

Review Article

Review on Jinnah Papers

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Jinnah Papers, Edited by Z. H. Zaidi, First Series, Volume VIII: *The States: Historical and Policy Perspectives and Accession* (2003), pp. xxxix, 434, Rs. 500; First Series, Volume IX: *The States: Hyderabad, Jammu and Kashmir* (2003), pp. xliii, 654, Rs. 650; Second Series, Volume X: *Quest for Political Settlement in India* (2004), pp. xlviii, 775, Rs. 750; Second Series, Volume XI: *Consolidating the Muslim League For Final Struggle* (2005), pp. lxiii, 793, Rs. 750; and Volume XII, *The Verdict For Pakistan* (2005), pp. lv, 788, Rs. 750. Distributed by Oxford University Press, Plot # 38, Sector-15, Korangi Industrial Area, Karachi 74900.

In his review of Wolpert's *Jinnah of Pakistan*,¹ John Kenneth Galbraith, U.S. envoy to India during J.F. Kennedy's administration (1961-63), refers to the skewed impression sought to be created by the biographies of Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) and other Indian or pro-Indian accounts. In essence, it was that 'Jinnah, by comparison [with Gandhi], seems a petulant, self-centered figure, who, out of pride, arrogance and ambition, exploited ruthlessly the Islamic grievances and obsessions of his followers to destroy the dream of one great unitary commonwealth on the subcontinent'. After poring over Wolpert, however, he felt that 'This highly competent book by a major historian of modern India does something to alter the foregoing impression, especially as regards Jinnah's early career'. And he concludes by saying 'I read this book with gratitude and the wish, as regards my own education, that it could have been written much earlier'².

In tandem, while reviewing Wolpert, Fouad Ajami, Director of Middle Eastern Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, says that,

¹ Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

² *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 17 June 1984.

So far Jinnah has been a brooding and inaccessible figure. He has been known mainly as a sinister rival to the saintly Gandhi, seen through the world that Gandhi, such a masterful P. R. man, set up for us. We have accepted Gandhi's depiction of himself as a universal man, a man above intrigues and deals. Gandhi gave the travelers and fawning biographers who came to India what they wanted. The visitors walked with *Bapu*, they stayed at his Ashram, they were told of nature cures. The chatty endearing man, at once so exotic and so much a product of the liberal empire, was a show all his own. As for Jinnah, we have seen him with his limitations and fears, unable to embrace a message of communal peace and brotherhood.

Forbidding Jinnah, or Plain Mr. Jinnah, as he himself said in an obvious put-down of Gandhi's title of Mahatma or Great Soul.... ...Wolpert has done what biography, at its best, should do: he has told the story of a complex and tormented man, and related his torments and choices to the insoluble dilemma which he inherited – to the predominance of men who slammed doors in his face while pretending to be able to take in all other men as brothers and compatriots. 'By the time Wolpert takes you to Karachi, on Jinnah's flight from Delhi to his new home and his new state [on 7 August 1947], you are left with a new appreciation of the man: no love, and for sure, no pity – these were sentiments that Jinnah did without – but certainly a measure of grudging respect.'³

As a corollary to both Galbraith and Ajami, it may well be said that had Chaudhri Muhammad Ali's (1905-80) *Emergence of Pakistan* (1967)⁴ appeared earlier, V. P. Menon's (1894-1966) *The Transfer of Power in India* (1957)⁵ would not have become, as it did, almost the standard version for all the subsequent accounts of the period.

In any case, of the three sides in the Indian political triangle – the ruling British, who symbolized and espoused the imperial cause, the (predominantly Hindu) Indian National Congress which stood for a united India, and the All India Muslim League (AIML) which advocated partition and Pakistan –, the respective versions of the two entrenched sides had become available, in instalments, from the middle 1970s onwards. In contrast that of the third side is *still* not readily and adequately available. Little surprising, then, the Pakistani cause

³ *The New Republic*, 7 May 1984.

⁴ New York, Columbia University Press, 1967.

⁵ Calcutta, Longman's, 1957

continues to be misrepresented and distorted, and, above all, has gone by sheer default, all these 58 years.

