

## **CBMs and Peace Process in South Asia**

*Muntzra Nazir*

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are generally described as 'arrangements designed to enhance assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of states. Confidence is the product of much broader patterns of relations than those which relate to military security. In fact, the later have to be woven into a complex texture of economic, cultural, technical and social relationship.<sup>1</sup> John Hoist further elaborates, 'Confidence building involves the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threat'. They aim at reducing the incentives for competition, which drive, from uncertainty and misunderstanding.<sup>2</sup> It is by nature a process in which each previous measure forms basis for further measures that progressively and cumulatively consolidate and strengthen the building of 'confidence' among states.<sup>3</sup>

CBMs could be useful to reduce tension and enhance mutual confidence between antagonistic states. However, the 'confidence building' is different from 'deterrence'. Deterrence aims at holding out threat of punishment to stop an opponent from pursuing a certain course of action. CBMs on the other hand seek to prevent or reduce the threat of war through positive means i.e. by opening channels of communications, offering incentives or rewards by promising greater confidence.<sup>4</sup> These are considered as tools employed to reduce tension and build mutual trust between adversaries. The objective of CBMs is to create an environment of peaceful co-existence.

CBMs include both military and non-military measures taken by hostile states to enhance mutual trust and confidence by reducing suspicions, misunderstandings and uncertainty in their bilateral relations. Broadly they are divided into three categories: military, political and

---

1

2

3

4

socio-economic. The political measures include ‘increase in joint policy planning at appropriate levels for consideration of matters of common interests. These measures also include promotion of legislative contacts for discussion of security issues and political overtures that demonstrate the purpose of promoting peace and inter-regional cooperation. Military CBMs provide the procedure and structure in order to avoid a war.’<sup>5</sup> They include:

Communication, constraint, transparency, contacts and exchange of information. They are the primary military CBM tools. Socio-economic CBMs range from cultural exchanges to trade agreements. In this age of globalization, socio-economic CBMs have become more important as means to manage conflict and ultimately bring peace. They are considered as effective tools for stable relationship by applying the principle of reciprocity to promote states’ enlightened interests. Confidence building<sup>6</sup> measures are meant to reduce tension build mutual trust between the adversary states. Their main objective is to create an environment of peaceful co-existence and harmony. In the past, they have been successfully used in different regions.

The use and the pace of CBMs in Indo-Pak relations have now increased. These used to be adopted less frequently in the past. This study attempts to seek the track record until the beginning of the current phase when CBMs were adopted more frequently. It also endeavors to answer the questions such as: Why were not CBMs employed effectively in the past? What are the new options available to India and Pakistan now to pursue CBMs? What is the role of civil society for promoting CBMs and do the socio-economic and cultural CBMs promoted by civil society create more conducive conditions and environment for conflict management and resolution?

### **History**

The term of CBMs became popular in the mid-1970s with reference to the Helsinki Declaration in 1975, though the concept and process were applied to different parts of the world in the past. The experience of different regions regarding the application and effectiveness of CBMs for managing conflict and promoting peace varied, depending mainly on the peculiar conditions of region concerned. However, these contributed towards achieving their major goals.

---

<sup>5</sup>

In July 1975, the European countries (except Albania), the USA, Canada and the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Final Act, which contributed to resolving the security dilemma of Europe. The CBMs designed for conventional forces in Europe after the Helsinki Final Act succeeded in establishing status quo in Europe and facilitated the process of interaction between East and West. The agreement establishing the demilitarized zone between Israel and Egypt (September 1975) helped to bring peace between the two countries. A number of political, social and economic CBMs between Argentina and Brazil led both sides to give up their nuclear ambitions, paving the way for establishing peace in the region. There are plenty of examples around the world to suggest that animosities between the states can be defused through CBMs.

In South Asia, CBMs were sparingly used between India and Pakistan in the past to manage conflict. There is now more attention towards them. Various CBMs are being adopted for defusing tension, managing conflict and promoting peace and stability in the region.

### **CBMS in South Asia (India & Pakistan)**

Since India and Pakistan gained independence, mutual distrust and antagonism marked relations between them. They fought three wars (1947-48, 65&71) and on at least four occasions (187, 1990, 1999 and 2002) they were at the brink of major armed conflict. Currently, major unresolved issues are: Kashmir, Wullar Barrage and demarcation of boundaries in Sir Creek and Siachen. Out of these, Kashmir is the most contentious issue that has caused wars between the two countries.

Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 raised the level of political stakes in their bilateral confrontation and heightened tension in the region. This led to a growing need in both countries to primate peace and adopt some measures of insurance against a catastrophic conflict that no one wants.

The term (CBM) was first applied to India and Pakistan relations in the wake of crisis, which was caused by India's military exercises called Brasstacks (1986-87). However the phenomenon of CBMs at that time was not alien to both countries. They had used some measures to avoid and resolve certain conflicts in the past.

- Karachi agreement (1949)
- Nehru Lique pact (1951)
- Indus Water treaty (1960)
- Tashkent agreement (1966)
- Run of Kutch agreement (1966)
- Hotline military operation directorates (1971)

- Simla agreement (1972)
- Salal Dam agreement (1978)
- The formation of Indo- Pak joint commission (1983)

The major development occurred India and Pakistan attack each other nuclear installations in December 1985, which was formally signed in December 1988 and finally ratified in 1991. The agreement was verbally mooted following the crisis which erupted due to perceived threats regarding attack on each other's nuclear installations in September-October 1984.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless it was formally signed in response to 'Exercise Brasstacks' crisis' (1986-87) when there was the possibility of a war between the two countries.<sup>8</sup> At the end of the crisis both sides recognized the need for some kind of arrangements for safety of their nuclear installations. So it was followed by the signing of the non-attack agreement in 1988. Again the agreement was ratified, following another escalation of tension in Kashmir (1990), which also carried the possibility of war that could have possibly escalated to the nuclear level. At this point India suggested extending the agreement to cover protection of civilian targets from nuclear attack but Pakistan did not agree.<sup>9</sup> Since then, certain CBMs have been installed to defuse tension between the two countries.<sup>10</sup> Some of are as follows:

### **Communication**

Communication measures are designed to defuse tension during the moments of crisis. They consist of consultative mechanisms that help states to air their grievances and prevent the grave crisis before it occurs. Some important communication measures adopted by India and Pakistan are as follows:

- Hotline was established between the prime ministers of two countries in 1989.
- In December 1990, it was decided that Directors General Military Operations of both sides would use the hotline on weekly basis, if only to exchange routine information. It was first established in December 1971. Earlier that month India and Pakistan fought a two front war. It fell into disuse and was renewed in 1990.
- The communication lines were also established between sectors commanders along the western sectors of the line of control in

---

7

8

9

10

Kashmir. They are not used on a permanent basis but can be activated quickly if the need arises.

- In May 1993 hotline between Pakistan Air Force and Indian Air Force was established.
- In May 1993 it was also decided to establish between Communication naval vessels and aircraft of the two navies when they are in each other's vicinity.

### **Constraint**

Constraint measures are to keep various types and levels of forces at distance from each other, especially along the borders. Pakistan and India, also observe these measures. Agreement signed in this connection and as follows:

- Two countries signed an agreement on advance notice of military exercises, maneuvers and troops movements in 1991. Accordingly, it was decided that exercises at corps level to be held 45 kilometers away from the International border. No military activity could be allowed within 5 kilometers of the border between two countries.
- Both sides signed an agreement on violation of air space in April 1991, which was ratified in August 1992. The agreement provided that armed fixed-wing aircraft could not fly within ten nautical miles of the International border; armed rotary aircraft would not be allowed to fly within one nautical mile and no aircraft within one thousand meters of their border.

### **Transparency**

Transparency measures are very important steps in confidence building, as they help states to foster greater openness of military capabilities and activities. Measures upon:

- Pakistan invitation to that have been taken in this respect in Indian and other foreign military attaches to observe 1989 military exercises (Zagreb Momin) to confirm no hostile nature of exercise.
- In order to defuse tension, caused by Indian military exercise (1990) that escalated into border crisis, India invited US observers to monitor troops and equipment deployments.

### **Contacts& exchange of information**

They are also important tools in order to build confidence between adversaries. They include military to military and government-to-government contacts in order to observe each other's military formation and certain other military activities. The mechanism for the regular

exchange of information of military preparedness is also to remove the element of mistrust and suspicion. India and Pakistan exchanged the lists of their nuclear installations and facilities under the 1988 agreement on prohibition of attack against nuclear installations and facilities on 1 January 1992. Afterwards, even during a low point in their relations, both countries continued to exchange lists of their nuclear installations and facilities on the first of every year.

