

The State, Ideology and the Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan

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Abstract

Being a multi-ethnic state, Pakistan has been facing ethnic and ideological crisis since independence. The state outranked the creation of nation, rather than the nation preceding the creation of state. Islam was used as a binding force, but after the creation of Bangladesh, Islamic solidarity became questionable. Ethnic nationalism emerged from the ashes of East Pakistan crisis. After 1971 the state, created on the basis of a separate Muslim identity soon dissipated into various ethnic movements challenging the centre for an equitable and just share of power and resources. Instead of addressing issues of equity and fair play, the military-bureaucratic establishment over-centralized the state structure, resulting in the political polarization of Pakistani society. While trying to understand the ethnic politics of Pakistan from historical and comparative perspectives, this paper attempts to analyze the role of Pakistani state in dealing with ethnic minorities and religious forces.

Introduction

In this paper historical and comparative approaches have been applied. Historically state specific policies are analyzed right from the time of independence. Comparative approach, applied in this paper, does not indicate a comparison with other countries but the capability and capacity of the Pakistani state to deal with various ethnic minorities, particularly at a time when the particular ethnic movement decided to confront with the centre. In this reference, Bengali movement in former East Pakistan (1966-70), Baloch movement for autonomy (1972-76 and 2002-present), the demand for autonomy by Sindhis (1982-88) and finally the Muhajir movement in urban Sindh (1991-98) are particularly important.

To understand the basis of ethnic politics in Pakistan and to analyze the role of state to deal with these various ethnic minorities, an attempt has been made in this paper to see the basis of religious

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extremism in contemporary Pakistan and to study the role of the state in its historical context.

Theoretical framework

There has been much debate among the scholars dealing with the issue of ethnicity as to whether it should be examined as a primordialist or an instrumentalist phenomenon. The supporters of the primordial approach view ethnic adherence as one of the 'givens' of human existence, and ethnicity as a natural impulsive phenomenon. Moreover, they can be subdivided into socio-biologists, such as Pierre Van de Berghe, who believe that it has a biological and genetic basis and those, like Clifford Geertz, who analyzes it as a more sociological phenomenon. On the other hand, instrumentalists reject this natural view of ethnicity; they believe that it is rooted firmly in behavior. Eller and Coughlan, for example, write: 'claims to ethnic membership arise, and change according to situational variable circumstances and interests'.¹ In other words, ethnicity is a tool constructed to gain material, political or other advantage.²

However, there are sets of scholars who are of the opinion that the essential condition for shared ethnicity is belief in common descent. Anthony Smith is one of them who sees the above mentioned definitions as partially correct. Perhaps 'ethnicity is best understood in terms of a rational and non-rational continuum rather than as an either/or dichotomy'.³ Ethnic groups experience two kinds of oppositions: First, the most common is economic/political discrimination. Second, pressure to assimilate with other ethnic groups in the society. The most common source of such pressure is the state. In their efforts to become nation states, many states promote an official nationalism (national, culture, language, history etc). The objective behind such an exercise is to mould a homogenized population with a greater sense of unity and loyalty to the state.⁴

The state power and culture

The state is the main focal point in contemporary International Relations. The duty of the state is to provide security (internal and external),

¹ Ifaat Malik, *Kashmir Ethnic Conflict International Dispute* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.1.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.134.

defense, economic development etc. States are the most important determinants of socio-political change in modern times.⁵ Moreover, state's capacity and autonomy are very much a function of the extent of its domination over society.⁶

The position of the state in a multi-ethnic society is very significant. Three broad theories can be identified in the context of state: First, a neutral arena of interest group competition (viewed neither as dominated by the groups that contest in its arena, nor as an autonomous force in relation to them). Second, instrument of group domination. Third, relatively autonomous entity with interests and strategies of its own (e.g. local control administratively convinces the gathering of popular support).⁷ Contemporary modern states generally cohere to the second and third theories. The first which is supposed to be neutral is very difficult to implement in practice. The position of the state vis-à-vis various ethnic groups in a pluralistic society, will obviously affect its treatment of those groups. The state dominated by one particular group is likely to pursue policies favorable to that group, with frequent consequence of arousing resentment in less favored groups.⁸