Against this backdrop, the National Archives of Pakistan (NAP)'s project to publish the *Jinnah Papers (JP)* represented a major breakthrough in Pakistani historiography. (The last several volumes, however, feature Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, Culture Division as the logo.) Volume I was published in 1993, and volume XII in 2005.

First, a word about the Editor-in-Chief, Dr Z.H. Zaidi. He has been associated with the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, for some forty-five years, and is currently a Senior Research Fellow. And for a year or so he was also engaged in retrieving and preserving the archival material on the Muslim struggle for freedom, during 1966-67. As I had indicated in the *Muslim League Documents 1900-1947*,⁶ Zaidi did the much needed and laborious spade work in locating the AIML records in 1966, which enabled Dr I.H. Qureshi (1903-81), the noted historian, who had direct access to President Mohammad Ayub Khan (1907-74), to rescue them from the ravages of neglect and inhospitable abode, and to get them, stuffed in 123 gunny bags and 46 steel trunks, transferred to the University of Karachi. Presently, a Committee for the Preservation of Muslim League Records, which was set up, with Qureshi as Chairman and Sharif al Mujahid as Secretary, decided to establish the Archives of Freedom Movement (AFM) at the University. Zaidi was, however, largely responsible for organizing it, putting it on a systematic basis, and making it a self-sustaining project, probably the first one at the University of Karachi, while Qureshi ensured adequate funding and training of recruits for the repair and restoration job. Aqeeluzzafar Khan and Muhammad Saleem Ahmad were the earliest recruits.⁷ The AFM, which constituted the most valuable documentary record of the Muslim freedom struggle were repaired and restored, classified, bound, and made accessible to scholars and researchers, from the late 1970s onwards.

Three decades later, however, bureaucratic preferences and penchant to build little 'empires' under their 'benign' auspices led the AFM to be transferred in indecent haste to the NAP at Islamabad – a decision predictably injudicious, unwarranted by research interests or the basic requirements of the advancement of historiography in Pakistan.

⁶ Sharif al Mujahid, *Muslim League Documents 1900-1947* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1999), Vol. I.

⁷ For details, see M. H. Siddiqi, 'Acquisition of Muslim League Records at the University of Karachi', *Past and Present*, Department of History, University of Karachi, 1967.

Worse still, little attention has been paid all these years to continue the work on the classification and listing of the remaining documents – and they run into thousands – under appropriate heads. It's almost 59 years since Pakistan was established and the AIML wound up, and the AIML's centenary falls this year. But the all-too-critical question still looms large – that is: how long should researchers have to wait to get a peep into the entire AIML records and archives?

Zaidi had also put the jumbled papers in the custody of Syed Shamsul Hasan, AIML Office Secretary at Delhi (1919-47), in order. Later, I had persuaded his son, Khalid Shamsul Hasan, to get them arranged, classified and bound at the Quaid-i-Azam Academy during 1980-81, and made available to researchers as Shamsul Hasan Collection (SHC). Zaidi had as well played a role in getting the Quaid-i-Azam (Jinnah) Papers (QAP) transferred from the Mohatta Palace, to the NAP, after Fatima Jinnah (1893-1967)'s death. His association with the present *Jinnah Papers* project, thus, represents the crowning glory to a long list of accomplishments, and a fulfillment of a life-long ambition.

The significance of the *Jinnah Papers* 'in unravelling the real Mr. Jinnah from the widely held myths and images created by his opponents and devotees alike' cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, inaccessibility to this primary source had marred earlier studies on Jinnah – e.g., Bolitho (1898-1947)'s *Jinnah*⁸ and Mujahid's *Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation*.⁹ The Jinnah Papers were, of course, available to both Wolpert and Ayesha Jalal,¹⁰ but, as Zaidi points out, they had made little use of them – the former only 20 documents in the QAP and 110 documents in the SHC, and the latter 24 in the QAP and 38 in the SHC. Jalal's case is understandable, but not Wolpert's, since, as Quaid-i-Azam Academy's Director, I, who was his only contact in Pakistan at the time, had interceded with the NAP's DG, Atiq Zafar Sheikh, in February-March 1981, to get photocopies of all the documents that Wolpert had selected, and with my friend, Khalid Shamsul Hasan, for the photocopies from the SHC. In any case, Wolpert's failure to consult the Papers more extensively leads him, for instance, to portray Jinnah's relations with his daughter, Dina, after her marriage as distant, cold and formal (p.370) while the Papers reveal a periodical exchange of letters and a warm and

⁸ Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan* (London: Murray, 1954).