*Military goodwill measures:* Certain measures aimed at promoting good will between each other's military personnel are also taken:

- Participation of senior military officer in seminar and guest speakers at each other's national defense colleges in May 1993
- Exchange of military bands in May 1993.
- Participation in each others military sports events

### **Political measures**

In addition to military CBMs both countries embarked upon certain political measures, which aimed at building, trust and promote harmony between them. The major initiatives taken by both governments are:

### **Consultation**

The Indo-Pak joint commission was established in 1983 with the objective of facilitating dialogue between two sides at ministerial and sub-ministerial level on a wide range of issues including trade, tourism, technology and communications. Its meetings were held from 1983 to 1989. Afterwards, the commission was superseded by a series of federal secretary's level meetings. Certain agreements i.e. reunification agreement, the air space agreement and the bilateral chemical weapons declaration were prompted by these meetings.

*Non-harassment of diplomatic person:* In November 1990, a code of conduct to 'protect diplomatic personnel', guaranteeing them protection from harassment was agreed upon in a meeting of Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries.

### **MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (1999):**

An important landmark regarding confidence building measures between two countries reached in February, 1999 in the wake of Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Lahore. During the visit, the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan signed a text of memorandum of understanding in Lahore on 21 February, 1999. Accordingly, both parties agreed to the following:

1. Engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines with view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
2. Provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
3. Undertake national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control, and to notify each other immediately in the event of any accident, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides agreed to identify /establish appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.
4. Abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear tests explosions unless either side in exercise of the national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests.
5. Conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to secure safety of navigation by naval vessels and aircrafts belonging to the two sides.
6. Periodically review the implementation of existing confidence building measures and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanism to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs.
7. Review existing communication links (e.g. between the respective Director General Military Operations) with a view to upgrade and improve these links and to provide for a fail-safe and secure communications.
8. Engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.<sup>11</sup>

### **Implementation**

An important principle for the effectiveness of CBMs is that once in place they must be abided by, as the building of trust and confidence requires reliability. In case of Indo- Pak relations the element of

---

<sup>11</sup>

reliability was lacking. The hot line established between the two DGMOs had not been very effective. It had not been used to exchange timely information, especially during the periods of crisis and tension i.e. it was not used during the crisis of 1987 and crisis in Kashmir in the spring of 1990. During Kargil crisis (1999), its use was sporadic. The hot line between the two prime ministers, which was first established in 1989, was re-installed in 1990 and again in 1997. Its very 'repeated re-establishment' reflects that it has been used intermittently. Nevertheless, during the Kargil crisis (1999) it was used by two prime ministers and helped to defuse the tension. Similarly, the agreement for 'non-intrusion of air space' has been periodically violated from both sides, especially in Siachen where the incidents of shooting down the helicopters were noted. Nevertheless, agreements on 'prior notification of military exercises' and on the annual exchange lists of nuclear related facilities have mostly been pre-notified; the annual exchange of lists of nuclear facilities is also in place, however, each side shows some skepticism as the definition of nuclear facility is not clear in the agreement.<sup>12</sup> The code of conduct about the non-harassment of diplomatic personnel's has also often been violated both sides. They are often harassed in both countries. The incidents of harassment of Indian diplomatic personnel in the wake of 'Babri Mosque's destruction' in 1992 and Indian nuclear tests in May 1998 occurred whereas the incidents of intimidation of Pakistani diplomatic personnel on Indian soil were also reported.<sup>13</sup> The memorandum signed by two sides at the conclusion of Vajpayee's Lahore visit in 1999, was a significant development in Indo-Pak relations in view of the fact that both sides showed their willingness to resolve the disputes including Kashmir. Although, the summit failed to address security issues in concrete terms as there was no agreement on non-deployment, non-induction of nuclear weapons as well as avoidance of further nuclear testing? Nevertheless, the confidence building measures proposed from two sides raised hopes in both countries. But Kargil conflict which erupted in April –June 1999 brought marked deterioration in Indo-Pak relations, robbing the spirit of confidence building measures agreed in MoU (1999). The peace process, initiated with Vajpayee's Lahore visit (1999) was stalled. The Kargil crisis also affected Pakistan's domestic politics deeply. A study conducted by the US based center for contemporary conflict maintained that Kargil deepened the mistrust between army and civilian government which led to the dismissal of

---

<sup>12</sup>

<sup>13</sup>



Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif government in October 1999, with the establishment of 4<sup>th</sup> military rule in Pakistan.