The state can also influence ethnic consciousness if it acts as a population classifier. This unique role of the state was seen most clearly in colonial times. Colonial masters classified and divided population into specific ethnic groupings. In modern societies, this role tends to be undertaken by states in which there are ethnic quotas in universities and government jobs. Thus, by making ethnic background a criterion for the allocation of such places, the state promotes ethnic identification. Finally, state legitimacy can be a factor in including ethnic consciousness. Legitimacy refers to democracy and to the very boundaries and existence of the state itself. Is the state acknowledged and accepted by its population? This question is particularly relevant for new multi-ethnic states in which the citizens have no previous history of forming a political unit. If they accept the sovereignty of the state in which they find themselves, then it has a chance of moving forward and establishing itself, and instilling in people a sense of being citizens of the state. But, if the sovereignty of the state itself is not acknowledged by

⁵ Eric Nordlinger, 'Taking the state seriously', in Samuel P. Huntington and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Understanding Political Development* (New York: New York Press, 1987), pp.353-90.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.7-34.

⁷ Paul Brass, 'Ethnic groups and the state,' in Brass (ed.) *Ethnic Groups and the State* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp.3-10.

⁸ Iffat Malik, *op.cit.*

(even some of) its citizens then there are grave implications for the survival of such a state, or at a minimum, for peace.⁹

The role of culture is also very important in multi-ethnic societies. It is explained as an element of exercise of authority by the state¹⁰ and a 'resource' to be used by political entrepreneurs.¹¹ In this reference, cultural identity is a tool that can be used by political entrepreneurs in competitions for power and resources¹² or by states in establishing hegemony over society. Thus, power is exercised through culture. Use of culture in hegemonizing state and society is thus an ideological tool to grab physical control of state and society. Moreover, states need to cultivate a national identity that is distinct from others. National identity is not given, nor is it entirely an invention, it is a social construct. The raw materials that construct national identity, among other things, include cultural heritage and shared experiences. Third world countries have been described as state-nations rather than as nation-states. A state-nation inherits a variegated population comprising disparate cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious and other such societal entities which have been united in their struggle against the colonial power, but may not share, as yet, a sense of belonging as citizens of a modern state. The state, therefore, has to invest considerable resources to transform the population into a nation because it cannot survive in the long run unless a majority of its citizens identifies with the state emotionally as well as rationally. When the state achieves its goal, nation becomes an integrated, coherent, homogenous body of individuals sharing a deep sense of belonging as members of polity. In other words, the state is firmly consolidated and enjoys wide support in the society.¹³

In the context of Pakistan, the state failed to integrate society. Instead of making effort to transform state-nation to nation-state and take drastic measures in this regard, the state started the process of internal colonization. As a result, the Bengalis separated from Pakistan. In the new Pakistan, its three small provinces — Sindh, NWFP (now Khyber

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.23.

¹⁰ Mustafa Kamal Pasha, 'Islamization, civil society, and the politics of transition in Pakistan', Douglas Allen (ed.), *Religion and Political Conflict in South Asia: India Pakistan and Sri Lanka* (New York: West Port, 1992), p.116.

¹¹ David Latin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986), p.11.

¹² Paul Brass, *op.cit.*

¹³ Ishtiaq Ahmed, 'Building a national identity', *The Daily Times* (Lahore), 11 April, 2006.

Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan — developed strong reservations against the centre with full-fledged insurgency in Balochistan and in some parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, instead of pursuing the policy of conciliation, state used force against the insurgents. Conceptually, the state used culture and ideology and linked it with Islam in order to strengthen its control over society, but state's failure in this connection has now become self-evident.