⁹ Sharif al Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981).

¹⁰ *The Sole Spokesman*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

tender relationship to the near end of his life¹¹. Thus, even the first volume which forms but a minuscule part of the Jinnah Papers call for substantive revisions to the extant historiography.

By all accounts, Jinnah was *the* critical variable in the emergence of Pakistan. To Malcolm Boyd, his was 'one of the most pivotal lives in the 20th century'.¹² To Collins and Lapierre, 'History beyond that written by his own people, would never accord Mohammad Ali Jinnah the high place his achievements merited, yet, it were he, more than Gandhi or any one else, who held the key to India's future on New Year's Day, 1947...'.¹³ To Leonard Mosley, Pakistan was a 'one-man achievement'.¹⁴ To Hodson, Constitutional Advisor to the Viceroy (1941-42) and the author of the most authoritative British account of the last decade of the Raj, 'It is barely conceivable that events would have taken the same course... and that a new nation state of Pakistan would have been created but for the personality and leadership of one man, Mr. Jinnah'.¹⁵ To Cragg, 'the really decisive advocacy as well as the causation of Pakistan' belonged with Jinnah.¹⁶ Jinnah was, thus, an 'event – making', rather than an 'eventful', man in the Sidney Hook sense: one who had helped to create 'a fork in the historical road' and left 'the positive imprint of his personality upon history – an imprint that is still observable after he has disappeared from the scene'.¹⁷ And on the basis of what contemporary analysts like Mosley, Hodson and Cragg say, Jinnah may be safely rated as the *Zeitgeist* ('Spirit of the Age') in the Hegelian sense about which E. H. Carr says, 'What he does is the heart and essence of his age; he actualizes his age'.¹⁸

A leader with such credentials should have normally provoked extensive research interest. That he did not during all these years should be largely attributed to the non-availability of the primary source

¹¹ Z. H. Zaidi (ed.), *Jinnah Papers: Prelude to Pakistan*, 20 February-2 June 1947 (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, 1993), vol. I, D. 359 and 525.

¹² Review on Wolpert, *Los Angeles Times*, 27 April 1984.

¹³ Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *Freedom at Mid-night* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), p.42.

¹⁴ Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961).

¹⁵ H. V. Hoodson, *The Great Divide* (London: Hutchinson, 1969), p. 37.

¹⁶ Kenneth Cragg, *Counsels in Contemporary Islam*, Islamic Surveys 3 (Edinburgh: University Press, 1965), p. 20.

¹⁷ Sidney Hook, *The Hero in history: A Study in Limitation and Possibility* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956), p. 157.

¹⁸ E. H. Carr, *What is History?* (New York: Vintage, 1961), p. 67.

material. Hence the *Jinnah Papers*' publication should inevitably have a 'multiplier' effect: it is bound to excite academic interest in Jinnah. It would also modify the extant skewed historiography on partition and Pakistan, which has thus far been largely based on the Indian version.

Because of the overriding interest of both the students and scholars in the 1937-47 developments, as well as for reasons of both logistics and significance, the first series covered the last phase: the period encompassing 20 February 1947 to 30 September 1948. Volume I covered the period from 20 February to 2 June 1947 – that is, from HMG's statement on the transfer of power to India by June 1948 to the Partition (or Mountbatten) Plan of 3 June 1947. Based on primary sources, the well-researched, 24-page Introduction to Vol. I, delineates how Jinnah finally triumphed, despite failing health and limited options, despite 'strong challenges and stiff opposition from the British and the Congress', despite 'factionalism, in-fighting and jealousies among the leading figures in the Muslim League' and, above all, despite the premium put on provincial independence in the HMG's statement of 20 February 1947. *Inter alia*, the Introduction also provides, albeit impliedly, a rebuttal to Ayesha Jalal's thesis in *The Sole Spokesman*.