Most of the above mentioned CBMs fall in the category of military and political. There were hardly a few CBMs in the socio-economic domain. Despite the existence of these CBMs between the two countries in the past, their relations remained conflict prone and mutual distrust and antagonism prevailed. Most of the contentious issue that caused wars between two countries remained unresolved.

### **Civil society and peace process**

Non-political and non-military CBMs can help to create an atmosphere conducive to peace and stability by enlarging the areas of cooperation between people of the two countries. These include cultural exchanges i.e. sporting events, exchange of artists, writers, academic teachers, journalists, exchange of books, magazines, newspapers, joint ventures in performing arts. Such contacts facilitate the process of mutual understanding and prevent military crisis. In societies like in Southeast Asia where civil society and NGOs do have greater space and role, the task of conflict avoidance or resolution has become much easier, but in case of India and Pakistan, the civil society groups and NGOs are not strong enough to create conditions, which can compel the state to follow a more pragmatic approach towards conflict resolution. They lack in organization, resources and leadership to take the challenge.<sup>14</sup> High literacy rate, developed communication and transportation, democratic institutions and processes provide conducive environment for civil society groups to work smoothly and effectively. These conditions are lacking in the case of Indo- Pak relations. Furthermore, growing gap between state and society in both countries has resulted in developing different perceptions towards each other. State actors depict civil society groups in these countries as threat to state security and interest. On the other hand, civil society groups consider state actors responsible for fomenting and promoting conflicts. It does make the job of conflict management and resolution more tedious. In the past, the efforts from the activists of civil society to create space for tolerant attitude were resisted from both governments. The strict visa policies from both sides did not help the peace move forward. Nevertheless, the changed environment forced both governments to liberalize the visa regime, opening communication links for promoting people to people contact.

In this regard the Neemrana Group named after a fort in Rajasthan was established, its first meeting was held in 1991. It was a

---

14

nongovernmental forum which was established to facilitate the dialogue process between the academics, and retired civil and military officers of two countries. Related efforts have been undertaken by the United States information Service through WorldNet teleconferencing.

Both countries have been exchanging sports persons and teams. Exchange of artists, writers, poets, musicians, painters and academics are more frequent in recently years. The publishers/book sellers from both countries participate in book fairs held in each other countries. The media persons from South Asia have also been active in their efforts to find a way to peaceful resolution of all inter-state and intra-state conflicts through sustained dialogue while rejecting the use of force, focusing on India-Pakistan conflicts. It is reflected in Lahore Declaration, Media and Reconciliation in South Asia, November-2004.<sup>15</sup> SAFMA (South Asian Free Media Association) was established in July 2000 and has organized four conferences in Katmandu, New Delhi, Colombo and Lahore, which critically analyze the role of free media in managing and resolving various inter-state and intra-state disputes in South Asia and state of negotiations between India and Pakistan. It can provide an institutionalized mechanism for monitoring the peace process in the region.

The task of bringing peace in the region through CBMs can be easier if the economic ties between the two country are strengthened .In this situation the governments restrained from acting rashly. These ties could also help to marginalize the extremist elements in both the countries as the civil society could act as buffer between state and society and various extremist and violent elements more effectively. In the past, Pakistan-India did have almost non-existent economic ties. In 1998, India official trade with Pakistan was only 0.44% it's of total trade. Pakistan's trade with India was 2% of its total trade.<sup>16</sup> The issue was made hostage to resolution of Kashmir issue Pakistan has been insisting on the settlement of Kashmir issue before talks on economic relations. However, now the need for strengthening economic ties between two countries is felt by both sides. Pakistan government, in a bid to to promote economic relations, approved a liberalized visa policy for Indian businessmen, who can get two years multiple visas. Pakistan Muslim League President Ch. Shujat Hussain announced it during his visit to India on 29 March, 2005.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup>

