reporting journal. Articles abounded on the primacy and necessity of *jihad*, and on the noble exploits of the *mujahideen*, often making allusions to the victories of the early battles of Islam. It resurrected long forgotten heroes of the struggle against colonialism, tying their struggles with the *jihad* in Afghanistan, See an article 'The *Jihad* industry' in the daily *News*, Islamabad, 21 March 2004.

to get education so that they should have a good standing in the new world order'.<sup>60</sup>



Qaumi Digest, Lahore, October, 1981: This portrait reflects the psyche of Pakistani press.

In this overall process the refugee kids developed a war psyche. A following true story from a classroom in a refugee camp in Pakistan depicts the picture. 'The classroom was full of young Afghan boys armed with colored pencils and empty sheets of paper. They were told to draw pictures about their future, so from their memories and dreams they began to depict the scenes they imagined. The expected images were revealed in form of airplane pilots, helicopter gunship pilots, *mujahideen* with big guns etc'.

However, in the pile of papers, one had an image that was distinctly different from the others. It was a picture of bright flowers, some trees and a green garden. When the teacher began to talk with the children and looked through the pictures, he discovered that amid this room full of future fighters and *mujahids* and pilots there was only one who would like to be a gardener. The question was asked. 'How will you

<sup>60</sup> Afghanistan Study Centre monthly *Bulletin on Human Rights Violation in Afghanistan*, No. 1, March, 1999, Peshawar, p.5



eat then and where will you get your food?'. The answer came back; we have our rations.<sup>61</sup>

Rural populations have become somehow urbanized and urban populations had to give up a lot of advantages which they enjoyed in the cities and accept restrictions enforced by the war, economically, socially and otherwise.

The future generation has been imposed with strange cultures and social life in the host countries and has adopted other's cultures, languages and social aspects which they carried after repatriation and will carry to Afghanistan. This is another cause for further fragmentation in the future.

A resolution which was adopted by an international hearing in Stockholm (1987) stated that 'the children of Afghanistan are the forgotten ones in a war that has by and large been ignored. And yet, they are not only the principal victims, but also the future of the country... Their physical wounds may perhaps heal within a year or so, the emotional and psychological trauma of the war will remain with the Afghans for generations'.<sup>62</sup>

## Conclusion

In a nutshell the Afghan war brought about the decline of the traditional elite (the Pashtun aristocracy of tribal origin) and the rise of a new elite: Islamist intellectual, *mullahs*, small warlords inside Afghanistan on the one hand, neo-fundamentalists 'new intellectuals' among the emigrants to Pakistan, on the other—all people who owe their emergence to the war and who, in some instances, have become 'war entrepreneurs', living from and by the war.<sup>63</sup> The goods that circulate—arms, subsidies, humanitarian aid—come from abroad or from the government and are allocated for political reasons. Thus this network originates with a state: either the local capital or foreign powers. The new powers were made more secure by the internationalization of the war and of the distribution network. The tragedy of 9/11 has been a manifestation of the mishandling of the Afghan imbroglio by the CIA and ISI. Highly disproportionate military and financial aid and training to Afghan refugees not only prolonged the unabated Afghan war, but also created

---

<sup>61</sup> Nassim Jawad, 'Role of the International Community in Future Afghanistan', *Defence Journal*, Karachi, monthly, xvii: 9 (1991).

<sup>62</sup> Bulletin on Human Rights, *op.cit.*, p.5

<sup>63</sup> Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: I.B Tauris, 1994), p.164.

and nourished religious extremism, terrorism, and Kalashnikov culture among the Afghan refugees, their foreign colleagues, and the local population of Pakistan.

The only lesson we should learn from the past blunders and experience of the Afghan conflict and refugees is that all local or regional issues and conflicts should be resolved through a political dialogue with the UN in a very dedicated manner, and not through military options. The UN and world community should adopt means and methods to persuade all countries to sign the refugee conventions and covenants.

The fall of the *Taliban* in Afghanistan should be a lesson to all religio-political parties of Pakistan that the only way to gain political power is not through violence and the barrel of a gun, but rather through democratic process and dialogue.

Another important lesson of the incident of 9/11 to all *jehadi* and *pro-jehadi* elements is that the Cold War is over, and that no society can afford to engage in militancy or adventurism in the name of religion or extremism, or to cross the border for purposes of helping co-religionist brethren. There is a cry for *jihad* from palace to public, and from *masjid* (mosque) to *mandir* (temple), against particular creeds, sects or religious groups, yet not a *jihad* against corruption, nepotism, favoritism, violence, terrorism, and narcotics. It would be far better for us to create a conducive environment for education and tolerance, because these are necessary for a credible political system and for the development of civil society.

Lastly, in Pakistan's situation, globalization has only led to religious extremism and a marginalization of state authority, as well as a failure of the international community to take concrete and meaningful steps in the direction of diverting its meagre resources toward the betterment of the developing nations.