Volume II-VII of the First Series covered the following themes and periods:

Vol. II – *Pakistan in the Making*, 3 June – 30 June 1947, 992 p (along with six maps)

Vol. III – *On the Threshold of Pakistan*, 1 July –25 July 1947, 1045 p (along with two maps).

Vol. IV – *Pakistan at Last*, 26 July-14 August 1947, 568 p.

Vol. V – *Pakistan: Pangs of Birth*, 15 August – 30 September 1947, 725 p (along with two maps)

Vol. VI – *Pakistan: Battling Against Odds*, 1 October – 31 December 1947, 805 p.

Vol. VII – *Pakistan: Struggling for Survival*, 1 January – 30 September 1948, 835 p.

The volumes (VIII-XII) under review, as was the case with the previous ones, have a standard format: a Foreword, an Introduction, the List of Abbreviations, a Chronology of Important Events, the texts of the Documents alongwith annexures (if any), Appendices (if any), a Glossary, an Index of persons and an Index of subjects, and maps (if any). Volumes X-XII also include a list of Documents and Appendices. References in the two indices are to page numbers, not to Documents. All the volumes feature a photograph of the Quaid-i-Azam, with volume VIII featuring a 1951 pencil sketch by Ahmed Mirza Jamil. All the volumes also contain several photographs concerning the principal

personalities during the period covered. The Introduction in each of these volumes, which largely provides a succinct and eminently readable background to the documents, is well researched and documented, attesting to the editor's expertise.

Volume VIII provides the 'Historical and Policy Perspectives on the Accession' of fourteen states or mini states (Amb, Bahawalpur, Chitral, Dir, Hunza and Nagar, Kalat, Khairpur, Kharan and Mekran, Las Bela, Swat, Junagadh and Manavadar), which had acceded to Pakistan. The last two were, however, occupied by the Indian forces on one pretext or another by November-end 1947. In all this volume contains 251 Documents.

However, the omission of the Indian version by V. P. Menon, Secretary of the Indian States Ministry, which provoked the long-delayed Kalat accession to Pakistan in indecent haste, is rather conspicuous – and inexplicable. Or is it deliberate – to spare the memory of the great Khan any sort of embarrassment? I have myself heard the news on Menon's visit to Kalat and its accession to India on the All-India Radio, on 27 March 1948, and read it in *The Hindu* (Madras) the next day. This controversial accession episode had inevitably soured relations between Jinnah and the Khan, who had previously the best of relations for several years. And that to a point that Jinnah regretted that he was unable to receive him due to his other commitments when, in a communication on 4 May 1948, the Khan proposed to 'stay with Your Excellency and Miss Fatima Jinnah as your guest...' (However, Jinnah did meet the Khan at the Residency in Quetta on 28 May.) In any case, the critical question that stems from the Kalat episode and that, moreover, needs to be probed into, pondered over, and grappled with is this: With India's hold over Kashmir on Pakistan's eastern frontier fairly consolidated, with the Congress-aligned Red Shirts disaffected in the troubled NWFP and with a hostile Afghanistan, both in the north and northwest, was New Delhi's bid for Kalat's accession meant to get the encirclement of the nascent state, still struggling for survival, swelled to a frightfully ominous threshold?

If this sounds a bit too sensational, consider the following two excerpts from the leading British daily. A correspondent noted in 1956: 'It is, however, a curious fact, that Afghan officials habitually express their certainty that Pakistan is fated in due course to disintegrate and be merged into a reunited India, which suggests that the claim to Paktoonistan may possibly have been formulated, at a time when this event seemed more probable than now, with an eye to an eventual

“division of spoils”¹⁹ Five years later, the correspondent of the same newspaper, again, noted: ‘In 1947, when the Afghan Government committed itself to the cause of the Pakhtoonistan there were probably hopes in Kabul that Pakistan would not long survive as a nation; such hopes have been dashed but the commitment remains’.²⁰

Volume IX deals with the two principal states of Hyderabad and Kashmir. The section on Hyderabad contains a total of 66 documents while the one on Kashmir 169 documents and 49 Appendices, which are extremely valuable in reconstructing the Kashmir story from the Pakistani viewpoint.