<sup>16</sup>

<sup>17</sup>

**Track II diplomacy**

The most prominent group involved in track II diplomacy between Pakistan and India is Neemran Group. The first meeting of the group was held at Neemran Fort Rajestan, India in October 1991. The initiative was supported by The US Information Service (USIS). More recently the group has received support from the Ford Foundation and German Foundations. The group comprises former diplomats, former military personals, media persons, and representatives from NGOs and academics from the two countries. The group meets at least once in a year. Since its establishment certain core issues have been discussed in its various meetings. The discussions have been well informed and fruitful because of high-level expertise and experience of its members. The group has a significant role in bridging the gap between the governments of two countries as it provides refined analysis and advice to the two governments, thereby providing a forum of communication to the two sides. A very important initiative by the Neemran Group was undertaken in May-June 2004, when a joint paper was submitted to the two governments on nuclear CBMs.<sup>18</sup> another group-Balusa comprising leading opinion makers from India, Pakistan and USA is also playing a significant role in Track II diplomacy between the two states. This group is however, primarily involved in bridging the gap between the people of two countries by exploring opportunities in the economic, environmental and energy sectors to discover the areas of common interest and confidence building. The group is very active in undertaking different research projects to create awareness among the people about the cost of conflict and benefit of peace between the two countries. Therefore the group is playing a critical role in impacting the public opinion for peace process.<sup>19</sup> Another example of track II diplomacy between India and Pakistan is the formation of India-Pakistan Soldiers' group which was formed in 1999. The group consists of retired armed forces personals from the two countries. The delegations arranged by the group have communications with the political and military leadership and diverse civil society groups in the two countries. The 'Delhi Policy group' and 'Islamabad Policy Research Institute' have also been engaged in talks seeking to develop 'a shared and agreed lexicon' on nuclear concepts such as 'minimum nuclear deterrence'. The foreign offices from both sides have been regularly informed about its proceedings.<sup>20</sup>

---

18

19

20

### **Military regime and peace process**

The fourth military rule in Pakistan was established in October 1999. In the beginning both India & Pakistan adopted non-flexible attitude towards each other. Initially India refused to talk to the Musharraf government as being a military government. India forced the postponement of the SAARC summit. Pakistan on the other hand stressed the centrality of the Kashmir issue in its dealings with India. During his visit to Muzafferabad in December 1999, General Musharraf stated that 'Pakistan is Kashmir and Kashmir is Pakistan'. Elaborating further he said: 'I want to reiterate that there is a change in the policy towards India. Earlier we used to say that we will negotiate all issues including Kashmir, but now the Kashmir comes first'. Federal commerce minister, Abdul Razzak, ruled out any possibility of trade with India before solving the core issue of Kashmir.<sup>21</sup> Indian leadership also refused to initiate the dialogue with military regime in Pakistan. Later, they insisted that India would not start a dialogue with Pakistan till it stopped cross border terrorism. The Indian prime minister even went a step further and stated that India would not talk to Pakistan unless Pakistan occupied Kashmir was returned to India.<sup>22</sup> However, in April 2003, Indo-Pak relations took a dramatic turn when Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, offered to resume dialogue which was stalled after Agra summit in July 2001, with Pakistan readily accepting the offer. Since then, there have been several rounds of talks at different levels between the two countries. There is general approval of initiatives taken for normalization of their bilateral relations, several proposals for confidence building measures have been forwarded; nevertheless, no concrete measures are taken to resolve the disputes. The talks held on Wullar barrage Siachen and Sir Creek ended without any agreement or significant progress. There has been some progress on security matters. The joint statement issued at the end of Pakistan's foreign minister Khurshid Mehmood Kauri's five days visit to India, in September 2004, stated that two sides agreed on various proposals of confidence building measures including holding expert level talks on conventional and nuclear CBMs.