Islamization in post-colonial state of Pakistan

Colonialism changed the post-colonial state with attitudes and ambitions that have redoubled its desire for hegemony and yet made its attainment more elusive.¹⁴ The colonial ideology suggested that the colonial state had to be separated from the people, based on a totally different and superior set of values and a commitment to change the society over which it ruled in its own image.¹⁵ The colonial policy followed indirect rule through chiefs and landlords which further reinforced and bifurcated state-society relations. The colonial state thus discouraged national identity and encouraged sub-national identity consciousness by strengthening religious, ethnic and tribal affiliations through its multilayered legal system, communalist representation and variegated patterns of extraction and disbursement of resources.¹⁶ Furthermore, state wanted to manage society and the economy through statism, which limited market forces and influence on non-state actors. In other words, state wanted to hegemonize economic growth. In Pakistan, the state has been pursuing Islamic ideology which provides complete hegemony and hence serves the goal of economic growth.¹⁷ The mark of colonialism is clearly evident and function of Islamization process is quite clear.¹⁸

The Pakistani state systematically introduced Islamic system in the country in the 1970's and 1980's — at a time of profound crisis before the ruling establishment. Popular Islamist movement of 1977, *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (Order of the Prophet), was complemented with the

¹⁴ Sayyed Vali Raza Nasr, *Islamic Leviathan Islam and the Making of State Power* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.11.

¹⁵ Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (New York: Cambridge University, 1994), pp.43-76.

¹⁶ Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self Assertion of Asian and African People* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1960), p.12.

¹⁷ Sayyed Vali Raza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.17.

¹⁸ Mumtaz Ahmed, 'Islamization and the structural crisis of the state in Pakistan', *Issues in Islamic Thought*, Vol. 12, 1993, pp.304-10, quoted Sayyed Vali Raza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.11.

rising ethnic tensions in the country which the state believed could be contained through greater reliance on Islam.¹⁹ The state, therefore, made a strategic choice: to champion the cause of Islam in order to shore up its authority and legitimacy, outmaneuver its opposition and gain stability. The state chose to manage Islamization rather than rely on Islamist forces to spearhead it. The state proved willing to give up secular ideology by Islamizing the public sphere, it brought Islam into the public arena and established a massive control over its flow in society and politics. Islamization allowed state to crush political opposition especially the ethnic forces and expand state power and capacity.²⁰

Historically, Pakistan at the time of its birth was weak nation. The weak state, confronted a huge task of state building; a fractured society with strong social institution and power brokers lacked ideological tools that were available to other Muslim states in the form of nationalism. Secular nationalism was so weak in Pakistan that it made Pakistan vulnerable to the Islamist challenge. The state was interested in only using Islam as a basis for its ideology and the military as a source of power for the state. To help reinvent the post-colonial state and its relations with the society, the state replaced colonial ideology with Islamic ideology.

The issue of ethnicity in historical context: 1947-69

Since independence, the state of Pakistan was ruled by bureaucratic elite which inherited the colonial state and ruled over society through the same channels of power as the British. Military and bureaucracy dominated Pakistan's politics. Before partition, the Punjabis and the Pathans were prominent in the Indian military. After getting independence half of that military's officers and soldiers came to Pakistan, ensuring a say for the military in the new state's politics.²¹ The military and bureaucracy were the colonial institutions, their attitudes towards politics, social control and government were those of the colonial era. The British policy in undivided India was focused on law and order rather than participation. The minds of the military and bureaucracy, therefore, inherited this attitude of the colonial masters.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.24.

²⁰ Sayyed Vali Raza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.17.

²¹ Brian Clougry, *A History of the Pakistan Army* (Karachi: Oxford University Press 1999), p.22.

Thus, the state became a military-bureaucracy condominium in which the political class was the junior partner.²² In addition, tribal leaders and landlords constituted a powerful social organization. The landed elite of Punjab, Bengal and Sindh supported Pakistan movement and, in doing so, guaranteed their influence on the future state. Roots of the Pakistani state in the provinces, which it had inherited, were feeble. The provinces had little in common except for the only fact that the majority of the population was Muslim. Their economies were not linked and were, instead, tied to the central grid of Indian economy from which they were now cut off. Moreover, these provinces were ethnically different from each other in terms of language, culture and history.