For various reasons, Hyderabad had staked for an independent or semi-independent status, leading to protracted negotiations with New Delhi. Ere long, however, India *a la* Israel today, went in for unilateralism: she mounted a ‘police action’ on 13 September 1948, overrunning the state five days later, on 17 September. This had inevitably pushed the embittered India-Pakistan relations to a new threshold. Embittered because of, among others, Kashmir’s ‘fraudulent’ accession to India. And fraudulent because New Delhi had brazenly violated the very principles she had cited to reject Junagadh’s accession to Pakistan, and demand Hyderabad’s accession to India.²¹

Volume X (second series) deals with the *Quest for Political Settlement in India*, covering the period, 1 October 1943 to 31 July 1944. This volume, which contains 612 documents and 62 Appendices, deals with a crucial period in the annals of the Muslim League. A period when its organizational structure was streamlined, with Jinnah engaged in frenetic efforts at consolidating the League; when he appointed a Committee of Action for ‘organizing, co-ordinating and unifying the Provincial Leagues and the entire Muslim League organization’, and when Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (1879-1972), the former Premier of Madras, published his much publicized formula, since called the CR formula. If the earlier Cripps Offer (April 1942) was the British alternative to Pakistan, the CR formula was the Congress alternative to it. Indeed, it was considered a viable substitute for Pakistan for almost six months (April-September 1944), till Jinnah, finally, pricked the bubble during his marathon talks with Gandhi, at Bombay, in September 1944. This was also the period when the Muslim League had its ministries for the first time in Bengal, Sind and the NWFP, and when, finally, the

¹⁹ *The Times* (London), 10 August 1956.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 6 September 1961.

²¹ T. Walter Wallbank, *A Short History of India and Pakistan* (New York: New American Library, 1963), pp. 239-41.

League expelled Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana (1900-75), the Punjab premier, clearing the way for the Muslim League and the Muslim Students Federation (MSF) to build up grass-root support in the countryside, as indexed by the Sialkot Conference (1944)'s astounding success, which would pay huge dividends in the ensuing critical 1945-46 elections.

Although Volume X's theme (*Quest for Political Settlement in India*) spills over in Volume XI, it principally features documents on the two important milestones on the unchartered and tortuous road to Pakistan, and to Jinnah becoming the sole spokesman: the abortive Jinnah-Gandhi talks, and the equally abortive (first) Simla Conference at Simla, during 25 June - 14 July 1945, convened by the Viceroy, Lord Wavell (1883-1950), to get the major political parties included in a reconstituted Executive Council. The common variable between the two, otherwise disparate events was that, directly or impliedly, they advanced the Muslim League's claim to be Muslim India's sole authoritative spokesman. While the Simla Conference's failure dramatized that no constitutional advance could be effected without the League's (and Jinnah's) concurrence, the Jinnah-Gandhi talks underlined the rather obvious fact that Pakistan could no more be put under the rug. And, all the while, Jinnah continued with his undaunting efforts at consolidating the League's provincial bodies, to prepare them for a final struggle. The volume contains 675 documents and two appendices. While the first one features an in-depth analysis of the CR Formula from the Muslim viewpoint, the second one has 148 documents concerning the League Election Fund, which Jinnah had launched soon after Simla.

Volume XII, which covers the period from 1 August 1945 to 31 March 1946, contains 614 documents, and one appendix on the role of the Aligarh students, which features 45 documents. It deals with the most pivotal and consequential event between 1940 and 1947: the all-too-critical 1945-46 general elections. Jinnah's clarion call at this juncture epitomized their criticality: 'Support the Muslim League and let us have a thumping verdict in favour of Pakistan.... All other matters must stand over.'²² Again: 'Establish complete unity, face elections with grim determination. Issue life-death. Every vote for League means rescue of

²² Jinnah to Mohammad Ashfaq Siddiqi, 25 November 1945, QAP, F-140/22; *JP*, Second Series, vol. XII, D. 301.

hundred million Musalmans, Islam, Pakistan.’²³ And, fortuitously for Muslim India, the nation responded to his call to a man.