The Indian media published a list of proposals, which both sides were likely to discuss.<sup>23</sup>

Accordingly both countries reached an agreement on certain issues including the CBMs in February 2005, to help pave the way for

---

<sup>21</sup>

<sup>22</sup>

<sup>23</sup>

normalization. The ministers for external affairs of both countries announced in a joint press conference, on 16 February 2005, that the two governments had decided to allow travel by bus across the LoC in Kashmir between Srinagar and Muzaferabad. The bus service was started from 7 April, 2005. Both sides agreed to an entry permit system rather than formal passport. An understanding has also been reached on 'opening further communication links for promoting people to people contact – a bus service between Lahore and Amritsar and the Khokhrapar-Munabao rail links'. Expert level meeting in Rawalpindi was held on the establishment of communication link between Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and Indian Coastal Guard on 10 May, 2005. Talks on conventional and nuclear confidence building measures commenced between high level Indian and Pakistani experts in August 2005. A meeting of foreign secretaries of both sides was held in Islamabad on 1 September, 2005 to review the implementation of various measures towards peace process. An agreement was signed on advance notification of ballistic missile tests on 3 October, 2005.<sup>24</sup> The gas pipeline project from Iran via Pakistan is also in the offing, creating economic compulsions for both countries to keep their relations conflict free. As a good will gesture, both countries released several civilian prisoners and fishermen in each other's custody, in consonance with the decision reached at the foreign secretary level talks from 27-28 June, 2004. The extremist elements on both sides, however, seem to resist the moves, for example, there have been statements from both sides, threatening bus service between two parts of Kashmir. It reflects that peace process might be de-railed by a negative development or accident in any country, which could be exploited by extremists. Moreover, there are statements about linking CBMs with resolution of Kashmir issue. President General Musharraf stated on 23 March, 2005, that confidence-building measures would lose credibility if Kashmir issue was not settled. Yet, the encouraging sign is the continuity in the dialogue process.

### **Major factors that contributed towards the failure of CBMs in South Asia**

- Animosity between India and Pakistan have deep historical roots. Animosity in the relations was reflected in the hostile approach adopted by the Congress and the Muslim League leadership towards each other during the struggle for independence, germinating in various disputes. General perception prevailed in Pakistan that the

---

<sup>24</sup>

Indian leadership could not reconcile with the establishment of Pakistan and it hoped the partition would be annulled and two parts be united one day. This contributed towards mutual distrust and perpetual suspicion of each other's actions.

- Both countries suffered from internal socio-economic and ethno-political conflicts. The class conflicts, communal violence and struggle against central authority were the common features of their socio-political landscape. Each side blamed the other side for its domestic problems, which adversely affected their bilateral relations and efforts to solve their problems. Public declarations from the leaders of both sides could serve have as CBMs but they for garnering domestic support, used to give statements that have often increased tension in the region.<sup>25</sup> For example, the provoking statements of Indian leaders after Vajpayee's return to India in March 1999(after Lahore declaration) generated a similar response from Pakistani leadership, having negative implication on the peace process. Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated: the Pak army is fully geared and equipped to face any eventuality. His statement came in the wake of an interview of Jaswant Singh (Indian foreign minister) to a Pakistani daily in which he insisted on India's traditional stance on Kashmir and cross border terrorism.<sup>26</sup> Such developments often shattered the feeling of euphoria created by efforts to pursue the peace process.
- Wide disparities in respect of size, economic and military strength between two countries erect barrier in the way of confidence building process. The military might of territorially larger India and its economic potential accentuate the insecurity of Pakistan that is not conducive to building confidence between them. India's worldview as great power also does not help Pakistan to overcome its security fears.
- CBMs are meant to hasten the peace process. Certain level of trust is required for implementation of CBMs in their true spirit. CBMs between India and Pakistan have usually been negotiated after serious military crisis or under external pressure. Therefore, implementation of CBMs has often lacked will. For example, important CBMs were negotiated after crises like those associated with Brasstacks exercises (1987) or in Kashmir (spring 1990) result the agreements on 'not to attack each other's nuclear facilities and

---

<sup>25</sup>

<sup>26</sup>

installations (1988); advance notification of military exercises and movements (1991) and up grading hot-line communication between DGMOs (1991). Even the Indus Water Treaty (1960), Tashkent Declaration (1966) and Simla Agreement (1972) were concluded after serious military crises.<sup>27</sup>