Right from the very beginning, East Pakistan demanded greater representation and equal distribution of resources from the centre. The state rejected these demands which ultimately alienated Bengali population from the state. The state, which found it difficult to resolve the issue of language, fundamental socio-economic problems, land reforms, ethnic, linguistic and class conflicts, quickly surrendered to the temptation of mobilizing symbolisms in the services of state formation. This attitude of the state opened the doors for Islamic political parties to influence national politics. Initially, the secular state resisted this trend, but later on compromised with the original concept of Pakistan as a thoroughly secular state. The government adopted the Objectives of Resolution demanded by the Islamic forces as a statement of intent with regard to the future constitution.²³

Massive problems faced by the new state — refugees, economic turmoil and war with India etc. — led to the concentration of power in the hands of bureaucratic and military elite.²⁴ In this scenario, in order to get social control, state made political alliance with landed elite and tribal leaders and, on the ideological front, it turned to Islam to control socio-economic and political power. The alliance between military and bureaucracy and the political elite helped to establish the state. The state leaders advocated strong central government, but political elite, through

²² Hamza Alavi, 'Ethnicity, Muslim Society and the Pakistan Ideology', in Anita Weiss (ed.), *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp.21-47.

²³ Afzal Iqbal, *Islamization in Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1986), pp.42-47.

²⁴ Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan Political Economy of Defense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.57.

whom they ruled favored a weak centre.²⁵ The conflict between these two forces had deeply influenced Pakistani politics, which later on affected democracy and created deep rooted ethnic divisions.

The ruling establishment found it very difficult to effectively contend with tensions between Punjabi and Muhajir elite and Bengali and Sindhi nationalists in the provinces. The problem that confronted the political centre immediately after the partition was to keep East Pakistan at bay in order to avoid its domination and to produce an ideology capable of keeping the country together under the control of West Pakistan elite, which comprised Punjabis and Muhajirs for the most part. The East Pakistan was physically apart from West Pakistan; India was in between the two flanks. East Pakistan had more population than West Pakistan. At the time of the first census in Pakistan, in 1951, there were 41.9 million people in East Pakistan and 33.7 million in West Pakistan.²⁶

The Objective Resolution of 1949 had formally introduced Islamic concerns to constitutional debates and committed Pakistan to greater Islamization. As a result, by the end of the first decade of Pakistan's existence, Islamic forces were fully included in political process and had moved to appropriate the national political discourse from the state.²⁷ However, the state never formalized a workable arrangement with Islamic forces, frictions and confrontations started between the two in the political discourse. The state did not formulate any clear policy regarding Islam until 1958, when the military under General Ayub Khan's command took over power.

Coup of 1958: When Ayub Khan took over power his regime comprised secular elements. He justified the coup as an effort to save the state from an Islamic take over.²⁸ He attempted to strengthen state institutions and to expand their control over society, economy and politics. Once freed of its shackles, the state would be able to do away with the encumbrances of ethnic conflict and Islamic activism, and to embark on development.²⁹ While trying to extricate ethnic conflict and religion from Pakistani politics, Ayub chose to crush the first and managed the second. His era saw the emergence of linkage between Islam and state power and

²⁵ Tahir Amin, *Ethno-National Movements in Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988), p.72.

²⁶ Sayyed Vali Raza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.59.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.60.

²⁸ *Ibid.* pp.147-48.

²⁹ Herbert Feldman, *Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), p.147.

alienation of ethnic forces from the centre. However, during 1958-62, he tried to use Islam for socio-economic development by portraying Islam as a progressive force and to use it to justify development. In other words, the state accepted Islam, but only if it would control its interpretation, institutions and politics. Later on, Islamic forces challenged the interpretation of state's Islam which was afterwards rejected by the masses.

During the 1960's host of problems emerged which challenged Ayub's regime. These included unequal distribution of wealth, middle class and poor facing economic exigency; corruption; defeat in the 1965 war with India; the challenge of the left and Islamist forces; development of the pro-democracy movements for ending authoritarian rule, and ethnic forces demand for autonomy especially in East Pakistan. Under these pressures centre collapsed; Ayub Khan resigned in 1969, delivering power to General Yahya Khan — another military general.

Ethnic conflict and class conflict (1969-77)

The decade of authoritarianism gave rise to ethnic and class conflict. Along with the rise of Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan, Sindhi nationalism and class conflict emerged in West Pakistan. Yahya Khan, who took power from Ayub Khan, accepted these challenges and took refuge in Islam. He believed that Islam was the only ideology which could not only release the pressure, but also silence the opposition and keep Pakistan under one fold. But Islamic solidarity failed to reduce the intensity of Bengali nationalism.