Inexplicably though, the Introduction fails to spell out the huge criticality of the electoral verdict. More surprising, it conveniently confines itself to a mere bald reportage:

The results of the elections to the Central Assembly gave Muslim League a sweeping victory as it captured each one of the Muslim seats. In the provincial elections, it obtained an overwhelming majority of Muslim seats in Muslim minority provinces – 82% in UP, 85% in Bihar, 92% in Assam, 93% in CP, and 100% in three provinces namely Bombay, Madras and Orissa. Among the Muslim majority provinces i.e. Bengal, the Punjab and Sind, the Muslim League bagged nearly 94%, 88% and 80% of the Muslim seats respectively.... (p. xxi)

Still more inexplicably, it even fails to cross-reference to Vol. I, Appendix XIII, wherein the election returns in respect of the Central Legislative Assembly, the Council of State, and the five provinces in the northwestern and northeastern India have been detailed and documented.

In any case, so overwhelmingly critical was the electoral verdict that it calls for a detailed analysis, if only to spell out its supreme significance. And in that regard, just consider the following. The Muslim League won, in aggregate terms, 86.45% of the Muslim seats and bagged 75% of the popular vote. This obviously meant that the League had finally acquired a social depth at the grass-root level – a far cry, indeed, from its 1937 standing, when it could barely obtain 24% of the Muslim seats and 4% of the popular vote.²⁴ And, in perspective, the massive electoral verdict represented the triumphant vindication of the League’s and Jinnah’s claim to represent the Muslims. A long standing and oft reiterated claim,²⁵ which he had put forward, first tentatively, at a students’ moot at Lucknow in August 1936, called to launch the left-oriented All-India Students’ Federation, and, later, more authoritatively, during his parleys with Subhas Chandra Bose (1897-1945), the Congress

²³ Jinnah to Mofizur Rahman, 5 December 1945, tel., Shamsul Hassan Collection, Students I/111; Zaidi, *Jinnah Papers*, Second Series, Vol. XII, D. 324.

²⁴ For details, see Sharif al Mujahid, ‘Towards Pakistan’, in Waheed-uz-Zaman & M. Saleem Akhtar, *Islam in South Asia* (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1993), pp. 492-94, 448-50.

²⁵ See Sharif al Mujahid, *Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation*, op. cit., p.442 and Mukhtar Zaman, *Students Role in the Pakistan Movement* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1978), p. 16.

Rastrapati, in 1938. *Inter alia*, Jinnah had not only most dramatically converted the desolate Muslim ‘no man’s land’ in 1936²⁶ into the third side of the Indian political triangle; he had also adroitly controverted Nehru’s (1889-1964) ‘two-forces’ dictum, which he had so haughtily flaunted during 1936-37 when Congress stood unchallenged on the Indian political landscape. Thus, Jinnah had further manoeuvred successfully to get Nehru’s uni-national and uni-cultured India framework buried under a new political reality, of which he alone was the architect, projecting a bi-national and bi-cultured India.²⁷ The Congress directly and the Viceroy impliedly had questioned the League’s representative status at Simla (1945), but after the elections none could challenge the League’s status. On 13 April 1940 Gandhi had challenged the Muslim claim to separate nationhood, arguing

I refuse... to believe that the eight crore Muslims will say that they have nothing in common with their Hindu and other brethren. *Their mind can only be known by a referendum made to them duly on that clear issue...* It is purely a matter of self-determination. I know of no other conclusive method of ascertaining the mind of the eight crores of Muslims. (*italics ours*).²⁸

The (1945-46) elections represented the sort of referendum suggested by Gandhi to ascertain ‘the declared and established will’ of Muslims on the nationhood and separation issues. Thus, in October 1946 the formula jointly authored by Gandhi and the Nawab of Bhopal (1894-1958) on the nomination of Muslims in the Interim Government acknowledged that ‘The Congress does not challenge and accepts that the Muslim League now is the authoritative of an overwhelming majority of the Muslim of India’.²⁹

The discussion above clearly underlines the monumental fact that once that ‘the declared and established will’ of Muslims was given

²⁶ Jinnah’s picturesque description of Muslim India in 1936: ‘The Muslim community, not only in the Punjab but in India as a whole, is at present a No-Man’s Land. Any body who chooses can squat on it and say I am your owner.’ Khurshid Ahmad Khan Yusufi (ed), *Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam* (Lahore: Bazm-e-Iqbal, 1996), p. 201.