- CBMs negotiated and adopted by India and Pakistan are strictly bilateral in nature. India has been averse to letting other parties intervene due to its insistence on bilateral conflict settlement approach. Past record of CBMs in Europe and Southeast Asia shows that multilateral approach adopted by these countries produced more desirable results.<sup>28</sup>
- Lack of political will to seek effective mechanisms for conflict resolution is a major cause behind ineffectiveness of the mechanism of CBMs in the past. CBMs can be effective when both sides are ready to show a sustained and genuine will to understand each other's concerns by showing tolerance and magnanimity towards each other. They must also pursue meaningful dialogue on the contentious issues.<sup>29</sup> There have been talks at various levels from time to time in between the two countries without any meaningful progress towards resolution of major issues, especially Kashmir issue that is a major irritant between them.
- Weak and ineffective civil society groups are also responsible for lack of or poor implementation of CBMs. Therefore, a permanent institutionalized mechanism was missing for reporting to the public the implementation of CBMs. It could have helped to make CBMs more effective.

### **Conclusion**

The track record of CBMs in South Asia has not been very encouraging in the past. They have been used sparingly between India and Pakistan. Both sides asserted that mutual trust was lacking. However, during recent years visible progress has been made on CBMs. Several important measures were announced covering areas as diverse as conventional and nuclear fields and enhanced people to people contact through bus service and rail links. In the past military related CBMs were given more importance, however, now, more emphasis is on socio-economic CBMs. Both countries also agreed to have a sustained dialogue on important issues including Kashmir. However, concrete measures have

---

<sup>27</sup>

<sup>28</sup>

<sup>29</sup>

not been taken to resolve them. In this scenario, it may be stressed that CBMs are not an end in them selves. The meaningful and productive dialogue on political issues is required to deepen and broaden the impact of CBMs.

#### NOTES:

- 1 Johan Jorgen Holst quoted by Naeem Ahmad Salik in 'CBMs-past present and future', *Pakistan Defense Review*, winter 1998, p.70.
- 2 Quoted by Dr, Maqsdul Hasan Nuri in 'CBMs in South Asia: Practice, Problems and Prospects', *Regional Studies*, Islamabad, xiv, 2 (spring 1996), p.31.
- 3 *Ibid.*
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 Saima Qayum, 'Confidence Building Measures and Nuclear Non Proliferation in South Asia', unpublished M.Phil thesis, 1999, Government College University, Lahore, pp.37-50.
- 6 W.P.S. Sindu, Brian Cloughley, John H.Hawes and Tersita C.Schaffer,'Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures in Southern Asia', (Stimson Center), Report No.26, November 1998, pp.38-9.
- 7 *Ibid.*
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 Dr, S.M. Rahman (ed.), *Security, Trade and Advanced Technologies in South Asia*, (Islamabad: Margalla Press, 1995), pp.38-51; [file:///C:/.../ The Henry L Stimson Center-Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia.htm](file:///C:/.../The Henry L Stimson Center-Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia.htm) 17-Feb-05.
- 10 <File:///C:/Documents and Settings/Administrator/My Documents/Lahore Declaration, Indian...3/19/2005>
- 11 Dr, S.M.Rahman, *op.cit.*, pp.38-51.
- 12 *Ibid.*
- 13 Dr, Moonis Ahmar, 'Civil Society and Armed Conflicts', *The News*, 6 May 2003.
- 14 Lahore Declaration, Media and Reconciliation in South Asia, *Journal*, South Asia, Jan-March 2005, p.158.
- 15 'India-Pakistan relations, The benefits of trade', *The News*, 11 May 2003.
- 16 *The Daily Times*, 30 March 2005.
- 17 Manjarika Sewak, *Multi- Track II Diplomacy between India and Pakistan – A Conceptual Framework for Sustainable Security*, (Colombo: Lordson publishers, 2005), pp.40-2, 48.
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 *Ibid.*, pp.47-8.



- 20 'Trends in Indo-Pak Relations', *Strategic Analysis* (monthly journal of IDSA), volt xxiv, no.2, p.240.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p242a
- 22 *The Daily Times*, 3 September 2004.
- 23 <http://www.stimson.org/?SN=SA20060207948>
- 24 Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, *op.cit.*, p.56.
- 25 Trends in 'Indo-Pak Relations', *Strategic Analysis*, *op.cit.*, p.233.
- 26 File://A:\ The Henry L Stimson Center-CBMs in post Cold War South Asia.htm 22/04/2004
- 27 *Ibid.*
- 28 *Ibid.*