On the other hand, uneven economic development during Ayub's era had sharpened class conflict in Pakistani society. Crony capitalism emerged in the economic sector and the major chunk of market was controlled by famous twenty two families which created a wide gap between haves and have nots. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tried to address these sentiments of economic deprivation of the poor sections of the society. He made his party's election manifesto on these revolutionary lines in which he coined the term of Islamic socialism which guaranteed equal rights to the down trodden and neglected sections of the society. In this background, elections were held in 1970. Awami League which emerged as the single largest party in East Pakistan demanded broad autonomy. In West Pakistan, Pakistan People's Party won 81 out of 138 seats. After the elections, Z.A Bhutto and military refused to allow Awami League to form the government and

deliver power to East Pakistan.³⁰ In reaction, Awami League actively protested, the military then used brute force which resulted in the loss of East Pakistan.

After the military debacle of East Pakistan, Yahya Khan handed over power to Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP). Bhutto promised to implement fundamental changes in the country. He also promised to disenfranchise the structure of power that Pakistan had inherited from the colonial era, i.e. to distribute wealth from the dominant ethnic groups and provinces to the smaller ones, and equal distribution of power between powerful groups and masses. Under Islamic socialism he combined socialist rhetoric with Islam. After the loss of East Pakistan it was feared that the country that could further disintegrate along ethnic lines, the state to take refuge, therefore, took under the shadow of Islamic solidarity. Throughout the 70's Pakistan became palpably more Islamic conscious. The 1973 constitution is its clear manifestation. Bhutto, moreover, developed close ties with Middle Eastern rulers, hosted the second Islamic summit in the hope that these actions would give his regime some Islamic legitimacy. On the domestic front, the government sponsored International *Serah* (life of the Prophet) conference in 1976, made Arabic language compulsory in primary education, switched over national holiday from Sunday to Friday, established the Ministry of Religious Affairs and declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims. He even dubbed Pakistan's nuclear weapon as 'the Islamic bomb'.³¹ In other words, Bhutto not only used Islam as a political tool, but popularized it at social, political, cultural and economics levels. Islamic forces, however, never accepted Bhutto as an Islamic ruler. They built Islamic opposition against him and confronted him throughout his era and by the end of his rule, these forces were in a position to bargain with the state in a strong manner.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, Bhutto had to face tough resistance. He used strong tactics to dismiss the two non-People's Party provincial governments. Against his action, turmoil started in Balochistan. The Baloch resisted and a guerilla war broke out, which pitched the Baloch tribes against the Pakistan Army. The army action in Balochistan also sharpened the ethnic feelings among Balochs. The opposition blamed Bhutto in bringing back military into politics. Thus, Bhutto's era failed to reverse the erosion of the state authority that had followed the fall of Ayub Khan and the loss of East Pakistan. His socio-

³⁰ Sayyed Vali Raza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.75.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.80.

economic programme faced a strong opposition. He had isolated himself from the democratic forces and at the end no body was there to bail him out when Zia-ul-Haq, the then Chief of Army Staff, took over power through a military coup in order to 'save' Pakistan from the power struggle between Islamic forces and the state.³²

Pakistan under so-called Islamization (1977-88)

General Zia- ul- Haq started a broad-based Islamization policy that had a profound impact on Pakistan's society and politics. He tilted Pakistan's politics towards right in order to eliminate People's Party from the political scene of Pakistan. Additionally, ethnic challenge confronted the state which again reinforced the tendency to rely on Islam to organize national politics. The Bhutto era had clearly aggravated ethnic tensions in Pakistan. The domination of ethnic politics had marginalized the muhajirs and the Punjabis who were cautious of rising ethnic tensions and wanted to see national politics away from ethnic concerns. The *Nizam-e-Mustafa* movement introduced by Zia mobilized a strong segment of urban population which evaporated ethnic concerns for some time from the political debate. The regime, however, remained worried about ethnic undercurrents in Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan.³³ While down playing Punjabi domination of the state, Islam allowed the military to limit any resistance and continue its control.³⁴

Zia also brought ideological changes in the state's institutions. For example, he opened military's institution to Islam.³⁵ He encouraged soldiers to pray and fast and also distributed religious literature. On regional front, turmoil in Afghanistan transformed the political map of the region. Zia took full advantage of this development by supporting *mujahideen* who were fighting against the Soviet troops and thus gained international support. He funded Wahabi *madrasas* (religious schools) which later on not only provided social and political base to his regime, but also became the breeding ground for the religious zealots which has

³² *Ibid.*, p.100.