²⁷ For details, see Sharif al Mujahid, ‘Pakistan Resolution and Indian National Congress’ in K. F. Yusuf *et al*, *Pakistan Resolution Revisited* (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1990), pp. 315-20.

²⁸ *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1969-84), 71: 412-13.

²⁹ Bhopal-Gandhi formula for Muslim representation in the Interim Government, 4 October 1946, in *ibid.*, 85: 416.

in Pakistan's favour, its emergence, in some form or another, could not be long resisted, nor delayed. And it came within eighteen months.

Of course, Zaidi, as usual, has done an excellent job in editing these volumes. More so, because it is characterized by greater sophistication than the earlier ones in terms of including or excluding what he has. More refreshing, he has also included documents from the SHC and the American archives. Above all, he has finally moved away from the long abandoned 19th century Rankean tradition of, what E.H. Carr calls, 'a fetishism of facts', complemented 'and justified by a fetishism of documents'.³⁰ Remember, Zaidi had plausibly argued in his Foreword to the first volume: '.... since it is the whole document which forms the piece of evidence for the scholar to interpret – to excerpt it is to impose on others the value judgements of the editor – we should publish these papers in their entirety. The evidence which a document conveys may be "trivial, revolutionary, scandalous, reasonable, pious, comic or dull", but the evidence has to be produced and preserved completely' (xix). Thus, as suggested in my earlier review of the *JP*, Vol. I,³¹ documents such as seeking financial help or employment, soliciting Jinnah's patronage for a certain brand of tea or some business enterprise, or detailing other such trivial matters have been judiciously and thoughtfully omitted. And, again, as suggested by me, Zaidi has also been extremely circumspect and choosy in the inclusion of easily available published material as Appendices, as against, especially, the first volume. This means that, translated in terms of a viable time frame, we wouldn't have to wait for another thirty years for the series to be completed. Remember, the project was started some time in 1992. At another level, the abandonment of the Rankean approach has brought the publication and printing costs down, making the present volumes more affordable, price-wise.

As was the case with the earlier volumes, the present ones are also cast in the HMSO's 'Transfer of Power' format. They are also the best published series in Pakistan, in terms of paper, printing, presentation, planning, and binding, and the price is commendably reasonable in terms of even prevailing Pakistani prices. This should help a wider distribution. However, consistency in style needs to be looked into, a bit. Sometimes the date precedes, and sometimes follows, the month.

The earlier volumes had sought to meet one of the cardinal institutional structural requirements of such projects and compilations:

³⁰ E.H. Carr, *What is History*, *op. cit.*, p.

³¹ *Dawn*, 20 March 1996.

they had an Editorial Board – for what it was worth. In the present volumes, however, this Board doesn't get mentioned. Nor a word about its abandonment in the Foreword. Since the *JP* would be taken as a 'model' for future projects of this sort, it's absolutely incumbent, both in the interest, and for the future direction, of Pakistani historiography, that the universally accepted institutional format and structure be routinely conformed with.

Finally, in terms of institution building, whose dire need is recognized on all hands, the project could well serve as a nursery for training young researchers in the techniques and modalities of compiling and editing documents. Of course, given his age and the state of his health, what Zaidi has done is most commendable. However, if he gets some of the professionally trained, retired academia in Islamabad actively associated with the project, on a full/part time basis, he will not only be lessening the huge burden he so stoically shoulders, but also ensure to get the series completed within a reasonable time frame, if not during the lives of the generation that had seen Pakistan emerge on the subcontinental map in 1947. More important: such academically equipped staff is bound to be of valuable assistance to the editor, the only historian in the project. For one thing, their expertise and timely counsel would help avoid the sort of 'bald reportage', alluded to above, and spell out the broad parameters of the core significance of an event in the light of previous and subsequent developments, which would necessarily be an integral part of their antecedent knowledge. Even otherwise, Zaidi should, by all means, be considered a national asset, and he should, at all costs, be severely spared shouldering the marginal tasks involving mere nuts and bolts, now that the general format and modalities of editing the *Jinnah Papers* have been firmly laid.