³³ General Khalid Mahmood Arif, *Working with Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-88* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.72-81.

³⁴ Sayyed Vali Raza Nasr, 'Pakistan Islamic State, Ethnic Polity', Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, 16:2 (Summer1992), pp.81-90.

³⁵ Mir Zohair Hussain, 'Islam in Pakistan under Bhutto and Zia ul Haq', in Hussain Mutalib and Taj-ul- Islam Hashmi (eds) *Islam, Muslims, and the Modern State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p.59.

now fractured the very fabric of Pakistani society.³⁶ Though these efforts played an important role for his political survival, pockets of ethnic tensions continued to impact Pakistani politics. The Sindhis, showed resistance in the form of Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). As a result, Pakistan's politics became polarized between pro-Zia forces (military, Islamist and the private sector), and the PPP allies (landed elite and religion minorities).³⁷

Pakistan: democratic era of the 1990s

Pakistan in the 90's faced tremendous problems. Ethnic tensions in the form of civil war in Karachi, collapsed law and order situation, and sectarian violence undermined the authority of the state and proper functioning of the democratic governments. During this decade, Benazir Bhutto of PPP and Nawaz Sharif of Muslim League formed governments. Both of them were unable to control the rising tensions on political and economic fronts. Nawaz Sharif used the same tactics like his predecessor, Zia-ul-Haq, to augment power. He wanted to concentrate power under prime minister's control. He forced the resignation of president, dismissed chief of the army staff and was about to do the same again when General Pervez Musharraf ousted him from power in a coup in 1999.

The turmoil of 9/11 took place, when Musharraf was the ruler of Pakistan. This external shock changed and radicalized Pakistanis politics. Under international pressure Pakistani state cut off its links with the religious and sectarian groups and fought the war against terrorism with the help of international community.³⁸ However, international community showed strong reservations. It considers that a powerful segment of the state institutions still support these religio-sectarian groups. The fact is that there exists a historic relationship between the state and these forces. Pakistan turned to Islam at a time of profound crisis before the ruling establishment.³⁹ It chose to manage Islamization rather than rely on Islamist forces to spearhead it. Willing to give up

³⁶ Mutahir Ahmed, 'Linkage between terrorism and the CBMS in South Asia', in Moonis Ahmar (ed), *Paradigms of Conflict Resolution in South Asia* (Dhaka: University Press, 2003), pp.173-84.

³⁷ Sayyed Vali Raza Nasr, *op.cit.*, p.150.

³⁸ Mutahir Ahmed, 'Linkage between Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges for the Muslim World', in Moonis Ahmar (ed.), *The World After September 11: Challenges and Opportunities* (Karachi: University of Karachi, 2003), pp.88-103.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.24.

secular ideology by Islamizing the public sphere, the state brought Islam into the public arena and established massive control over its flow in society and politics. And now, the state finds it difficult to genuinely cut off its relations with these very forces.

Conclusion

The state, at present appears to be facing three challenges: First, international pressure to fight against terrorism and to crush religious extremist forces which in the past were supported by the state; second, the rising power of the religious and sectarian forces, which was directly or indirectly supported by the state, and finally, the ethnic issue which have again turned violent. The ethnic insurgency in Balochistan and religio-ethnic violent movement in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (popularly known as local Taliban) are clear cut examples in this respect. The only viable option to deal with these challenges is to have a genuine functional democracy with the agenda of de-centralization of powers and full autonomy to the provinces in the country with the help of genuine democratic forces who have the capability and capacity to face these challenges with the support of the people. However, the structure of post-colonial state in Pakistan has never allowed this.